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Sixtieth Anniversary Issue

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Fall 1982 *$4.75*

THE MIDDLE EAST: A TURNING POINT?
Begin's Rhetoric and Sharon's Tactics – *Amos Perlmutter*
Lebanon: A New Republic? – *Ghassan Tuéni*
An Israeli-Palestinian Peace – *Harold H. Saunders*

The Care and Repair of Public Myth – *William H. McNeill*
Science and the Villager – *Richard Critchfield*
Toward an Overall Western Strategy – *Hans-Dietrich Genscher*
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

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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EDITOR'S NOTE

For this 60th Anniversary Issue, we have not sought to match the extraordinary array of talent marshalled by Hamilton Fish Armstrong ten years ago. A Diamond Jubilee is modestly less significant for *Foreign Affairs* and its readers than it was for Queen Victoria and the British nation.

Yet any anniversary does suggest looking more deeply at what drives individuals and nations. Our two lead articles come at this subject from what could hardly be, on their face, more divergent backgrounds of study and experience. Yet their thoughts come together on significant points, and both Professor McNeill and Mr. Critchfield seem to us to be saying things that are fundamental and perhaps seminal—and with rare qualities of style.

But there are other reasons for the unusual length of the issue. West German Foreign Minister Genscher's presentation of the basic views of his government seemed to us exceptionally clear and full, and there are important additions to our recent spate of articles on U.S. military strategy, especially in Europe.

It is partly because of length that we have printed Mr. Oksenberg's China article and Mr. Freedman's review of the Falklands War in smaller type. Both are predominantly historical, but their conclusions have direct and immediate policy and action relevance. We apologize to those few readers who in the past have been bothered by our use of this smaller type, but we trust that none will be misled by the placement of the articles—which, as we have noted before, is always of secondary significance as an indicator of importance.

Finally, we have made an extra effort to offer the best possible future projections from the war in Lebanon. Readers will find ample food for thought and disagreement in the contrasting views of Messrs. Perlmutter, Tuéni and Saunders. In view of the fast-moving developments in that area, it may be useful to note that this issue was put to press on August 26.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to inform American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, signed or unsigned, which appears in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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William H. McNeill

THE CARE AND REPAIR OF PUBLIC MYTH

Myth lies at the basis of human society. That is because myths are general statements about the world and its parts, and in particular about nations and other human in-groups, that are believed to be true and then acted on whenever circumstances suggest or require common response. This is mankind's substitute for instinct. It is the unique and characteristic human way of acting together. A people without a full quiver of relevant agreed-upon statements, accepted in advance through education or less formalized acculturation, soon finds itself in deep trouble, for, in the absence of believable myths, coherent public action becomes very difficult to improvise or sustain.

Myths, moreover, are based on faith more than on fact. Their truth is usually proven only by the action they provoke. In 1940, for example, when Hitler had defeated France, the British public continued to support war against Germany partly because they "knew" from schoolbook history that in European wars their country lost all the early battles and always won the last. This faith, together with a strong sense of the general righteousness of their cause, and fear of what defeat would bring, made it possible for them to persist in waging war until myth became fact once more in 1945.

Clearly, without British actions in 1940, World War II would have followed a far different course. Russian and American resources might never have coalesced with Britain's to create the victorious Grand Alliance of 1945. Germany, in short, might have won. Yet no merely rational calculation of relative strengths and military capabilities in June 1940 would have supported the proposition that Great Britain could expect to defeat Hitler. Action, irrational in the short run, proved rational in the longer run. Myth is what bridged the gap, remaking the reality of June 1940 into the reality of May 1945.

On the other hand, Hitler and his followers, too, were guided

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by their own set of myths. But their belief in Germany's racial superiority, no matter how firmly embraced and enthusiastically acted upon, brought only disaster. So belief by itself is not enough. Complex constraints operate in human affairs, only partially understood even by the wisest. Consequently, human hopes are never fully realized, and unforeseen side effects continually throw up new problems that redirect action even in the most routinized situations. It is in directing and redirecting action that myth comes into play. Conversely, when actions undertaken in accordance with accepted ideas fail to achieve anything like the expected result, it is time to reconsider the guiding myth, amending or rejecting it as the case may be. As a result of this process, the British national myth survived World War II with little amendment, whereas Germany's suffered a wrenching discontinuity.

Liberalism, Marxism, and the various technocratic ideals of social management that have proliferated so remarkably since World War II all constitute living myth systems, subject to amendment or rejection in the light of results, just as Nazism was. But the feedback between myth and action proceeds smoothly and effectively only when destruction and reconstruction of agreed-upon general statements about the world remain more or less in balance. Discrediting old myths without finding new ones to replace them erodes the basis for common action that once bound those who believed into a public body, capable of acting together.

How can a viable balance between myth making and myth breaking be assured? How can a people know what to believe and how to act? How indeed?

II

The classical liberal recipe for the care and repair of public myth was to rely on a free market in ideas. The United States is committed to this principle by law and to quite extraordinary degree also in practice. By allowing dissenters of any and every stripe a chance to express their views, liberals from the seventeenth century onwards hoped and believed that a kind of natural selection among myths would prevail. When, as is commonly the case, inadequate evidence obstructs fully rational choice, the upshot of action based on tentative or provisional belief would still suffice to permit the people to choose—eventually—what to believe and how to act.

The efficiency of such a free market obviously depends on how long it may take for the process of testing and confirmation—or

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rejection—to work itself out. In rapidly changing conditions, when more and more dimensions of social life are in motion and become subject to deliberate manipulation, there may not be enough time to test new formulations before they must again be altered to match newer and ever-changing circumstances. Worn-out old myths may then continue to receive lip service, but the spontaneity and force attainable when people truly believe and hope and act in unison will surely seep away.

In some fields, the free market in ideas works very well. This is conspicuously the case in natural science, where myth, tested by action and revised in accordance with results, continues to achieve spectacular success. It may seem whimsical to equate scientific theories with myth, but if one accepts the definition of myth offered at the beginning of this article, surely the shoe fits. Scientific theories *are* statements about the world, believed to be true, and many of them also provide a basis for action, as our extraordinary technology attests. Moreover, no scientist any longer thinks that any actual theory fits reality so closely that revision and amendment will never be needed. No formula, whether mathematical or verbal, is immune from correction. Thus Newton supplanted Aristotle and Descartes, and was in turn corrected by Einstein, whose reign may soon be coming to a close if contemporary physicists succeed in formulating some new synthesis among the strong and weak forces their experiments have discovered.

Continual and fertile interplay between myth making and myth breaking in natural science stands in striking contrast with human affairs, where successful myth making is in short supply. This is not simply because effective social myths must go beyond observed facts. That is just as true in physics and the other natural sciences, where theory regularly runs beyond observation, guides perception and, frequently, directs experiments as well. For it is only where they have a theory to test that scientists can know how to filter out the various background noises that obscure experimental results when such guidance is lacking. Thus fact and theory interact in natural science in almost as strong a way as in human society.

Yet the natural and human worlds are not the same. Their great difference arises from the sensitivity of human behavior to symbolic stimuli. Physicists, after all, need not concern themselves with how particles of matter or energy will react to general statements they make about the world: whereas anyone describing human behavior knows that if what is said seems to be true, it

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will make a difference in how human beings who believe it will act. Such reflexivity therefore makes social myths different. They are more powerful to create and to destroy what they purport to describe than the formulations of the physicists, whose myths affect only the observation of behavior, not the behavior itself.

In human society, therefore, belief matters most. Evidence supporting belief is largely generated by actions undertaken in accordance with the belief. This is a principle long familiar to students of religion. In Christian terms, faith comes first, works follow. The primacy of faith is equally real for the various civil religions that since the eighteenth century have come to provide the practical basis for nearly all of the world's governments. Democratic elections legitimate governments when enough people believe that periodic elections are the right and proper way to choose who shall rule. For the same reason, divine-right monarchy, caliphal leadership and submission to the Son of Heaven were once effective too. But when assent becomes halfhearted or is actively withheld from such myths, obedience becomes irregular, the predictablility of human action diminishes, and the effectiveness of public response to changing conditions begins to erode.

This, it seems to me, is our situation today around the globe. Democratic myths confront the reality of organized private interest groups operating in the interstices of empire building among rival branches of vast and ever-growing governmental bureaucracies. This makes the electoral process increasingly irrelevant to encounters between officials and citizens, even in countries like our own in which elections are not affected by armed intimidation at the polls or limited to candidates approved by a single party.

The audio-visual mass media, by opening a path into private homes where aspiring candidates may sell themselves to the voting public, do even more to insulate the electoral process from administrative realities. In the United States a candidate who secures access to TV has already won half the battle; subliminal empathy does the rest, slightly affected by the plausibility of promises to satisfy everyone, dismantle the bureaucracy, fight crime and safeguard peace. In other countries political salesmanship takes less extravagant forms. There, party organizations or governmental officials set more severe limits on access to mass media, and on programmatic statements attacking constituted authorities. In poorer lands, where TV screens have not yet spread into private homes, political campaigns are still likely to focus in the old-fashioned way on public meetings and private deals with locally based leaders of whatever sort—party functionaries, tribal chief-

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tains, employers, landowners or whoever else matters in getting things done. But everywhere TV acts to undermine the electoral process, tending to reduce it to a popularity contest among tinsel personalities.

Communist countries have restricted the political impact of mass media by limiting what can be said in public to a narrow party line. But that policy runs into difficulties of its own. Apart from a widespread loss of credibility, the heavy weight of the police regimes that enforce restriction on public debate blatantly contradicts the anarchic brotherhood promised by Marx's vision of post-revolutionary communism. Consequently, as revolutions recede in time, the gap between reality and expectation becomes more difficult to explain away.

III

Political institutions are therefore not working well on either side of the Iron Curtain. Inherited political faiths are in danger of losing their credibility. The incipient stage of such a change is difficult to recognize or measure accurately; yet withdrawal of belief may suddenly come to matter more than anything else in foreign and domestic affairs. Revolutionary situations, like that which recently boiled up in Iran, register the collapse of old belief; but a successful revolution, like every other collective action, must invent or revive its own myths. Stability, predictability, control are otherwise impossible. The body politic cannot endure without agreement on truths that can be used to guide and justify public action.

To be sure, the United States is not in a revolutionary situation. Nonetheless, discrepancies between old myths and current realities are great enough to be troubling. They seem to widen every day, yet serious effort to revise inherited public myths remains largely the province of revivalist sectarians.

In times past, such situations have sometimes given great leaders the opportunity to reshape a nation or to remodel a state in response to a new vision of what was right, proper and possible. World War II and its aftermath gave this kind of scope to such diverse figures as Charles de Gaulle in France, Konrad Adenauer in Germany, Mao Zedong in China and Tito in Yugoslavia. Before that, the depression of the 1930s called Franklin D. Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler into action. Maybe our current difficulties will find a similar resolution in one or more of the most deeply affected countries. What is needed is a suitably charismatic figure with a vision of past and future that millions will find so compel-

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ling as to make them eager to join in common action to achieve newly articulated purposes.

Nevertheless, though the niche may be empty and waiting, no one can count on its being filled. Great public figures do not arise in a vacuum. They personify and give voice to ideas and ideals already scattered about and accepted by at least some segments of the public that responds to their call. The great leader's role is to put a coalition of new ideas into action, often by dint of overlooking logical discrepancies. When the resulting mix commands enough support to generate effective common action, logical shortcomings scarcely matter. The people who follow the great man's lead have, in effect, revised their mythical system and can therefore persist as an effective public body for as long as the new myths and action based on them continue to yield acceptable results.

But where do political leaders' new ideas come from? Tito and Mao drew on Marxism, Adenauer revivified a Catholic, corporatist tradition that had suffered near total eclipse in Bismarck's Germany, while De Gaulle combined Gallicanism, technocracy and a personal sense of mission that perhaps derived as much from his name as from anything more tangible. Such traditions are themselves human creations, of course, being largely the work of intellectuals and men of letters, packaged by historians for use in schools and other public places and then transmitted and sustained by educational, religious and other cultural institutions.

In a time such as ours, when inherited myth systems are in disrepair and no great political leader has yet emerged, historians, political scientists and other academics who are paid to educate the young and think about matters of public importance ought to feel a special responsibility for proposing alternatives to accepted ideas. Only so can they hope to trigger a successful reorganization of public myths that could command the support of informed and critical minds. To leave the field to ignorant and agitated extremists is dangerous. That, after all, was how Hitler came to power. Yet American historians are doing so today with clear conscience and from the best of motives.

Pursuit of truth has been the overriding ideal of our universities ever since the professionalization of research in academic institutions began about a century ago. Challenging prevailing myths without regard for the costs arising from the disintegration of belief therefore became professors' special calling. Intellectual honesty required as much, and methodological rigor demanded special attention to anything that failed to conform to mythical

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prescription and expectation.

Hence the enthusiasm for revisionism. Careers have been made and schools of historians have flourished on the strength of their discovery of flaws in received notions about the American nation and its government. By uncovering the sufferings of the poor and oppressed, revisionists discredited older ideas about the unique virtue and perfection of American society. They showed that liberty and democracy did not assure equality after all. Assimilation to a Yankee model of behavior did not guarantee happiness either, even for the most enthusiastic converts from other cultural backgrounds. Still other iconoclasts challenged the belief that foreigners differed from us simply because they had fallen behind the progress of the United States and only needed a little capital and know-how to become as rich, free and fortunate as Americans were supposed to be.

No one is likely to reaffirm these discredited notions today, even though public rhetoric often assumes the reality of such myths without expressly saying so. Politicians and journalists really have little choice, since suitably revised national and international myths are conspicuous by their absence.

Instead, the main energies of the historical profession have gone into detailed research, often focusing on the experience of groups formerly excluded from historians' attention, i.e., on one or another of the ethnically, sexually and occupationally oppressed segments of society. Frequently, the effect of such scholarship is to substitute a divisive for a unifying myth, intensifying the special grievances of one group against others.

Truth and intellectual honesty are no doubt served by noting the yawning gaps between democratic ideals and social practice. They would be even better served if historians found it possible to fit their new data and sensibilities into a wider perspective in which weak and strong, oppressor and oppressed would all find a place. In such a history, of course, the things that unite human beings would have to come to the fore. This might even provide a matrix for mutual understanding and more effective public action. Yet macrohistory is commonly deemed unscientific, and this despite the example natural scientists have given of how to react to new, discrepant data by revising theory to embrace old and new in a single formula believed to be true.

The main reason for eschewing macrohistorical synthesis is the mistaken notion that generalization inevitably involves error, while accuracy increases with detail. Getting at the sources and staying close to them seemed a sure way to truth a century ago

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when academic departments of history were set up. Industrious transcription of dead men's opinions therefore became the hallmark of historical scholarship. It still provides a convenient substitute for thought, despite historical quantifiers and other methodological innovators. Yet an infinitude of new sources, each of them revealing new details, does not automatically increase the stock of historical truth. More data may merely diminish the intelligibility of the past, and, carried to an extreme, the multiplication of facts reduces historical study to triviality.

The truth about foreign affairs, for example, does not reside solely or chiefly in the texts of diplomatic notes filed away in foreign offices. Search of supplementary sources like newspaper files, TV scripts and private papers will not do much to remedy the defects of diplomatic history based on faithful transcription and comparison of official documents. The reason is that all such research assumes that the situations within which human beings act are obvious and unchanging, so that only operational details that passed through the consciousness of the actors at the time need to be attended to.

But this is not the case, and historians actually know better. States are not eternal; nations emerge and pass away. Alterations in communication nets change the way governments and peoples interact, and patterns of power transform themselves all the time in ways of which contemporaries are only dimly aware. Yet changes of this kind commonly matter more for understanding what happened than anything that can be discovered by consulting additional past opinions as recorded in sources hitherto unexplored. Industriousness in archives may merely obstruct vision of the larger patterns whose evolution matters far more than new details of particular transactions.

To move from detail to perception of larger patterns is not achieved by accumulating more and more instances. Appropriate concepts are needed. Each change of scale requires its own vocabulary to direct attention to the critical thresholds and variables. Finding the right things to lump together and the right words to focus attention on critical transitions is the special work of human intelligence—whether applied to history or to everyday encounters with the world. Nearly everything is done for us by the language we inherit that generalizes and organizes the flow of sensory experience with every noun and verb we employ. But myth makers and myth breakers are entrusted with the task of adjusting and improving received ways of understanding and reacting to the world. As such, they are supposed to think more persistently and

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perspicaciously than others, making whatever change may be needed in inherited words and concepts so as to take account of new experience.

Finding the right vocabulary to focus attention efficiently is a difficult matter. The history of human thought records some of the more successful efforts that have been made. As a result of centuries of struggle to come to grips with the complexity of things, we now have many separate sciences, each with its own vocabulary. These actually describe the same reality at different levels of generalization. Thus, for example, no one doubts that atoms, molecules, cells and organisms simultaneously occupy terrestrial landscapes, and we have appropriate sciences for each. We also know that complicated ecological relationships exist among the separate organisms and populations of organisms that share any particular part of the earth. However complicated the relation may be across these diverse levels of organization, it is not the case that small patterns are automatically truer than large patterns, or that error inheres in a description of the ecosystem but is absent from formulas that apply to atomic interactions. Indeterminacy extends to the atomic and sub-atomic level too, as twentieth-century physicists agree.

Historians, however, through their idolization of written sources, have commonly allowed themselves to wallow in detail, while refusing to think about the larger patterns of the past which cannot be discovered by consulting documentary sources. They have consequently undermined inherited myths that attempted to make the past useful by describing large-scale patterns, without feeling any responsibility for replacing decrepit old myths with modified and corrected general statements that might provide a better basis for public action.

IV

If historians persist in dodging the important questions of our age in this fashion, others are sure to step into the breach by offering the necessary mythical answers to human needs. The question then becomes what groupings will take form and gather strength around such myths. So far, sectarian fissiparousness seems the dominant trend. Religious syncretism and revival, whether Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Buddhist, achieve success largely by cutting true believers off from the corruptions of civil society around them. Secular forms of sectarianism seem at a low ebb by comparison, thanks to the wearing out of both the Freudian and the Marxist faiths.

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Tides in myth making and myth breaking are, of course, unpredictable and have often taken sudden, surprising turns. Recent events in Iran remind us of how precariously old and new systems of ideas coexist. Yet I, for one, am not prepared to abandon a secular and ecumenical faith in the power of human minds to decipher the world.

Several points seem clear to me. One is that troubling encounters with strangers constitute the principal motor of change within human societies. Ecumenical world history ought therefore to be specially sensitive to traces of past cultural interactions. This has the immediate effect of escaping the Europe-centered bias we have inherited, for any plausible view of the human adventure on earth quickly discovers that the dominance of European civilization is a matter of recent centuries. European expansion since 1500, indeed, appears to be analogous to what happened before when Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Indian and Chinese civilizations each in turn attained skills superior to those known elsewhere, and for a few centuries were therefore able to influence others within the interacting circle of the Old World.

Whoever admired or feared the skills in question set out to acquire them or else sought to strengthen local society against their threat. Either way change resulted, often of a far-reaching kind. Comparable but less well-established patterns of cultural efflorescence and outward flow can be discerned among pre-Columbian Amerindians. African history, too, begins to become intelligible—though still dimly—in terms of diffusion of skills of the kind recorded more fully by the literate civilizations of Eurasia.

A second obvious proposition is that the national history of the United States fits into the pattern of world history not as an exception but as a part. More specifically, the rise of the United States was an important segment of the global phenomenon of European expansion that dominated most of the earth from shortly before 1500 to shortly after 1900. The U.S.S.R., too, is a monument to the same process, having been built by pioneers who moved eastward and overland rather than westward and overseas as in the case of the United States. This geographical difference had important consequences for the fashion in which the repertory of European skills and institutions was altered and adapted on the two frontiers. But such differences ought not to obscure what was common to all European frontier societies, East and West, and also in such diversified places as South Africa, Australasia and South America.

Placing our national experience within the panorama of world

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history will require us to give up both the original Puritan vision of creating a "city on the hill" uniquely pleasing to God, and its variously secularized versions that continue to dominate our national self-image. Manifest Destiny, translated into an aggressive, hard-nosed pursuit of national advantage in the tradition of Theodore Roosevelt and his successors, is as unsatisfactory a guide to action today as is the universalistic legal-moralism associated with Woodrow Wilson and his political heirs. Limits to our national power need to be recognized more clearly than either of these traditions admits. The plain fact is that the wealth and power of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world have diminished since 1945, and we must get used to this elemental fact. The best way to start is to recognize that the American way of life is no more than one variation among many to which humanity adheres.

This need not diminish personal and collective attachment to inherited values and institutions. Recognition of humanity's cultural pluralism might, indeed, allow us to react more intelligently to encounters with other peoples than is likely to happen when we are either aggrieved and surprised by their persistent, willful differences from us, or else remain self-righteously impervious to the possibility of learning something useful from people who diverge from us in enduring, conspicuous ways.

Finally, it seems no less evident that currents of cultural interaction have, since 1914, begun to run in new directions from those that dominated the world during the preceding four centuries. How to understand the contemporary scene requires more detachment from everyday events than we can easily achieve. For a while after World War II, the bipolar diplomatic pattern of the cold war seemed to ratify the existence of rival and opposing Soviet-U.S. spheres of influence. But Japan's economic rise, together with heartfelt Third World aspiration toward a more perfect emancipation from imperial tutelage, and complex cross-currents within old Europe that extend, sometimes, to Russian and American societies as well, makes that simple bipolarity now seem inadequate in spite of President Reagan's efforts to make it the key to all else.

Perspective arising from the course of future events may be necessary before observers can discern the pattern of our time as clearly as we can recognize past patterns of interaction among the peoples and cultures of the earth. Nonetheless, seeing contemporary foreign affairs as a continuation of longstanding processes of cultural encounter will surely teach us not to expect the various

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peoples of the earth to wish to be like us any more than we wish to be like them. It should teach us also to expect local variation in the expression of even the most universal human aspirations. The fact that nearly everyone prefers wealth and power to poverty and helplessness does not therefore assure any uniformity in the way different peoples will choose to pursue the common goal. Nor are material goods everything. Beauty and holiness are also widely disseminated ideals, and the desire for membership in a supportive community of comrades is an even more universal and, often, passionate desire.

V

The most problematic of all these human aspirations is how to define the limits of comradeship. This, indeed, is where humanity's myth-making and myth-destroying capacity comes elementally and directly into play by defining the boundary between "us" and "them." Broadly inclusive public identities, if believed and acted on, tend to relax tensions among strangers and can allow people of diverse habits and outlook to coexist more or less peacefully. Narrowed in-group loyalties, on the other hand, divide humanity into potentially or actually hostile groupings.

The choice is awkward because advantages do not lie wholly on one side. Sectarian groups, their faces set firmly against the larger world, are far more supportive to their members than variegated, pluralistic societies can be. Nations, for the same reason, provide their citizens with more vibrant public identities than transnational and global organizations will ever be able to do. What humanity needs is balance between a range of competing identities. A single individual ought to be able to be a citizen of the world and hold membership in a series of other, less inclusive in-groups simultaneously, all without suffering irreconcilable conflict among competing loyalities. But that could only occur if conventional limits to jurisdiction somehow stabilized relationships among all the multitude of possible in-groups. Such stability has perhaps been approached in times past when some territorially vast empire brought order of a kind to parts of the globe, but it is no recipe for our foreseeable future.

Instead we must do the best we can to survive in a world full of conflict by creating and sustaining the most effective public identities of which we are capable. Cultural diversity is and always has been characteristic of the human species. No sensible person would wish or expect to see uniformity instead. Ordering diversity is, nonetheless, difficult. Violence played a large role in times past,

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by defining geographic boundaries and modes of interaction among diverse communities. Violence is sure to remain among us, heirs as we are of hunting bands that became the most skillful of all predators. But wisdom can sometimes restrain violence, or channel it into less damaging forms of behavior than preparation for atomic war.

Apart from the practical value which serious myth making aspires to, the reality of world society in our day constitutes an intellectual challenge that can be met only by rising to the grandest mythical plane of which we are capable. Only so can the world we live in become intelligible. Inherited ideas—whether dating back to pagan Greece, Christian Europe, 1776 or 1848—are simply inadequate, and there is no use pretending otherwise. There is still less sense in pretending that all we need is more detail. What we need is an intelligible world, and to make the world intelligible, generalization is necessary. Our academic historians have not done well in providing such generalizations of late. Thoughtful men of letters ought therefore to try.

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Richard Critchfield

SCIENCE AND THE VILLAGER: THE LAST SLEEPER WAKES

Before the 1920s, change in American agriculture was slow. Silent films of the time wonderfully record the dusty dirt roads, farm wagons and Model-T Fords passing by, threshers in overalls pitching bundles, small family farms with cows, pigs and chickens, and the speed and power of a rural way of life set by the three-mile-an-hour gait of the horse. By 1940, as highly mechanized, highly capitalized farming took over, this way of life was just a nostalgic memory. Since 1940 the number of Americans who farm has dropped from about 30 percent to less than three percent.[1] This is probably the most fundamental change in modern American history. Its cultural consequences have still to be calculated.

If the 1920s and 1930s brought decisive change to American agriculture, the decade of the 1970s now is likely to be seen, if at a much lower level of technology, as the start of a similar turning point for many of the people of the Third World, particularly the Asians. These were the years when contraceptive devices—the Pill and IUD, not widely available until the mid-1960s—first reached the villages. Scientific agriculture did not fully win acceptance by Third World governments until the successful application of breakthroughs in tropical plant genetics in the late 1960s (and not until the late 1970s in China, where dwarf, fast-maturing, short-stemmed grain had to be crossed with local colder-climate varieties). The postcolonial expansion of primary education and the training abroad of large numbers of students in Western technology did not begin to pay off until the 1970s. Transistor radios came in early, but television did not reach substantial

[1] Gilbert C. Fite, *American Farmers: The New Minority*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981, p. 234.

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numbers of villages in China, India, Indonesia, Egypt, Mexico and elsewhere until the end of the decade.

The change that really mattered came in the mentality of the villagers once they saw concrete evidence of how Western technology could improve their lives. To try and date this more precisely: In 1978, after a five-year absence in Africa and Latin America, this writer returned to a number of Asian villages, from India to Indonesia, where I had lived for months on end in the late 1960s and early 1970s and several times revisited, most recently in 1973. Among all the village people I knew personally, there was a marked difference: somehow, in those five years, something had happened in their minds. They felt that the future would no longer simply repeat the past, as it had always done, but could be radically improved by all the new Western technology. As I reported to *The Economist* in an article headlined "A great change has started," published on March 9, 1979, "Times change and men, once they have the technological means and enough years to culturally adjust, change with them."

The pace of this change has steadily quickened. One can now confidently say that a quiet agricultural revolution has begun in the Third World that is likely to have more dramatic effects on more human beings than any revolution that has gone before. This agricultural revolution differs from our own in three fundamental ways:

First, it is coming 50 years later. During these 50 years, man's control over matter and energy, particularly in physics and biology, and his ability to process and distribute this knowledge, has grown enormously. As Vernon Ruttan and other agricultural economists have pointed out, the biggest gains in American farm production have come from oil-based mechanical technology, or advances in output per worker. Between 1920 and 1940, horses were quite suddenly replaced by tractors, combines and other machines, with new investment also in fertilizer, electricity, prepared feeds, pesticides and other nonfarm inputs. In the Third World, starting about 1967–68, the biggest gains in farm production have come from biological technology, advances in output per unit of land. The numbers of draft animals—about 75 million in India, 50 million in China[2] (which uses more river junks)—are not declining, but growing with official encouragement. Biotechnology, unlike mechanical technology, does not demand the same substitution of capital for labor. Experience in Asia during the

[2] *Report* (A/CONF.100/11), United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, Nairobi, Kenya, August 10–21, 1981.

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1970s shows it is more labor intensive, not less.

Second, peasants are involved, that is, subsistence cultivators within ancient civilizations. Their culture is highly dependent upon a village, the basic economic unit. There are about two million of these villages left, a third of them still pretty much intact in post-Mao China, another third in what was pre-1947 India—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—and the rest scattered among the other 130 or so nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America, plus some islands. North America, unlike Europe or Russia, never had a peasant society. The uprooted European peasant immigrants, who mostly settled America's post-frontier rural society, found themselves in scattered, individual farms surrounding a small town usually dominated by a Yankee commercial and professional class. Peasant tradition was discouraged; farming was seen as a business for profit, with land, rent and labor looked upon as capital and commodity. As post-1940 agriculture industrialized and farms got ever bigger and fewer, thousands of small farm communities died or moved toward extinction, and with them their churches and schools. Despite pro-rural feelings among presidents from Thomas Jefferson to Theodore Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy, the economic basis of American culture, never having been a village, shifted from small town to city. This has meant a weakening of church, family, the work ethic and the small town's sense of community. It suggests the American model is not one the Third World can or should follow.

Third, the staggeringly big populations involved are way beyond our own experience. Village populations have been doubling every 30 years, though, since contraceptives started to catch on, that interval has grown slightly to 34 years.[3] In a few places—the Nile Valley, the Mexican central highlands, the island of Java—absolute population growth has already overshot the available land and water even with the maximum application of known biotechnology. Here an alternative to agriculture must be found, probably in decentralized industry. Japan offers the best model; it industrialized through a system of small village-based engineering workships which made components for a central core factory (as American bomber pilots discovered during World War II). At the Indonesian government's request, the Japanese are now trying to transplant their system to Java as a way of keeping people on the land.

The hope must be that a village-based agrarian civilization, with man's oldest cultures adapting to his newest scientific knowl-

[3] *World Population Data Sheet*, Washington: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., 1981.

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edge and expanded population, could offer an attractive and attainable future for the Third World.

In any case, during the 1970s, so much peasant energy was released, so much élan and dynamism, that this agricultural revolution is now unstoppable. The crucial transfer of scientific knowledge, and its application as technology, has already been made. Even if we unwisely reduced our technical assistance and expertise, somebody else could now supply it (most probably the Japanese).

II

In framing American policy toward this totally different Third World of the 1980s, it may help us to picture it, not in the conventional terms of a devitalized fixed state, as statistics and even factual evidence are likely to suggest, but rather as a kind of vast, ongoing revolutionary drama in perpetual kaleidoscopic movement, in which countless individual actors—the villagers—make choices and take actions to learn, adjust, develop and survive. Increasingly, we will take on the role of spectators, while continuing to lead in the supply of technology and advice.

If one assumes that the resources and science are there, as it will be argued they are, the Third World can look to a much brighter future if each of its dominant cultures adapts in its own way, preserving what is most valuable in its particular culture. This means it must preserve the village, the economic basis of every single Third World culture. We cannot say that this will happen; some cultures may not adapt, in some societies villages may not survive. But cultural adaptation and the survival of the village are what we, as Americans, should be looking for, and trying if possible to assist.

In such a situation, optimism and pessimism become largely irrelevant. It is like watching a play; as a theater-goer you are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the outcome; you simply wait to see how it comes out. If others in the audience loudly proclaim that the play will end badly, you naturally have to disagree with them on the grounds that no one knows. I will say one thing: none of the villagers that I have known personally since the late 1960s or early 1970s is worse off today than he or she was a decade ago; most of them are a little better off and a few are substantially better off. Also, I have confidence that when the time comes, these people, as individual villagers, will make the right choices.

It is in these individual terms that we somehow need to perceive

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them. Traveling in the United States, after spending half a lifetime in the Third World, one finds most Americans can fix most of these countries on a map. A good many are knowledgeable about their current political and economic situations. In their minds, as in their newspaper headlines, they keep up with the Third World's wars, revolutions, coups, famines, gluts, slumps and booms. Yet, unless they've been there themselves, many Americans tend to people these countries with dark and faceless mobs. Our geography and history help to explain this. So does television. The popular image of what are now about three-fourths of the people alive is distinctly blurred. Television brings these people into our living rooms when they revolt, riot or starve, but rarely when they are just going about their daily lives, steadily trying to improve them. This may explain why Americans tend to perceive the Third World's villagers as more miserable than they actually are and as somehow inert—or as objects, statistics, things to be manipulated.

This depersonalization may be inescapable, but it does reinforce the American habit of looking at problems in terms of the politics of the surface, instead of the economic and cultural trends beneath the surface. This makes us slow to recognize long-term economic changes (the rapid economic growth of East Asia) or cultural changes (Islam's counterreformation), which require changes in policy. Examples closer to home, aside from the decline of rural-based values, would be the social isolation, in the cities of the North and West, of the American black, or the way we unintentionally played into Hanoi's strategy in Vietnam of eroding the Confucian ethical system that was, and still is, communism's central adversary. In the Midwest last summer I found farmers deeply concerned about export markets (now 40 percent of annual American grain production) but somehow unable to make that leap of the imagination that would relate their own well-being with what happens to distant peasants of another race and culture.

Despite a true sense of nationhood in much of the Third World, politics there too often tends to be a private game played by a small, educated elite of Westernized businessmen, soldiers and urban intellectuals who are often more in tune with Washington or London than with some village ten miles down the road. (India's former Prime Minister Morarji Desai was amazed during a 1978 interview when I described what was going on in villages outside Delhi.) A good many of the smaller Third World nations do not even qualify as whole societies but are rather arbitrarily detached fragments of them, notably in Africa. Too many of these

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are run by men whose primary concern is not to get murdered in their successor's coup d'état. Villagers tend to identify themselves primarily with a historically enduring culture; they are Punjabis not Indians, Javanese not Indonesians; not Sudanese or Kenyans but members of the Dinka or Kamba tribes.

Purely economic lenses can also distort. A good many economic statistics ultimately depend on a village peasant providing accurate information to a local government official, something few of them, in their own self-interest, are going to do. What we know of crop production, for example, is usually based upon what comes into the market; there is no way to tell if peasants are eating or storing more. Economic facts seem mathematical and scientific, but what does it mean to the average American that average life expectancy in the Third World last year was 58 years and per capita GNP $560?[4]

The average, moreover, is almost nowhere typical. Anyone who goes to enough villages is constantly journeying back and forth through time, as if in some Jules Verne contraption. You can visit the Stone Age with Sudan's Dinka tribe, live in Old Testament days with desert Bedouins, glimpse the Middle Ages in old Cairo or Fez (or, until the mid-1970s, in any one of a million villages), or see something like Europe's agricultural revolution conveniently telescoped in India's Punjab. Most of the villagers, while still relatively poor, are starting to lead healthier, longer lives, with higher rates of literacy and a wider range of information than any generation that has gone before.

We can no longer treat the Third World as something static, as if we were biologists dissecting a frog. Rather, if we are to look beneath the political surface and grasp the causes for what is going on, we are required to consider the Third World's people in individual terms and in a new, essentially anthropological way.

III

No culture is ever static, but usually there is time to gradually adjust to change. The West, well before the post-1800 industrial revolution, had centuries in which to evolve. Most critically, the Protestant Reformation emphatically transformed Christian culture from the world-rejection of the historical Jesus to a world-affirming religion of the urban middle class, with philosophical motivations for seeking salvation primarily through hard work and a more rational control of life.

[4] *Ibid.*

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When technological change comes too fast, age-old beliefs can become incoherent. Among some deeply religious, illiterate peasants, the universe can become utterly incomprehensible. Such personal crises, if enough people suffer them, can produce such political eruptions as Iran's revolution, Anwar Sadat's murder, peasant uprisings in Central America or growing caste violence and lawlessness in India.

V.S. Naipaul, a gloomy but astute observer of change in Africa, India, the West Indies and within Islam, has attributed "all the trouble in the world" to the need of all of its people to adapt to the West and its ways.[5] "Not adapting to its tools," he said in a *Washington Post* interview last year, "but trying to fit in with its ideas."

This writer would agree with Naipaul, except that an anthropologist might argue that you can't separate the ideas from the tools: all culture has an economic basis. In the anthropological definition, culture is a set of rules or solutions to problems, handed down from father to son (or, more often, mother to son) so that each new generation does not have to start out from scratch. It is kind of a ready-made design for living.

In Africa last fall I questioned Richard Leakey about early agriculture. Leakey, who has traced man's origins back two million years from fossil finds at Olduvai Gorge and Lake Turkana, takes the view that man is not innately anything but is capable of anything. Leakey has written, "Human beings are cultural animals and each one is the product of his particular culture." Leakey argues that man evolved a cooperative society because his hunting-collecting economy required it and this same ethic was carried on for the same reason after the invention of agriculture in the Middle East area 10,000 to 15,000 years ago.

Aristotle reached much the same conclusion from his study of animals and humans 2,300 years ago; he wrote that every creature's mode of living is decided by how he obtains his food. If you change agriculture, you change culture. Aristotle also offered an explanation for human fertility declines; he said that the more highly developed any species or individual becomes, the smaller will be his number of offspring. Common sense, yet the Third World delegates at the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest had to keep hammering the point in: increase human productivity (or the value of time) and fertility decreases.

[5] See V.S. Naipaul, *A House for Mr. Biswas*, New York: Penguin Books, 1976; *India: A Wounded Civilization*, New York: Knopf, 1977; *A Bend in the River*, New York: Knopf, 1979; *Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey*, New York: Knopf, 1981.

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If one can condense human history into a paragraph: Something like a man hunted and collected for two million years, slowly migrating up from Africa, into Europe and South Asia, down to Indonesia and Australia and up to Siberia and across into the Americas. Neolithic woman, as the collector of berries, roots and wild grain, invented agriculture 10,000 to 15,000 years ago. Man, the hunter-herder, followed draft animals into the fields as the inventions of irrigation and the plow led to the rise of civilization about 6,000 to 7,000 years ago. The invention of the heavy moldboard plow and the dryland manorial farming it made possible led to the rise of Europe, starting about 1,500 years ago. This was followed by the industrial revolution 200 years ago and the West's present global technological domination.[6]

From the day man followed his cattle down from Central Asia and up from Africa into the Fertile Crescent and Egypt and invented the plow, wheel, sail and irrigation, nothing really big affected the peasant villager—aside from the invention of the moldboard plow and gunpowder—until about 1800. During these 6,000 to 7,000 years, there were great nonfarming advances, such as the Gutenberg printing press, and techniques of seafaring and navigation, but agriculture experienced relative technological stagnation. The peasant of A.D. 1800, whether in Europe, India, China or the New World, used about the same energy resources as the 5000-B.C. cultivator did (animal power, wind, water, sun and his own muscles); he could travel much the same tiny maximum distance per day; he used much the same materials for tools (iron and wood) and fuel (firewood and forage for draft animals); and had much the same life expectancy (to his late thirties and early forties). When I first visited Asia in the late 1950s, the tools and fuel of most villagers were still fixed at this level.

But for those of us in the West, after 1800 everything suddenly went whoosh. Today, thanks to Western technology, in the reckoning of *The Economist*'s deputy editor, Norman Macrae, world population has risen sixfold; real gross world product has risen eightyfold; the distance a person can travel in a day has gone up between a hundredfold and a thousandfold; the killing area of the most effective megadeath weapon a millionfold or more; the amount of energy that can be released from a pound of matter over 50 millionfold; and the range and volume of information technology (computers, chips, telecommunications) several bil-

[6] See William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West*, New York: New American Library, 1964.

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lionfold.[7] The West, in this sense, now includes small enclaves in most of the Third World's great cities, part of the same jet-and-electronics network we belong to. Beyond are the two million villagers where a very sudden closing of the 5000 B.C.-1980s A.D. technology gap should now be possible.

IV

Plato, in his critique of reason, contrasted the "inflamed society" of the city with the "simple society," of which the most universal form has always been the village. Interestingly, almost all of the great religions have rural origins while almost all the great political ideologies came from cities. These include Western industrial capitalism and communist collectivism, another Western export, the two main development choices offered the postcolonial Third World. But capitalism has failed to supply sufficient jobs and income, and communism, by denying villagers privately owned land, has failed to provide sufficient incentives.

To Aristotle, the three basic institutions of the village were property, marriage and the family. To him, communism broke down because humans need the stimulus of gain and private ownership for hard work and husbandry. Aristotle believed the power of habit, or "second nature," was enough to defeat revolutions.

In China, with a billion of the Third World's people, about 80 percent of them still rural, recent anthropological studies suggest this to be true.[8] On a 1980 visit to the North China Plains, I found that once you stepped inside a village family's household walls, property, marriage and the family mattered just as much as in any other village culture. There were the same ubiquitous, proudly displayed family photographs, the same complaints about the expense of weddings, the same deference shown to old people, even the same mind-numbing liquor that is, alas, the gesture of having broken the social ice from Africa to India. Unlike city workers, Chinese peasants own their own household land and get no pensions, looking after the elderly at home. Garden plots, where vegetables can be grown for sale, are usually allocated and detached, but every family raises a pig or two at home for cash income. (This was done with Mao Zedong's blessing; he even coined a maxim: "The pig is a fertilizer factory with four legs.")

[7] Norman Macrae, "America's third century," *The Economist*, October 25, 1975.

[8] See, for one example, Molly G. Schuchat and James D. Jordan, "Continuities and Discontinuities in China: The Natural Villages and the Production Brigade," in *Village Viability in Contemporary Society*, eds. Priscilla Reining and Barbara Lenkerd, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

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Unlike the gross neglect of public property in China, the flowers, fruit trees and humble houses within private courtyard walls are well maintained. Far from being the robots one might expect, the rural Chinese seem supremely individualistic, Confucian and civilized. Mao must have had culture in mind when he told Nixon, "I have only been able to change a few places in the vicinity of Peking."

American agricultural scientists, who have traveled in the rural Soviet Union, confirm it is much the same there. Something that can be called a village exists and the Russian peasant clings to his private plot just as tenaciously as the Chinese does to his family household.

A universal village culture does exist. It seems likely to survive any ephemeral and short-lived political system arbitrarily imposed on it from cities. Technology can revolutionize human behavior permanently because it transforms the economic determinants of that behavior. There is no historical evidence that any political ideology has ever been able to do this in any lasting way. Even Maoism.

V

One finds six main cultural variations in the rural Third World: Confucian, Malay-Javanese, Hindu, Christian, Islamic and African. They do much to explain why villagers culturally adjust to Western ideas and technology in such different ways.

All contemporary village society has something generic about it. A group of families occupying a rural place and engaged in farming inherits similar ways and customs quite naturally evolved over centuries from a simple agricultural economy. These have to do with the concrete aspects of ordinary daily life. Village cultures strikingly differ only when it comes to the attempts by their early ancestors to provide life and the world of their times with metaphysical meaning. What is something of a universal village culture in other key respects stops somewhat short of the realm of abstract ideas, or religion—though even in religion the appeal of magic and miraculous deliverance has great universality in villages. This writer, since the late 1960s, has lived in 21 villages for months on end, three of them for over a year, and visited villages in 52 countries altogether. The religious interpretations that follow are not based upon formal scholarship, but rather upon villagers' own presentations of their beliefs. I have excluded Buddhism because, though it decides village behavior in Thailand, Burma and among Tibetans, it is outweighed by either Confucian or Hindu ethics in

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daily village life in countries like Vietnam, Sri Lanka or Nepal. Judaism in the Third World, of course, influences only the rural Israelis.

Confucianism, or, more accurately, post-Confucianism, embraces East Asia—China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Hong Kong and Singapore. As British sinologist Roderick MacFarquhar pointed out in an essay in *The Economist* in early 1980, "Confucianism is as important to the rise of the East Asian hyper-growth economies as the conjunction of Protestantism and the rise of capitalism in the West."[9]

Village Confucianism is basically a system of harmonious, subordinate relationships stemming from the fundamental adage that "Filial piety is the basis of all social conduct."[10] The son obeys the father, the younger brother the older brother, the wife the husband, the worker the employer, the subject the state. Its great advantage in adapting to technology lies in its subordination of individual interest to group interest (just as the unrestricted freedom of individual choice and substitution of chosen "life styles" for inherited culture seems to have weakened our own adaptive capacity).

Rural South Korea, especially among the older people, seems to have preserved traditional Confucian behavior in its purest state; in Taiwan it is more obscured by Taoist and Buddhist influences. But faith in social harmony achieved through subordination to one's group is a common thread running through every East Asian village society, including that of post-Mao China.

The Japanese practice what is perhaps the prime example of biological technology in agriculture compared to our mechanical technology. It is true the Japanese grow rice with an amazing variety of mini-machines, including mechanical rice transplanters, and employ helicopter spraying, along with vinyl sheeting, concrete-banked paddies and massive use of chemical fertilizer. But Japanese farm machinery is designed for a part-time cultivator with two or three acres. The ordinary Japanese may work in a factory, but he feels deep ties to his small plot of ancestral land and holds on to it. Similarly, he manages to preserve something close to a village in his modern urban setting; almost every Japanese belongs to a small community with the same system of mutual rights and obligations one finds in villages. And so far Japan's main emphasis in agriculture has been on biological

[9] Roderick MacFarquhar, "The post-Confucian challenge," *The Economist*, February 9, 1980.
[10] D. Howard Smith, *Confucius*, London: Paladin, 1974.

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advance; there has been no significant movement toward big farms and big machines as in this country.

Japanese rice technology has rapidly spread to South Korea and Taiwan, where conditions also exist to make it work: decent farm prices, land holdings of similar size (though all three countries may lift land ceilings), educated women, irrigation and up-to-date water management, and opportunity for all villagers to learn the new biotechnology and get the credit to try it out. Vietnam cannot catch up until it abandons its totalitarian politics; agricultural advance depends too much on adequate incentives and the stimulus of gain and private ownership.

China, with its common Confucian culture, remains, of course, the big question mark. Mao Zedong's legacy to Chinese agriculture is very mixed; on the one hand, in his later years he gave farming and the Chinese peasantry top priority in investment, something few leaders of other developing countries have done. On the other, the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution set back Chinese biological science and its application to agriculture at least a generation. Whether the pragmatists who succeeded Mao can provide sufficient incentives and ownership to the Chinese peasantry without the whole communist system coming apart will take years to resolve. Most hopeful is the way traditional Confucian values have survived since 1949 in the Chinese villages.

Malay-Javanese culture embraces Malaysia, Indonesia and a few smaller neighbors. Its heartland is the crowded island of Java, where two-thirds of the world's fifth most populous nation live. Uniquely syncretic, the Javanese have historically been able to take what they wanted from other peoples while keeping their own central values, so that they are nominally Muslim, Hindu in many of their deepest values, and also animist and mystical. With its *wayang kulit*, or shadow play, gamelan orchestras and all-night dance and drama performances, this is the most artistic and theatrical of all village cultures.

Javanese especially, but all Malays, possess a distinctive mentality that first fiercely resisted Western ideas (the anti-communist bloodbath of the late 1960s virtually wiped out village modernizers too) and then Western technology until the mid-1970s when scientific rice farming and contraceptives rather suddenly won general acceptance. Since 1973–74, according to the American Embassy in Djakarta, the rice crop has jumped from 12 million to 22 million tons and the annual population growth rate in East Java and Bali has dropped from 2.4 percent in 1977 to an astonishing one percent—a change which, if it stands up, will

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represent one of the fastest fertility declines ever.[11]

Javanese village culture's gift of graceful survival seems to come from a readiness to accept the necessary new, once it is somehow collectively felt to be the only way to preserve the desirable old. In seven visits to Java between 1967 and 1981, this writer witnessed this unusual adaptation to change.

Hinduism, the third main culture, affects most of South Asia, including not just India but Muslim Pakistan and Bangladesh and Buddhist Nepal and Sri Lanka; all villages in the region have some important vestige of the Hindu caste system. Caste is highly complex, but in villages it can be fairly simply seen as a contemporary relic of the ancient system, common to all early civilizations, whereby cultivator classes exchanged their labor and subservience for a share of the harvest and paternalist welfare provided by a rural overseer class. This system breaks down once rent, land and labor are commercialized; caste is incompatible with modern farming.

India has enormous untapped resources of land, climate, water, natural gas and hydroelectric potential, yet it remains desperately poor. The country's fundamental dilemma, as caste erodes and in some regions disintegrates, is how to bring into its economic and social system the 60 percent of rural families who are landless or nearly landless low-caste or outcaste laborers. Until and unless this disenfranchised absolute majority of the Indian people get purchasing power and lead more productive lives, India's industrialization and population control efforts are stymied. Willy-nilly, India has to grow more food and modernize farming as fast as it can. The men and women who run India (and much of it is run, as in China, by state governments) have become acutely aware of their dilemma in recent years, and a start has been made in what will have to be a massive shift of income and wealth through land reform, public work programs and decentralized industry.

As Nobel laureate economist Theodore Schultz has argued, aside from sensible programs and policies there are real limitations to what a government can do when social disequilibrium, caused by economic and technological change, reaches such huge proportions. Historically, Schultz has said, people rather than governments tend to work things out. This seems most likely to happen in India, at the cost of a good deal of violence and suffering along the way.

Individual Indian villagers, caught in the caste breakdown,

[11] Interview, Edward Masters, former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, March 1982.

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react in many ways. Punjabi Sikh untouchable laborers, whom I have known since 1969, tend to regard themselves as better off. Many, while keeping their village homes, bicycle to town jobs, get more money than they did as field laborers and work only eight hours. As one expressed the most common sentiment, "We're free. The landlords can no longer rule over us in their fields and treat us like animals." (Which, as late as the early 1970s, they did; Sikh untouchables were forced to sit on the ground and use no utensils or water vessels in a landlord's house; there were constant humiliations and intermarriage was unthinkable although to an outsider upper and lower caste looked and dressed pretty much alike.)

Yet caste always held the Indian village together and provided the rural social order. Rural crime, long rare, has risen sharply and the old sense of community is gone. Caste was never the unmitigated evil Mahatma Gandhi said it was. In the Punjab one can still find older landlords who feel a strong sense of traditional obligation to feed and look after the wants of the village low-caste poor (and who expect the old show of respect in return). Just a decade ago in northern India a harvest (mowed by hand with sickles) or a bullock cart race could be a heartwarming spectacle with men of all castes working together to get the wheat in before a storm or cheering for the cart of a fellow villager. Such scenes have vanished now; everything is done on a contractual, money basis and youngsters from different castes often do not even know each other's names.

Much of what happens in India will depend on the sum of small choices taken by hundreds of millions of obscure individual peasants. Most authorities agree that India has the resources and scientific knowledge that, combined, could eradicate poverty. Many blame the managerial capacity of India's political leadership for the failure to use them. But this overlooks the deeper cultural issue: how to replace archaic beliefs that have outlived their economic relevance?

One thing India has going for it is its democratic political system. The poor absolute majority has the controlling vote. If democracy survives, India seems likely to have frequent changes of government, exemplified by Indira Gandhi's remarkable comeback. The minority "haves" in India's 570,000 villages inevitably benefit sooner from agricultural modernization than the majority "have-nots." Yet any New Delhi government has to push food production. This means the opposition—any opposition—steadily grows more popular with the "have-nots" than whoever is in power. This is India's crucial safety valve. But it means the

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Indian elite has to show a new political maturity by starting to build up constructive alternatives to India's post-independence leadership. Democracy is not a luxury in India; it is an absolute necessity. With it, the Indians may have the political resilience, during this trying period of cultural adjustment, to muddle through.

Despite such complex problems, the three purely Asian cultures are adapting to Western techniques more easily than Christian, Islamic or African villages.

In the rural Third World, *Christianity* tends to mean Roman Catholicism, brought to Latin America and the Philippines by Spanish colonialists, to Brazil by the Portuguese and, in much smaller numbers, to a few places like Vietnam, by the French. Protestant peasant villages are almost nonexistent outside Africa, where they are a relatively new phenomenon and the main cultural adjustment is with tribalism.

Latin postcolonial society, with its feudal past, tolerates a greater degree of social inequity than one finds in Asia and Africa. This is evidenced by landownership patterns, the region's chronic vulnerability to peasant uprisings and to military juntas which prop up hereditary landowning minorities, and the vast contrast which exists between the modern glitter of cities like Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City and Manila and the often gross neglect of peasant villages in the hinterland. Among Latins (and one must culturally include the Philippine people among them), the bright lights are always in the city, whereas in Java, Egypt or Bangladesh, villages enjoy a superior cultural life and an urban migrant worker's "real life" only begins on visits home. This may help explain why six out of ten Latins live in cities, often crowded into terrible slums, compared to just two to three out of ten Asians or Africans.

Latin villagers are broadly of two kinds: descendants of transplanted European peasantry or African slaves; or, as in Mexico and Peru, Indian peoples influenced by pre-Columbian civilization and then Spanish culture who are still in an incompletely developed relationship with their urban centers of intellectual thought. The dual culture of the latter group, part-Western, part-primitive, complicates adjustment.

So does the Latin *macho* ethic of ostentatious male virility. Women, as the prime teachers of small children, are the custodians of culture in any society. If women are kept too subordinate, as they often are in Latin villages, the entire society suffers. Latin villages are also held back, of course, by the Vatican's continued

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opposition to artificial contraception, itself a lag in cultural adjustment to a changed world. Most Catholic villagers are as conservative as Pope John Paul except when it comes to birth control, which most women seem to favor.

If something as big and complex as the Third World could be seen as a picture, *black Africa* would stand out as something different, as something out of the drawing. Africa's comparative isolation until the late nineteenth century kept its population stable and in check by malaria, smallpox and periodic epidemics of other diseases. Man was able to evolve gradually from a hunter and collector (still found among Botswana's quaintly named !Kung and other tribes) into a hunter, herder and primitive slash-and-burn cultivator, because population density rarely exceeded 250 persons per square mile. The arrival of modern medicine—first with the colonial *memsaabs* with their Epsom salts and sanitation, then with doctors and hospitals, but most crucially with sulfa drugs and antibiotics—doomed the old way of life.

The past half-century has seen a mass migration toward small settled farms, or *shambas*, on ground high enough, wet enough and cold enough to grow corn. Corn has rather quickly become the main diet of black Africa. Eventually a hybrid maize belt irrigated with presently untapped rivers could transform Africa into a major food producer.

The most pressing problem of cultural adjustment is that too few African rural men regard agriculture as the key to development and village income. Growing food is often still seen as the woman's task. Elsewhere in the world, as mentioned earlier, man the hunter and then the herder entered agriculture with draft animals, in Asia about 6,000 years ago and in Latin America 5,000 years ago. In much of black Africa this is only now starting to happen.

In Kenya, where the oxen-driven plow has only recently replaced the digging stick and hoe, women often even do the plowing (sometimes with a burly husband walking alongside shouting commands). The hunter-warrior is no more; the settled male farmer is not yet. As my interpreter in Kenya, a woman, put it, "This is the problem we face here in Africa. You see these women working hard in the fields? They suffer. Their husbands may be working in town, drinking beer, spending their wages, enjoying themselves." Women still produce 80 percent of the corn that comes to market and even more of what is eaten at home in Kenya, perhaps black Africa's most modern country. In West Africa, older men will farm but again there is a mass exodus of

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young males into the towns and cities seeking jobs; few make a go of it.

Black Africa is the last place left in the world where population growth shows no sign of slowing down. Rather Africa's growth rate is going up, from 2.5 percent a year in the 1960s, to 2.9 percent last year. (In Kenya, it is 3.9 percent, the world record; the average woman has 8.3 live children, compared to the African average of 6.6.) Africa is also the only place left where food output is growing more slowly than population. The yearly growth rate in farm production has dropped from 2.3 percent in the 1960s, to about 1.3 percent now.[12]

Africa needs more time to adjust its culture to a changed economic basis. One can find men in their seventies who fought tribal wars, hunted elephants and other game with spears and traps, recall their parents' tales of Arab slavers and English ivory traders, and saw the first missionary schools and white settlers come. In Nairobi, a modern city of skyscrapers, jets and heavy traffic, you still see barefoot Masai, naked under their blankets, and realize the whole transformation has come in just two or so generations; recombinant DNA, for instance, is already being used there in the search for vaccines against cattle disease. The key to a prosperous and stable village-based African agricultural future lies in male cultural adaptation. Can these rural people leap over the long centuries this process took elsewhere?

Islam differs from the other five village cultures in two essential ways. First, unlike the Confucian, Malay-Javanese, Hindu and African cultures, Islam is geographically dispersed. So is Christianity in terms of cities, though most Christian villagers are concentrated in Latin America. One of every six of the earth's inhabitants is a Muslim; they live in 70 countries and there are huge Muslim populations in both Russia and China. Second, within Islam, a movement has arisen in reaction to the spread of Western ideas and technology that is specifically anti-Western, anti-technology.

One possible explanation for this, suggested to me by living in seven Muslim villages—one, in Egypt, for over a year—is that Islam is the most living religion. Muslim village men and women take the admonitions of the Koran seriously, even literally, and try to obey them in their daily lives. Since the Prophet Mohammed lived in the late sixth and early seventh centuries and was a cultural product of the Arabia of his time, this imposes an almost

[12] *The Economist* research staff.

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impossible social code in a modernizing world. It creates unusual stress and confusion in the Muslim villager's mind.

It is rather as if we tried to literally follow the teachings of the historical Jesus of Nazareth in modern society. Islam has never had its Protestant Reformation, which provided the philosophical underpinning for the industrial revolution by transforming Christianity into a rational, ethical, world-affirming religion, assuring an urban middle class that it could seek salvation through hard work and a more scientific control over matter and energy.

As in the world-rejection voiced by Jesus in the Gospels, there is a deeply held Islamic belief that order and reason are limited and no scientific or technological progress can enlarge them. Faith is what counts. As Shahhat, an Egyptian *fellah* whom I've written a book about, keeps telling me, "Everything is from Allah. We cannot decide anything. Everything we are is from God."[13] Moreover, despite its new oil riches, the Islamic heartland in the Middle East is almost as embattled today as it was during the Crusades; from its once proud and commanding position, Islam descended to years of subordination, and in the Middle East a few centuries of outright Western domination.

Muslims can really go one of two ways. They can partly deny the laws of Islam and adapt to such necessary changes as birth control, scientific agriculture and more rights and education for women. The Westernized elites who run most Muslim countries see no other choice. Most Muslim villagers want better lives and they're now aware that they'll get them from such new things as improved seeds, fertilizer, irrigation and knowing how to use them, and not from a lot of bloody upheaval. But others will persist in the probably futile task of remaining a true Islamic society, as Khomeini has attempted in Iran and Sadat's assassins would have tried in Egypt.

All Muslim villagers are torn between wanting technological advance and longing for the imagined purity of the Islamic past. In a few, as we have seen, it can produce an irrational revolutionary rage. The challenge of the Muslim revival seems certain to grow as Western technology penetrates ever deeper into the rural villages. Arnold Toynbee, who regarded the West's failure to spread Christianity universally as fundamental, interestingly suggested as far back as 1946 that should the world ever become deeply enough divided between its rich, white north and its poor black, brown and yellow south, Islam could rise again.

[13] See author's *Shahhat, an Egyptian*, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1979; New York: Avon Books, 1980, p. 219.

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More likely, of course, the Muslim revival is just a futile reaction. Yet, especially as seen in the villages, it does compel a certain admiration. With the exceptions of Confucianism and Protestant Christianity, all of the great religions have their origins in pastoral or village culture. Islam alone, of these, has chosen sometimes to give battle, rather than reach an accommodation, in an increasingly urban, secular, scientific, post-religious age.[14]

VI

Agriculture is the basis of everything else. Industrialization has taken hold when agriculture was reformed and supported (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), but failed when agriculture was neglected (Iran) or faltered when it was not first put on a sound basis (India). Civilization, as in the six cultures above, is rooted in agriculture. When farming methods are revolutionized with Western technology, the survival and cultural adaptation of the village holds the key to all our futures.

Not everyone shares this central emphasis on culture. Lester R. Brown of the Worldwatch Institute, for example, has written to me, "I realize you emphasize the need to take cultural factors into account. Nonetheless, it is my conclusion that the era of cheap food is past and the real cost of expanding food production will rise, making it extremely difficult to eliminate hunger and malnutrition." As perhaps the most effective and energetic publicist of the dangers of overpopulation, overuse of resources and overpollution, Brown, reinforced by those with similar views, has strongly influenced debate on development issues in Washington, New York and on university campuses. In 1980 this essentially gloomy and alarmist interpretation received the Carter Administration's imprimatur in the *Global 2000 Report to the President.* This school of thought focuses almost entirely on material resources and reflects what seems to be a post-Vietnam loss of faith among many American intellectuals that history is the actions of men. Human skill has its champions, of course, but a recent one, Julian L. Simon, in his book, *The Ultimate Resource*, badly undermined his credibility by flatly asserting that population growth was an absolute good and that we should prefer a growing population to

[14] For detailed portraits of village cultures see Richard Critchfield, *Papers*, 1970–71, Alicia Patterson Fund (India, Indonesia, Iran, Mauritius and Morocco) and *Field Staff Reports*, 1976–82, Universities Field Staff International (formerly American Universities Field Staff) (Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Indonesia, India, Philippines, Mauritius, Morocco, Tibet, Sudan and Kenya). Also, *Villages*, New York: Doubleday, 1981, and *The Golden Bowl Be Broken*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974. For Vietnamese culture, see *The Long Charade*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.

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one that is stationary or declining.[15] (Let the punishment fit the crime; Professor Simon ought to be sentenced to 30 days penance in Calcutta's worst slum.)

Predictions that "people will get poorer" and of "increasing illness and misery"[16] might be harmless as purely academic issues to be chewed over at endless seminars; they become fundamentally insensitive when they blunt our ability to know what is actually going on. During a nationwide university tour last spring, I found students almost totally uninformed about agricultural developments in China and India during the past decade.

There is not necessarily a contradiction between Brown's position and the argument set down in this essay. To rephrase his, Brown argues that even if cultural adaptation matters, the physical elements of development have now become so enormously difficult that in the short term even if villagers adapt they may not, in many cases, achieve progress. This could be, but let us not prejudge the outcome.

The challenge is of great magnitude. Demographers currently project world population to stabilize in the twenty-first century at ten billion people, or somewhere around two and a quarter times the 4.5 billion we have now.[17] Moreover, world demand for grain is growing, not just from more mouths to feed, but from very rapidly rising demand for more animal feed—a major U.S. agricultural strongpoint—as prospering middle income nations shift from grain to meat and milk diets. (South Korea and Taiwan, both able to feed their relatively small populations, have become huge feed grain importers.) Further down the line is a new source of demand should enough grain be converted into fuel (principally gasohol). In Brown's words, things could get "pretty panicky." Howard W. Hjort, the Department of Agriculture's chief economist under Carter, predicts that if American farmers were to meet projected food, feed and fuel demand by themselves by 1990, they would have to produce almost half again as much each year as they are producing now. Although the chief problem of American agriculture since 1920 has been chronic excess production, which deflates foreign prices, Brown is probably right when he says that such enormous production increases would be too expensive with oil-based mechanical technology.

But biological technology is a chapter just begun. The best-

[15] Julian L. Simon, *The Ultimate Resource*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981.
[16] U.S. Council on Environmental Quality and U.S. Department of State, *The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the Twenty-First Century*, Washington: GPO, 1980.
[17] Population Reference Bureau, *op. cit.*

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informed sources on the Third World in the 1980s, I find, are agricultural scientists—the agronomists, plant breeders, soil men and such who have been quietly changing the face of world agriculture the past 15 years. Most of them are connected with the new international network linking 13 agricultural research centers, eight of them set up since 1971. Scientists in national programs in 130 developing countries are participating. Since the Chinese became actively involved during the late 1970s, this network has been pooling knowledge and genetic material on every crop grown on the planet, plus livestock breeding, plant and animal diseases and cropping systems.

These scientists know what is happening because they are making it happen; many are confident that if fertility rates continue to decline, the Third World's agricultural revolution can succeed. They explain that biotechnology works best where there is year-round warmth, sun and controlled water, i.e., irrigation. The United States has about 38 to 39 million acres of irrigated land. According to Norman E. Borlaug, Gurdev S. Khush and other eminent agricultural scientists who make frequent visits there, China has 116 million irrigated acres, can expand this, and may be able to divert some of the Yangtze River's waters to the North China Plain. India, they report, irrigates 135 million acres, is trying to add another six to seven million acres every year, and has the potential to irrigate as much as 275 million acres. Dr. Borlaug points out that as much as 80 percent of the Ganges and Brahmaputra waters flow wasted into the Bay of Bengal.[18] With sufficient irrigation and farming year-round in its warm climate, India could have a terrific land-use rate. Moreover, the most authoritative current projections on climate change suggest that rising CO_2 in the atmosphere might benefit, rather than harm, Third World agriculture. While the American and Russian grain-producing regions are predicted to grow hotter and drier (with all the dust, grasshopper and thistle plagues this can mean), India, China and northern Africa are forecast to grow just slightly warmer, but with greater, more reliable rainfall.[19]

Look at the figures which emerged in the country reports at last year's U.N. energy conference in Nairobi: China, which used no chemical fertilizer before 1960, applies only 14 million tons annually now. India applies only six million tons, not much more than the five million tons Egypt uses, though Egypt farms less

[18] Personal correspondence.

[19] See William W. Kellogg and Robert Schware, "Society, Science and Climate Change," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1076–1109.

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than one-fiftieth as much land. The entire Third World uses just eight percent of its hydroelectrical potential, China only three percent of an estimated 370,000 megawatts. India uses only 11 percent of 75,400 megawatts available in the Indian Himalayas and virtually none of the 83,000-megawatt potential in the central Himalayas of Nepal. (And most experts put this official Nepalese estimate as far too low.) China and India have more solar potential than the United States (a lot more sunshine). Aside from the previously mentioned draft animals, both countries have huge numbers of fertilizer-producing livestock, India a cow for every two and a half persons and China more than 300 million pigs.[20]

During the Nairobi conference, it came out that the entire Third World—now just under 75 percent of the people alive—consumes just eight percent of the world's oil supply and of that eight percent, only a twentieth is going to agriculture. Despite this, India, according to Dr. Borlaug, has tripled wheat production since 1967 and China, getting its late start, increased wheat output 50 percent in just the three years from 1977 to 1979. In 1979–80 and 1980–81, according to Ann Crittenden, *The New York Times'* specialist on Third World development, India increased its total grain output still another 15 percent and 2.3 percent respectively, Indonesia 13 percent and 9 percent and Pakistan 4 percent and 8 percent.[21]

Aside from the Nile (where the adverse environmental impact of the Aswan Dam has been exaggerated), few of the Third World's great rivers have yet been fully harnessed for irrigation and hydroelectric power.[22] Nor, in Dr. Borlaug's view, have more than 30 to 40 percent of the villagers yet fully been reached with the new technology. Dr. Khush, the chief plant breeder at the International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, estimates the Chinese could easily feed their projected ultimate population of 1.5 billion simply by applying the same amount of chemical fertilizer to rice that American farmers do. That would solve one-third of the problem right there.

Just in the past two years, mostly by accident, I have come across researchers in California seeking to enhance photosynthetic efficiency, "non-till" farming in Iowa (using herbicides instead of the plow and cultivator), sugar growers in Hawaii using drip

[20] United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy, *op. cit.*

[21] Interview, Ann Crittenden, *The New York Times*, March 1982.

[22] For further discussion of the Aswan case, see *Integrated Studies of Water Quality in the Nile River and Lake Nasser*, a project undertaken by the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Cairo, in collaboration with the Environmental Science Proram, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

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irrigation and computer farming, Chinese (in cooperation with the University of Alabama) breeding new hybrid rice, Kenyans developing drought-resistant sorghum and other crops, and, in India, growing use of solar pumps, new 60-day nitrogen-fixing pulses and underground canals to prevent evaporation. There has been such an explosion of scientific knowledge and its application to farming that few but the agricultural scientists now seem able to keep up with it.

The comprehension of American policymakers of such technological change is starting to lag behind. This was evident at the Nairobi energy conference, where China, India and others proposed the creation of a new international network of energy research centers modeled after the agricultural research one. This would not cost much; the entire budget for all 13 agricultural centers is only $145 million, of which the United States pays only about one-third. The delegation from the United States, which seemed chiefly concerned to oppose funding any sort of new institution, including a World Bank energy affiliate, apparently missed the central point: what the major Third World nations were seeking was not essentially money but commonsense help to set up a modest and more rational system to process and distribute all the new knowledge on energy technology.

VII

While America's farming population declined steadily from 80 percent of total population in 1860 to 2.7 percent in 1982, it can be argued that the critical decades in that trend came between 1920 and 1940, when the farm sector still employed 30 percent of all Americans, and the apparently irreversible commitment to mechanical technology was made.[23] The comparable critical period for the Third World is likely to have started in the 1970s. Although the American role is limited by the central requirement that the villagers themselves culturally adapt, and is contingent upon our empathy and understanding of this process, the Third World's agricultural revolution is, in the main, an outward movement of specifically American scientific farming knowledge; the United States is deeply involved.

As argued earlier, a village-based agrarian civilization must be the most attractive possibility that lies ahead. What can we do to help bring this about?

First, our guiding principle should be the preservation of the

[23] Gilbert C. Fite, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 234.

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village, a small rural grouping of about 1,000 to 2,000 people in families, as the continued basic economic unit of about two-thirds of mankind. This means American technical assistance should go only to the spread of such science and technology as enables small cultivators to stay on the land. Labor-saving mechanical technology, provided it is designed to relieve individuals of back-breaking drudgery, should be supported, but not large tractors, combines or other machines which substitute capital for labor and serve to industrialize agriculture. Northern India has already gone too far in this direction.

American experience and advice is so valuable to Third World policymakers precisely because they are trying to avoid our rural depopulation and the weakening of rural-based values. They need to profit from our mistakes.

The village-preservation principle needs to be applied pragmatically in concrete situations, following something like Aristotle's golden mean that right is what works best. Congressional mandates, such as requirements to "help the poorest of the poor," are awkward to apply. For example, in 1979 this mandate led Senator Daniel Inouye to insist that the Agency for International Development assist only primary education in Indonesia, the world's fifth largest nation which at the time had less than 300 Ph.Ds. Technical advisers on the scene should be given maximum latitude.

Second, priority should be given to the transfer of the most sophisticated Western science. This means all the training we can afford to provide in the most advanced plant genetics, agronomy, soil science and chemistry (in fertilization, pesticides and insecticides), as well as in modern irrigation engineering (few villagers irrigate properly) and the application of this chemical, technological and genetic knowledge to new cropping systems. It also means applying the latest biological science to livestock breeding and the control of animal and plant disease.

At the same time, we should be wary of "appropriate technology," if that is narrowly defined, as it so often is, to mean the kind of rudimentary, Tinker Toy farm equipment that simply represents some half-baked step in the evolution of our own mechanical technology. Some appropriate technology is practical and beneficial, but far too much of what has been offered the Third World suggests it is designed to keep the backward backward. As UNICEF official Tarzie Vitachi and others have pointed out, villagers sensibly reject it.

Third, the emphasis in energy research should be on ways to

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harness the villager's oldest resources: animal power, wind, water and sun. An example is research to bring down the cost of photovoltaic cells to a price a village cooperative could afford (and if we don't do it, the Japanese probably will, and benefit accordingly). Experience in West Africa, where the French have taken the lead in supplying villages with solar units to provide refrigerated antibiotics, telephone communications to summon emergency help, and a community television set, demonstrates how such basic amenities can reduce urban migration.

Americans have the managerial and technical skill to speed the spread of rural electrification, a vital component in any strategy to preserve the village as an economic unit. Hydroelectric power is the Third World's greatest untapped resource; the very rapid spread of mini-hydropower projects designed for a single village is an encouraging current development. (American academics who argue, as some do, that villages do not need electricity have evidently never spent time in one without a flashlight.)

In Nairobi, energy officials attending the U.N. conference stressed in interviews their interest in conserving oil that is either domestically produced or expensively imported for use in industry, transport and urban consumption. This new emphasis on finding non-oil energy sources for agriculture should also help to preserve the village.

The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, formed in 1978 to run the new global scientific network from offices in the World Bank, in 1980 presented a heavily documented case that the spread of biotechnology increases rural employment and that land size limitations need not prevent adoption of the most sophisticated new crops.

Taiwan perhaps offers the best example of this. Its villages are 100-percent literate, 100-percent electrified, grow the most scientifically advanced rice on small two- to three-acre farms and yet still retain strong traditional customs and values. Enter a village home, and the family altar, with its ancestral tablets, joss sticks and scroll with its Buddhist fertility goddess, goes right along with the sewing machine, refrigerator, television set and the sacks of chemical fertilizer and high-yield seeds, the mini-tractor and mechanical rice transplanter.

This shows what can be done once land holdings are of equitable size, women are given fairly equal rights to work and education, land is farmed by the family which owns it, and attention is given to better seeds, good water management, multiple cropping and hydroelectric power. The Taiwan example also suggests how far

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most Third World governments have to go. Lester Brown is right when he argues that we ought to tie our technical assistance to needed reforms so that political leaders feel compelled to do the things they need to do to make the new biotechnology work.

The question remains whether Americans will look beneath the politics of the surface and recognize these long-term economic and cultural changes in time to provide constructive leadership.

The question will be asked: why us? It is the villagers who have to adapt. True, yet strictly in terms of technological leadership, there are at least two, and maybe three, good reasons. First, it is primarily the transfer of American agricultural science in the 1960s and 1970s which has touched this revolution off. Virtually the entire scientific agricultural establishments of countries like India and South Korea are American-trained. We have the most familiarity with the probable economic and social effects of this science. To abandon the enterprise now would be like leading someone halfway across a flooded stream and then letting them find their own way, sink or swim. Look at what happened in Nairobi last year; with a little American leadership the Third World might now have a sensible way to pool energy information.

Second, the much-discussed start of the decline of American global power in the 1970s is now accomplished fact in East Asia, where Japan has already assumed the predominant role in trade, investment and technical assistance. In Indonesia, for example, Japan's economic presence, and corresponding influence, is now five or six times greater than our own.[24] A journalist visiting Djakarta today, who wants to know what is going on, may skip interviews with American officials, but not with the Japanese. Mexico provides another example: illegal immigration can only be solved in the villages of the central highlands, where the poorest 60 percent of the rural Mexicans live. Instead of anti-wetback outcries, the United States needs to help Mexico with education, organization and management to establish small-scale, agriculture-based, rural industry. If it does not, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry—drawing upon the pathfinding effort in Indonesia today—may soon loom rather large south of the border.

Indeed, future American technological assistance should be concentrated in Latin American countries like Mexico, as well as in Africa and the Muslim world, where cultural adjustment is coming most slowly. We can expect the Confucians to roar ahead,

[24] Interview, Edward Masters, *op. cit.*

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followed more hesitatingly by the Malay-Javanese, with the Hindus in doubt but probably trailing behind. India, aside from its need for solar, hydroelectric and other energy technology, has the agricultural science; the Indian people inescapably have to solve the Hindu caste problem by themselves. If they do so and pragmatic policies succeed in transforming China and India over the next several decades, America and the West may be challenged to maintain the leadership they won 200 years ago by harnessing technology first.

The third reason has to do with our own cultural adaptation to technology, or lack of it. As Ayatollah Khomeini and others have shrewdly seen, Western civilization has evident and exploitable racial and spiritual weaknesses. As our technological supremacy diminishes—as it has, for example with regard to Japan—we find ourselves dealing with non-Western cultures in a new spirit of equality.

The deeply religious Muslim, afraid as he is of the secular late twentieth century, or the African trying to work out a new role for himself, or the agnostic, group-directed Confucian, does not, as long as he stays a villager, really aspire to be like us. True, if we think of villagers as poorer and more miserable than most of them actually are, they tend to see us as richer and happier than we are. To a typical villager, America is a kind of star-spangled wonderland of untold wealth and the good life, of oomph and vitality, freedom and fun.

Yet they do not relate this fantasy to their own daily reality, nor, I suspect, are they ever likely to. Somehow, instinctively or intuitively, villagers suspect that any society with such a tiny minority of farmers must be very fragile; some Americans share this suspicion. We go back to Aristotle, Leakey and the anthropologists, to the idea that a man's culture is ultimately decided by the way he gets his food. We may be no exception. Nobody will ever again repeat our kind of oil-based mechanized agricultural revolution. Even with cheap oil, which is gone, we might feel culturally compelled to retreat from it ourselves.

The villagers are not moving from their (A) to our (B). Rather we are all moving toward (C), a wholly new kind of society based upon biotechnology, electronics, new energy sources and all the other scientific advances.

For the Third World's agricultural revolution is coming just as millions of Americans are struggling to reconcile industrialized agriculture and its effect on rural society with emotions and values that lie deep in our past. A reruralization of America cannot, in

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itself, restore lost values. This would require a probably unacceptable economic return to something like the pre-1920 subsistence family farm.

But science itself might provide a new high-technology economic basis to allow small groups of Americans to live comfortably and productively on the land. Our predicament is like that of the villagers: they have to find ways to keep their values; we have to find ways to restore ours. The villagers and ourselves all exist in the same continuum stretching unbroken through time. We stand at one end, the most technologically advanced society ever. But what we find most culturally meaningful is deeply rooted in the distant past. Let us look back, past the decaying cities, past the probably failed experiment of suburbia, past the dying small towns, past the vanished pioneer settlements, to the living source of all human culture—the agricultural village. By helping its ancient civilizations adapt to our most advanced scientific techniques, we just could be exploring our own way toward a more civilized American living pattern.

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Hans-Dietrich Genscher

TOWARD AN OVERALL WESTERN STRATEGY FOR PEACE, FREEDOM AND PROGRESS

"The unity of the Alliance is the basis of any successful relationship with the East." The converse of this remark by President Reagan also holds true: agreement in the Alliance on policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as agreement on political, economic and military strategy—this is the basis of the Alliance's cohesion and its ability to act.

In the Summer issue of this periodical the German view was presented on the subject of military strategy.[1] I shall therefore confine my observations to questions of political and economic strategy.

Ever since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and especially since the imposition of martial law in Poland as a result of Soviet pressure, these questions have been at the forefront of the discussion between Europe and America. In this debate we have managed to transform crises of the Eastern bloc into crises—or rather moods of crisis—in the Western Alliance.

What the outside observer sees is truly paradoxical:

— In Poland the fragility of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe is once more being demonstrated—and more clearly than ever. A communist party, deprived of its ideological strength and no longer able to rule on its own, cedes power to the military.

— The crisis not only of the Polish but of the entire communist economic system manifests itself: Marx had proclaimed that capitalism would founder on its contradictions, but these events make it clear that it is socialist planned economies in which the conditions of production are at variance with the productive forces.

— The Communist Party of Italy describes Soviet-style communism as a system "that does not permit any genuine democratic participation, either in production or in political

[1] Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1157–70.

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affairs, and thus not only stifles freedom and creative forces but at the same time checks economic dynamism as well as technological and cultural development."

But those who do not read *Unita* will hear little of this. Instead they will gain the impression that a crisis in the Alliance between Europe and America was sparked off on December 13, 1981, when martial law was imposed in Poland.

It is high time that the Western democracies put an end to this paradox, that they terminate the self-destructive despondency which causes them to blow up differences of opinion, such as are normal for an alliance of free states, into "crises" which render them incapable of seeing where the actual crisis exists in the world.

We must once more become conscious of the spiritual and material strengths of the West and realize that in the secular confrontation with the Soviet Union our democracies are better placed. What we need is self-assurance and confidence. From this confidence we must derive consensus on a consistent long-term overall strategy for our policy toward the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

II

The mood of crisis in the Alliance is focused on differences of opinion over détente. A great deal would be gained if we were to realize that the word "détente" has different meanings for Americans and Europeans.

When Europeans speak of détente, they refer to only one part of a dual strategy. The other part is to maintain adequate military strength in the Alliance to ensure its defensive capability and deter any attack on a member state or any political blackmail. In the European view, this policy of a balance of power must continue to be supplemented by détente: in other words, readiness for dialogue, negotiations and cooperation on equal terms with the East, with the aim of keeping a check on the East-West conflict and reducing tensions.

Understood in this way, détente is one of the two pillars of a dual strategy for peace. The first one, that of safeguarding equilibrium, is the foundation on which détente can be built and which is in fact indispensable for détente. For it is obvious that without equilibrium the Western democracies could not negotiate with the Soviet Union on equal terms but could merely pursue a policy of appeasement and compliance with Soviet demands.

The central element of the European policy of détente, and

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especially of the German policy toward the East, is the aim to establish and preserve a modus vivendi in a divided Europe—one which casts aside the basic conflict between East and West that cannot be resolved within the foreseeable future and which permits bridges of dialogue and cooperation to be spanned over the rifts formed by different philosophies and long-term goals. In this way it is intended, in the short term, to mitigate the effects of the division of Europe and, in the long term, to foster an evolutionary process in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, leading to greater freedom for people in the East and to a genuine peace order in Europe. As the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), concluded at Helsinki in 1975, states quite clearly, the United States and Canada play a part in establishing a peace order for Europe and in the process leading to it.

Incorporated in this European policy for peace is the policy pursued by the Federal Republic of Germany toward the German Democratic Republic (GDR). We follow this policy out of our responsibility for peace in Europe. It is designed to secure fruitful relations between the two German states as well as the greatest possible exchange of information and personal contacts between Germans on both sides of the frontier. Our long-term goal is and always will be "to work for a state of peace in Europe in which the German nation will regain its unity through free self-determination." This is how the goal is formulated in the Letter on German Unity which the Soviet government officially took note of when the Moscow Treaty of 1971 was concluded.

It should be obvious to all our allies that no responsible politician in the Federal Republic cherishes the illusion that it could seek to attain the indelible long-term goal of regaining German unity by pursuing a national policy of going it alone. Rather, the Alliance and a joint Alliance policy for a peace order encompassing the whole of Europe are the prerequisites for attaining this goal.

This makes another point clear: the national interests of the Germans are in harmony with the interests of the West as a whole in seeking a favorable development of relations with the East. Nobody in the Alliance would like to see the current East-West tensions compounded by tensions between the two German states. And nobody yearns for the days when Berlin was the source of crises affecting East-West relations as a whole and thus threatening peace.

The German and European concept of détente outlined above

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as part of a dual strategy vis-à-vis the East is by no means alien to American thinking. The first person to develop such a dual strategy was President John F. Kennedy in his speech at American University in Washington on June 10, 1963.

In the Harmel Report of 1967, this dual strategy was established as the joint policy of the Alliance. Henry Kissinger, too, was of the opinion that a policy of equilibrium and efforts for détente belonged together. But it should not be overlooked that in the early 1970s the concept of détente was "oversold" in America, and came to be widely interpreted not as an element of a dual strategy but as a self-contained policy of its own.

The task remained the same: that of curbing worldwide the expansion of Soviet power. However, after the experience of the failure of a purely military policy of containment in Vietnam, this goal was now to be achieved primarily by a new method: the Soviet Union was to be integrated into a close-knit network of mutually beneficial cooperation and thus induced to subscribe to the principle of mutual political restraint and moderation on both sides in the field of armaments. In other words, the Soviet Union was to be given the opportunity to cooperate in the international system to its own benefit, which would thus establish a long-term Soviet stake in the stability of the system.

In the early 1970s the American and European policies of détente were mutually supportive. However, owing to the different approaches of these policies and the different expectations placed in them, it is inevitable, looking back on the 1970s, that many Americans today assess détente differently than the Europeans.

Many Americans feel today that détente has failed. They state that this policy was unable to induce the Soviet Union to exercise political restraint or moderation in the field of armaments. In fact, despite all negotiations on arms control the Soviet Union continued to build up its arms arsenal at full steam—in all categories and well beyond the extent that could be justified by defense considerations. Furthermore, since the mid-1970s the Soviet Union has openly adopted a policy of indirect and direct military intervention in the Third World.

Now, in the early 1980s, the Western democracies are therefore faced with a Soviet Union that has become a global superpower in military terms and is prepared—as demonstrated by the developments in countries ranging from Angola to Afghanistan—to make use of this newly acquired capacity for military intervention anywhere in the world.

The Europeans, and especially we Germans living at the frontier

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between East and West, judge this development in a way altogether similar to that of the Americans. And no less than the Americans are we alive to the threat emanating from this development. The danger now is obviously not primarily an attack on Europe in the form of a Great War. Instead the danger lies in a gradual shift in the balance of power in the world. At the end of such a process the Western democracies, and above all the European ones, would then be forced into compliance and subjugation by the Soviet Union demonstrating its overwhelming military superiority and by its control of sea lanes and Third World regions that are of vital importance for energy and raw material supplies to the West.

Americans and Europeans are largely in agreement in their analysis of this situation. The existing differences of opinion concern the conclusions to be drawn from the experience gained in the 1970s. While many Americans regard détente as having failed once and for all, most people in Europe continue to consider détente as a suitable and necessary concept. They feel that the setbacks sustained in East-West relations in the 1970s are attributable not to détente but to omissions in the pursuit of a policy of equilibrium.

The prerequisite for détente is equilibrium—the Alliance's dual strategy set out in the Harmel Report stresses this quite clearly. In the 1970s, however, American arms spending fell in real terms, while that of the Soviet Union continued to rise steadily. During the Angola crisis in 1975, the American Congress adopted a law making it clear to the whole world that the United States did not intend to become involved in the conflict. The Soviet Union regarded this as a carte blanche for an intervention by Cuban troops. On the other hand, the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments of late 1974 deprived the Administration of the possibility of offering Moscow broad-based economic cooperation.

The question thus remains unanswered of how Soviet policy would have developed if the United States, suffering from the double trauma of Vietnam and Watergate, had not itself seriously weakened its capacity both for putting up resistance and offering incentives.

The part of the Harmel dual strategy supplementing the policy of equilibrium can be labeled variously as détente (the term I prefer), dialogue, a quest for constructive relations, or a policy of stabilization and peaceful change—what matters is that a one-legged policy, as it were, of pure opposition is no longer feasible in this nuclear age. We live in a situation unprecedented in world

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history, in which resorting to military means for resolving a conflict is no longer a rational option because it would entail the destruction of the "victor" as well. The ambivalence of the Harmel strategy, which regards the Soviet Union as adversary and negotiating partner at the same time, is based on the ambivalence of life itself. Détente is geared to the overriding interest of East and West: that of preventing nuclear war.

Since the days of Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet Union itself has openly acknowledged that a war between East and West can be avoided. What appears only natural to us is in reality the outcome of a fundamental change in communist doctrine, a first breakthrough in a Manichaean concept that normally regards non-communists as nothing but class enemies. Leonid Brezhnev developed the principle of the avoidability of nuclear war into a strategy of "peaceful coexistence." This does not mean that the Soviet Union has foresworn its goal of a world revolution. Rather, a policy of peaceful coexistence serves to promote Soviet predominance (effectively domination) in such a way that a major war between East and West is avoided and economic cooperation with the West is made possible.

Hence a Soviet leadership that can expand its arms arsenal without encountering any corresponding efforts on the Western side, and that can intervene in the Third World without the risk of counteraction, will do so in keeping with the role it has ascribed to itself. It would be illusionary to expect anything else. But how would a Soviet leadership behave which, in pursuing such a policy, was faced with an adequate response by the West, involving a correspondingly high risk? In the long run it might find itself compelled to choose what it considers to be the "second best" course: that of genuine coexistence with the West. This is not Soviet-style coexistence which expects the Western democracies to yield passively to the alleged laws of history that provide for the victory of communism. Genuine coexistence can only mean living alongside one another in peace, cooperating with each other for mutual benefit, and permitting peaceful change in a pluralistic world.

The concept of a dual strategy provides the most effective response to the challenge posed by the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence": one part of this strategy, a policy of equilibrium, is designed to bring home to the Soviet leadership that it is futile to pursue a policy of predominance. The détente part of the strategy at the same time affords the Soviet Union an alternative, the option of cooperation with the West. If the road to predominance

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is permanently blocked, the Soviet Union might ultimately consider it to be also in its own interest to take up this offer of cooperation.

This dual strategy is of great importance especially now in view of the gradual change of leadership in Moscow. Any one-sided policy would fail to bring us nearer to the goal of making peace more secure:

— Unilateral concessions might only encourage the new generation of Soviet leaders to continue their quest for superiority.
— Confrontation, on the other hand, would ultimately have the same effect since the Soviet leaders would be given no other option.

It is imperative today that we avoid the mistake that led to the Second World War when the democracies, with their policy of appeasement, permitted the German Reich to gain military superiority in Europe. Equally, we must not repeat the mistake that led to the First World War when both sides lost control over developments and, despite a balanced situation, drifted into a war that nobody wanted.

In view of these considerations, we Germans contend that the policy of détente—a realistic policy of détente—should be continued. "Realistic" means that the Alliance is aware at all times of the persistent differences in philosophies and objectives existing between East and West and that it realizes that détente is only feasible on the foundation of a policy of equilibrium as one of the two pillars required for the preservation of peace.

The government of the Federal Republic of Germany has from the very outset pursued a realistic policy of détente. In its policy statement of October 1969 it already emphasized that it did not want to arouse any "illusive hopes." And I myself said before the German Bundestag on July 25, 1975, in a statement in connection with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, at a time when détente was at its peak:

> A realistic policy of détente is one which is fully conscious of its own limits. Détente policy must have security as its basis. For us there can be no security without the Alliance and its—and thus also our—readiness for defense. Anyone thinking he can safeguard his security through détente efforts alone would be a dangerous dreamer.

We Germans have acted in accordance with this perception. In the 1970s we increased our arms expenditure annually by three percent in real terms and made the Bundeswehr—an army of conscripts—one of the best equipped and trained in the world.

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Other European allies acted likewise.

The experience gained from détente in the 1970s is completely different in Europe from the experience gained in the United States, where defense spending decreased during that period. In America it is widely assumed that an atmosphere of détente impairs the readiness for defense, but precisely the converse is true for Europe. Europeans are willing to make sacrifices for defense if they are convinced that arms expenditure will help to stabilize peace. By contrast, an atmosphere of confrontation arouses fear of armaments.

Once we are aware of the difference between the European and American concepts of "détente," it should be possible, from this basic perception, to develop a long-term overall Alliance policy toward the East that draws common conclusions from the experience in the 1970s and provides a joint response to the challenges of the 1980s. Four fields are involved: arms control and disarmament, economic relations with the East, human rights and in this context especially the policy toward Eastern Europe, and policy toward the Third World.

III

The single most important question for the development of East-West relations in the years ahead, and indeed for worldwide political and economic developments as a whole, is whether another turn of the arms spiral can be prevented.

Despite the arms control and disarmament efforts undertaken thus far, the arsenals of weaponry in East and West and in the Third World have grown. It is therefore understandable that people become skeptical about arms control. But the achievements so far should not be underrated. Some important results have indeed been attained already: the Non-proliferation Treaty; the Limited Test Ban Treaty; the Outer Space, Antarctic and Seabed Treaties; SALT I and the associated ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; and finally SALT II, which although not ratified, is observed by both sides.

Above and beyond this, arms control negotiations fulfill an important task in themselves even before a treaty is signed. They lead to an exchange of information on armaments on both sides and make it easier to understand the other side's viewpoints and assess the potentials that exist. The dialogue between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and between the two alliances on mutual security issues is an unprecedented development conducive to stability.

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At the same time, arms control negotiations afford the West the most suitable forum for making it clear to the world that the Western Alliance's military policy is geared to equilibrium and not to a quest for military superiority. It is most important to make this clear so as to ensure public support for the Alliance's policy. The governments' calls for the necessary expenditures for defense will have the backing of their citizens only if the Alliance's policy is seen as a peace policy based on equilibrium. By contrast, a policy that could be misconstrued as simply one of confrontation would forfeit the support of the public.

Thus, despite the disappointments of the 1970s, the Alliance is rightly continuing the vigorous pursuit of its arms control policy. The members of the Alliance are agreed that arms control and disarmament are an integral part of its security policy. Acting in this conviction, and not least thanks to President Reagan's initiatives, the Alliance has submitted to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the most comprehensive disarmament proposals in the postwar period:

— In the START negotiations commenced in June 1982, the United States has proposed to the Soviet Union that both sides reduce considerably their intercontinental nuclear weapons.

— In the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) commenced in November 1981, the United States is seeking the complete elimination of all land-based American and Soviet intermediate-range weapons. This implies, incidentally, that the Soviet Union must be prevented from undermining these negotiations by developing further its short-range nuclear weapons. A new grey area not covered by any arms control agreement must not be allowed to emerge.

— In the Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Central Europe (MBFR), the allies involved have recently submitted a new comprehensive proposal designed to expedite the talks.

— Furthermore, we hope that when the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid is resumed it will prove possible to agree on the convening of a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. The purpose of such a conference is to agree on confidence-building measures applicable to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which would make the military potentials and activities in Europe more transparent and help to dispel the

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fear of a surprise attack and the danger of unintentional escalation.

The aim of the Western proposals made to the Soviet Union is to establish military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. This goal will indeed be difficult to attain, but may nonetheless be viewed with cautious optimism: in the present economic situation high military expenditure is an increasingly heavy burden in East and West alike. This holds true in particular for the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, when the Soviet economy was still expanding at a rate of four percent, the Soviet leaders were able both to increase arms spending by four to five percent annually in real terms and to improve the living standard of the population on a modest scale. However, since the late 1970s the growth rate of the Soviet economy has sunk to two percent, while the share of the gross national product accounted for by arms spending has risen to 14-15 percent. The Soviet Union is therefore faced in the 1980s with the choice between bread and guns: maintaining or even increasing the existing rate of arms production would ineluctably entail drastic cuts in the standard of living.

Concurrently, in the United States the trend of declining arms expenditure in real terms has been reversed on account of the Soviet arms buildup. The Soviets can therefore no longer hope to shift the balance of power in their favor through a continued unilateral arms buildup.

Given this situation, it is quite possible that the Soviet Union can bring itself to follow the course offered by the West: that of verifiable arms limitation and disarmament aimed at parity and equilibrium at the lowest possible level of armaments.

IV

The current discussion between Europeans and Americans is centered on the question of economic relations with the Soviet Union. We are agreed that economic relations have an important political function to perform within an overall strategy toward the Soviet Union. But what is this function?

In order to reach agreement on the function they *should* perform, it is first necessary to agree on the function they *can* perform. In other words, how important to the Soviet Union is its trade with the West? The differences of opinion start at this point, and I shall try to assess the situation from the German and European viewpoints. First of all some facts:

From 1947 until the 1960s the Soviet Union pursued a policy of self-reliance, partly under the impact of the Western embargo. Its

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trade with the West was minimal. However, the Western embargo and Soviet self-reliance did not prevent the country from being the first to enter outer space with its *Sputnik* and from catching up in the field of nuclear armaments.

In the mid-1960s the West liberalized its trade with the East to a large extent, and Moscow decided to open up its own country and the other countries of the Eastern bloc to international trade. Then, in the early 1970s, it also decided to take up credits with the West.

As a result, Soviet trade with the West grew rapidly: imports from the West tripled in the 1970s. However, by the mid-1970s this expansion had already reached its peak. East-West trade then began to stagnate for economic reasons. Trade between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union was particularly affected by this stagnation. In 1980, German exports to the Soviet Union only reached the same level in real terms as in 1975, and in 1981 they fell even in nominal terms. This decline persisted into the first quarter of 1982, while American exports to the U.S.S.R. continued to rise steeply. The United States is now, owing to its grain exports, by far the biggest Western exporter to the U.S.S.R.

Between 1971 and 1976 the Soviet Union financed about 20 percent of its imports from the West with the aid of credits. From 1977 onward the net inflow of capital began to slow down, and in 1980–81 there was a small net outflow. Growing debt-service payments therefore gradually offset net borrowings. In 1982, however, there is likely to be a net inflow again.

How important are trade and credits for the Soviet Union?

Most experts estimate that Western imports account for about 1.5 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP). In the field of Soviet expenditure on machinery and equipment, imports from the West accounted for approximately seven to nine percent in 1975; this share had fallen to six to eight percent by 1979 and has probably fallen further since then to the extent that grain imports have taken priority over machinery imports.

Depending on the estimates used, the Soviet Union's net indebtedness had fallen to eight to ten billion dollars by the late 1970s. Its debts with German banks were reduced from DM 5.3 billion in 1976 to DM 3.6 billion in March 1982.

Given a GNP of $1.4 trillion dollars (CIA estimate in 1979), this net indebtedness of eight to ten billion dollars does not even constitute one percent of GNP. In order to meet the debt-servicing payments, the Soviet Union has consistently developed export capacities. In view of the unprecedentedly high real interest rates

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prevailing at present, this calls for substantial efforts. That, too, should be taken into account when assessing the benefits of Western credits for the Soviet economy.

The fact that imports from the West account for 1.5 percent of the Soviet GNP does not, of course, fully reflect the actual situation. Imports from the West may have a greater importance for the Soviet economy than is expressed by this percentage of their value in dollars. They are virtually indispensable for some priority programs of the Soviet economy, such as those for maintaining and increasing meat production (import of feed grain) and for the envisaged increases in energy production (import of pipes and pumping stations). Imports from the West are also important to help overcome bottlenecks. By importing technological products the Soviet Union can save time and money and obtain better quality products in the bargain.

A substantial decline in imports from the West would therefore undoubtedly exacerbate the great problems besetting the Soviet economy. But only a disruption of the grain supplies from the West would have immediate, widely felt effects.

However, all of these considerations will probably not alter the fact that the Soviet economy—unlike those of other Eastern European countries—is largely self-sufficient and not reliant on the West. While the Soviet Union's economic relations with the West have reached a magnitude making the country seriously interested in cooperation, they have not reached a volume that affords the West leverage for inducing the Soviet Union to make major political concessions. The "carrot" and "stick" are simply too small for this purpose.

The prospect of trade may perhaps prompt the Soviet Union to make concessions in the humanitarian sphere. But trade incentives cannot make the Soviet Union abandon its arms buildup if it sees in this an opportunity for acquiring superiority. Nor can they prompt the Soviet Union to exercise restraint in the Third World if it sees chances of expanding its predominance there without incurring any risks. The Soviet challenge is political and military in nature—it can be countered effectively only by political and military means.

There is even less hope of making the Soviet Union incapable of continuing its arms buildup by denying it trade. The Soviet economy is made up of two components: the military economy and the civilian one. The military economy is given virtually absolute priority, and there can be no doubt that the Soviet leadership will and can at all times allocate to it the resources it

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considers necessary.

While Soviet policy can thus not be influenced in the short term by either economic incentives or economic "punishment," it must be clearly recognized that economic ties are of major importance for the long-term development of East-West relations.

Maintaining the Western readiness for trade means maintaining the offer of cooperation and constantly reminding the Soviet Union of the possibility of comprehensive East-West economic cooperation—that is, if the Soviet Union abandons its policy of predominance and seeks "genuine coexistence."

Drastic restrictions on Western trade with the Soviet Union would inevitably cause the country to relapse into a policy of self-reliance and to form closer economic ties with the newly industrialized countries of the Third World. Above all, they would aggravate the political climate between East and West, making it one of confrontation. It is precisely that climate which might make it easier for the Soviet leadership to gain the support of its own population for the continuation of its arms buildup and expansionism.

It must be borne in mind that the Soviet Union is in any case facing major economic difficulties in the 1980s. Western trade restrictions could exacerbate these difficulties only to a small extent. They would, however, afford the Soviet leaders a pretext for ascribing all of the difficulties to the "trade war" waged by the West against the Soviet fatherland.

True pressure for reform in the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc as a whole comes from within. External pressure would paradoxically reduce this pressure from within. It would above all enhance rather than impair the Soviet Union's capacity for expanding its arms arsenal. If the Soviet leadership wants to maintain the existing growth rate of four to five percent per annum in arms spending in real terms, although the economic growth rate has fallen to two percent and per capita income is rising only at a rate of one percent, it would have to reduce public consumption. The Soviet leaders are therefore faced with the dilemma that restrictions on consumption would lower the motivation of the working population and hence reduce economic growth. In this dilemma, a "trade war" with the West could in fact prove useful.

Therefore, when seeking to determine the type of trade and financial policy to be pursued toward the Soviet Union by Western governments it is not a case of whether one should be "soft or hard on communism." Rather, the question is what is the most effective policy for achieving our own objectives.

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A trade war would be counterproductive. We should keep this fact in mind in the current American-European discussion of the natural gas pipeline deal. If Europe were to go back on that deal, this would mean breaking contracts that have already been made. At the same time it would mean a drastic reduction in trade throughout the entire decade of the 1980s. The foreign currency earnings resulting from the additional Soviet gas exports to Western Europe made possible by the construction of the Yamal Pipeline are not likely to offset even the loss of income resulting from the expected decrease in Soviet oil exports to Western Europe. If the Soviet Union is denied these earnings, this would be bound to lead to a sharp decline in trade because of the Soviet lack of foreign currency. The U.S. Administration, too, stresses that it does not desire a trade war with the Soviet Union. But would such a breach of contract and such a drastic reduction in trade amount to anything different?

With all due respect for the priority of political considerations, we should not neglect the purely economic cost-benefit calculation. During the 1980 election campaign, President Reagan posed the question of whether the American grain embargo had not caused more economic damage to the United States itself than to the Soviet Union. This is a most relevant question. It would indeed be paradoxical if, by imposing embargoes, we were to weaken ourselves more than the Soviet Union. On July 25, 1982, *The Washington Post* published a report on an American projection based on the assumption that the major Western industrialized countries would reduce their exports of finished goods to the Soviet Union by one-half in 1982 and 1983. Its conclusion: the Soviet national product would suffer a loss of $4.5 billion during these two years, while the Western national product would decline by $30 billion.

All of these considerations seem to me to suggest the following course for our economic dealings with the Soviet Union:

It is in the interest of our dual strategy to maintain the current relatively limited trade conducted by the West with the Soviet Union, and at the same time to continue to put forth a long-term offer of truly significant and comprehensive cooperation, provided that the Soviet Union begins to pursue a course of genuine coexistence.

Until that time, the West should strictly orient its economic relations with the East to the three principles laid down at the June 1982 Versailles Economic Summit meeting and the NATO Summit in Bonn: the reciprocity of benefits, commercial prudence

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in granting credits, and the prevention of the transfer of militarily relevant Western technologies.

All of the partners in the Alliance are in accord on these principles. Our task is now to work toward agreement in specific instances.

Credits to the East should be granted only on market terms. It will not be possible to dispense with export credit guarantees, which are customarily granted by governments for capital goods exports. However, these guarantees, too, should be governed by economic considerations. The premiums should be cost-covering, and the guarantees should only be granted if the debt and liquidity situation appears to warrant accepting the repayment risk.

In their trade with the East, the Western democracies must be even more careful than in the past to prevent the transfer of technologies that might be used for military purposes. The controls of the long-standing Coordinating Committee (COCOM) must be tightened, and we must gain increased knowledge as to which technologies are of relevance to Soviet arms efforts.

Finally, the West should also be careful not to put itself into a position of dependence through its trade with the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic of Germany may serve as an example to illustrate the question of dependence. Taking into account both imports and exports, the Federal Republic is the largest Western trading partner of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, German exports to the Soviet Union amount to only one-third of our exports to Switzerland, for example. They accounted for 1.9 percent of our total exports in 1981. Ninety thousand people were employed directly or indirectly in connection with exports to the Soviet Union—or 0.4 percent of all employed persons in our country.

No one would conclude from these figures that the Federal Republic was subject to political blackmail by the Soviet Union. The "benefits" the Western media like to cite of German trade with the East are surely too small for that.

Nor will dependency result from the planned increase in natural gas imports beginning in the middle of the 1980s. These imports will only compensate, at best, for the expected decrease in Soviet oil deliveries. Thus the five or six percent of overall German primary energy consumption provided by energy imports from the Soviet Union will not rise, but may decrease. It is true that the share of Soviet gas in our overall gas consumption will increase to 30 percent; but we have taken precautionary measures to ensure that the major industrial customers can shift from natural

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gas to coal or oil on short notice. It should also be kept in mind that the Yamal Pipeline is an export pipeline. An interruption in gas deliveries—which would inevitably affect all of Western Europe—would thus be expensive for the Soviet Union too; it would interrupt the flow of hard currency and probably also curtail production.

V

In contrast to the Soviet viewpoint, which holds that détente only affects the relationships between governments, it has always been a concern of the West, and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, that détente should have tangible effects for individuals in their daily lives. It was intended that it would contribute to increasing the personal liberty of the individual in the East, and help to make it possible for people on both sides of the border between East and West to come together again.

In the CSCE Final Act, the West succeeded in gaining recognition for this concern: in Principle VII the participating states undertook to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and recognized that this respect is an essential factor for the peace, friendly relations and cooperation among them. And in "Basket III" of the Act the participating states set forth concrete pledges concerning the encouragement of contacts and encounters between people and of the exchange of information across frontiers.

We should clearly recognize what was achieved here: these arrangements made it possible to go far beyond a mere modus vivendi in Europe on the basis of the status quo, and to add dynamic elements to the policy of détente—elements which encourage long-term development in the communist countries of Europe toward greater freedom and self-determination.

Thus the CSCE Final Act has given the West an important instrument for a dynamic policy of détente. The Final Act does not require anything of us that we are not already doing. Instead, it gives us the political legitimation to call for the realization of human rights, for peaceful change and for the gradual overcoming of the division of Europe. In the Final Act the East expressly recognized these topics as forming an essential part of the dialogue on East-West cooperation. The West is therefore vitally interested in maintaining and utilizing the CSCE process.

Détente and the CSCE process were not responsible for creating the desire for more freedom among the people in Soviet-dominated Central and Eastern Europe, but they have made opportunities much more favorable for that desire to take on concrete shape

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than would have been possible in the atmosphere of confrontation of the cold war. The oppression of the dissident movements by the Soviet Union, and now above all the repression of the Polish workers' desire for reform, constitute severe setbacks. We should also recognize, however, that a movement like Solidarity in Poland would not have been possible without détente and without intensive human and economic relations between Poland and the West. Furthermore, even in the cold war era it did not prove possible to prevent the 1953 uprising in the GDR, the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, or the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. And we should be conscious of how much greater the personal freedom of each individual in the East is today, in spite of all setbacks, as compared with the 1950s and 1960s, and of how greatly opportunities have improved for people to come together across the existing borders.

The fundamental change in the situation of the Eastern European economies has far-reaching implications. Today they are dependent on cooperation with the West. The Soviet Union can no longer satisfy either their need for advanced technology or for food, and it is becoming apparent that the Soviets will be less and less able in the future to meet the needs of the other COMECON countries for energy and raw materials as well. This means that the Soviet Union has lost, along with its ability to secure for itself Eastern Europe's supply of important goods, its monopoly as a supplier as well.

Western policy toward Eastern Europe must take into account the changes that occurred in the 1970s. These changes provide the West with opportunities to exert influence on Eastern Europe that would have been almost unimaginable in the 1960s. However, we will only be able to take advantage of this leverage if we use it carefully—if we use it for a policy of small steps and gradual improvement.

The situation in Poland, where practically the entire nation is behind the demand for reforms and democratic rights of participation, provides a clear example of the dead end in which the Soviet Union finds itself with its definition of its security interests, which requires not only the loyalty of the Warsaw Pact member countries to that alliance, but also that they accept the rigid Soviet-style communist system. The Soviet Union has the military power to force that system on the people. By so doing, however, it can gain neither reliable alliance partners nor economic partners which provide an asset rather than a burden. That end can only be achieved if the Soviet Union responds in a constructive way to

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the desire of the nations for self-determination and the realization of their national European identity.

The CSCE Final Act points a way out of this dead end. It does not demand the dissolution of the alliances. It does not impair anyone's security interests. On the contrary, the fulfillment of the Final Act by all signatory states would give the whole of Europe more stability and more security. Maintaining the status quo in the Soviet Union's hegemonic sphere through force, on the other hand, poses a constant threat to peaceful living together in all of Europe.

Proceeding on the basis of their ideal of freedom, and with a view to securing peace in Europe, the Western democracies cannot and must not remain silent in the face of the suppression of freedom in Central and Eastern Europe; here, too, they must call for the realization of human rights and the right to self-determination. But they must work at the same time toward evolutionary change in the Soviet system of domination. In the long run, there is a good chance that these Western demands will be fulfilled, for they are in the interest of the Central and Eastern European nations, as well as in the interest of the West. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself might recognize the fulfillment of these demands as a way to achieve a more fruitful relationship with its European allies.

VI

Assuming that the balance is secured in Europe, it is in Asia, Africa and Latin America that movements determining the global power relationship are to be expected. For this reason it is of paramount importance for the West to pursue a suitable policy as regards the countries of the Third World and their desire for nonalignment.

At the time of its founding, the nonaligned movement was directed primarily against colonialism and against drawing the newly independent states of the Third World into the alliance systems of the West. In the struggle of the nonaligned countries against colonialism, the Soviet Union presented itself as a "natural ally," and in some instances a shortsighted Western policy forced the nonaligned countries to accept Soviet support which they had not originally sought, and indeed had not wanted.

Along with the process of decolonialization, which has now almost come to an end, this situation has changed. The nonaligned movement has entered a new phase in which it is trying to strengthen and secure on all sides the independence it has

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achieved. The invasion of nonaligned Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and the Soviet-supported occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam have alerted many countries of the Third World to the fact that the true danger to their independence is posed by the Soviet desire for political and ideological domination. The turning point was the summit meeting held by the nonaligned countries in Havana in 1979, where the overwhelming majority rejected the idea of siding with the Soviet Union as propagated by Cuba.

This new situation offers the West the chance for fruitful cooperation with the countries of the Third World. However, it can only seize this opportunity if it does not respond to the Soviet policy of predominance in the Third World by offering a mirror image of that policy, attempting to set up spheres of influence of its own. Instead, it must stand up firmly on the side of independence and self-determination. It would then be in step with the strongest driving force behind the minds and deeds of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. And it would also be in step with historical progress.

In concrete terms, a policy of respecting and strengthening the independence of the Third World requires, first of all, affirmation and encouragement of the right of Third World countries to determine their own course. We should not attempt to export our own political, economic and social models to the Third World. And we must not allow ourselves to be misused as protectors of outdated, unjust structures. Our interests are by no means endangered by the mere fact that a developing country calls its system socialist and its economy a planned economy. The important thing is that its government is able to act on its own, and that it is not dependent on Moscow for its existence and survival. As a rule, the West will be able to maintain fruitful relations with an independent government, for it is the West, with its affirmation of the right to self-determination and its willingness to provide economic and effective trade ties and technology, that is the natural partner of the Third World, and not the East.

Second, strengthening the independence of the Third World requires an active policy by which the West contributes to peaceful solutions to the conflicts in that region.

Third, strengthening the independence of the Third World means encouraging the trend toward regional associations there. Such associations create larger units, providing protection against intervention by alien powers. At the same time they create larger economic areas which facilitate—or make possible in the first place—the development and establishment of efficient industries.

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Recognizing this, we Germans have become an advocate in the European Community of promoting regional unions in the Third World, and we have supported the development of different kinds of interregional cooperation between the Community and those associations.

Finally, and above all, strengthening the independence of the Third World requires economic development assistance and a North-South dialogue marked by trust, with the goal of establishing stable cooperation in a spirit of interdependence between industrialized and developing countries.

In this North-South dialogue, we should also encourage internal development strategies which include the poor masses in the process of development. For most countries this will mean development strategies that are not based on forced industrialization along Western or Eastern lines, but that give priority to the development of labor-intensive agriculture, and industries producing simple goods for mass consumption. Only in this way will it be possible to prevent a large portion of the population from being excluded from the benefits of development, and to achieve development in stability.

The peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Third World and a system for economic and social development in stability minimize the opportunities available for the Soviet policy of expansion. At the same time, however, the will of the West to respect genuine nonalignment and to keep East-West antagonisms out of the Third World constitute an offer to cooperate with the Soviet Union as well. We for our part by no means want to transform parts of the Third World into Western zones of influence, and we demand from the Soviet Union only what we expect of ourselves: respect for the independence and self-determination of the countries of the Third World.

VII

The urgent task with which the Alliance is confronted at the beginning of the 1980s is this: in the spheres of political and economic strategy toward the Soviet Union, as well as in military strategy, which has not been dealt with here, we must maintain our ability for consensus and action, and where this ability is being threatened or lost it must be rebuilt. The NATO Summit Conference of June 9–10, 1982 in Bonn laid the groundwork for an overall Alliance strategy for the 1980s.

We must build on this foundation in order to overcome the differences of opinion that still exist in specific matters, in partic-

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ular as regards the question of economic relations with the Soviet Union. As long as we have not succeeded in bringing the differing opinions sufficiently close together in individual questions, and in balancing different interests, we must at any rate conduct the discussion in such a way that no damage is done to the foundations of the Alliance.

There are two foundations on which the Alliance rests: the consciousness of our community of values and of our common security—or, in other words, the awareness of Americans, Canadians and Europeans that they belong together and share the same ideals of freedom and democracy, and of the value and dignity of man; and the awareness of Americans, Canadians and Europeans that they can only defend those ideals by working together, that their fates are inextricably bound. We are of the same kind and we sit in the same boat. In an Alliance of free nations, it is only natural that there are differences of opinion and interests as regards individual questions, and that they are expressed in open discussion. We should consider such differences to be just as normal as are differences of opinion and interests within our democracies.

There have always been such differences within the Alliance. As far as their substance is concerned, they do not seem to be any larger or more insurmountable today than in the past. What is alarming, however, is the perception of these differences in public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, and a spreading feeling that something is wrong with the Alliance. What is also alarming is that some people on both sides of the Atlantic often seem to have lost their consciousness of the community of values and our common security which are the foundations of the Alliance.

In Europe there are those who thoughtlessly speak of "the two superpowers." And some even consciously advocate "equidistance."

In the United States, for its part, the news coverage by the media creates the false impression of widespread anti-Americanism in Europe. And that impression leads to a dangerous inclination to "go it alone." It is certainly more plausible for Americans than for Europeans to think that they could secure their future in freedom alone, without the Alliance. But it would also be an illusion for Americans to believe this. As General Bernard Rogers put it in the Summer issue of this periodical, "The simple fact is that the United States could not retain the freedoms or the prosperity it knows today through some alternative 'Fortress America' concept."

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For the older generation in Europe and the United States, a generation that consciously experienced World War II and the postwar era, the basic feeling of belonging together and being dependent on each other is something very natural. The members of that generation experienced warding off together the threat to freedom posed by the Soviet Union. We Germans also came to know the Americans as generous victors who helped us to establish a free democracy and a thriving economy. The Europeans and Americans who are now 20 to 30 years old did not share those experiences. And the members of the older generation are now recognizing with dismay that they have too heedlessly assumed that feelings and insights they had taken for granted would be passed on automatically. We must do all in our power to correct this mistake. In Europe and in the United States the older generation must make a conscious effort to impart its basic historical experiences to young people. Moreover, young people on both sides of the Atlantic must come into contact with each other much more than in the past. No arguments, no matter how good, can replace the firsthand experience of belonging together.

In addition to the two basic feelings which I referred to as the foundations of the Alliance, there is another important aspect that should be mentioned: the sense that the burden of our common defense is distributed fairly among the partners in the Alliance. I consider it dangerous that today many Americans apparently have the impression that there is no fair burden-sharing.

This impression has to do with the fact that the United States, at considerable sacrifice, is currently increasing its defense expenditures to a much greater extent than are the Europeans. Nonetheless, it is not justified. Most of the European partners in the Alliance, and above all the Federal Republic of Germany, increased their defense expenditure annually by an average of three percent in real terms throughout the decade of the 1970s. During that period the United States reduced its expenditure by an annual average of two percent in real terms. Europe's share of overall Western defense expenditures (not only those within NATO) increased between 1969 and 1980 from 21 to 42 percent. The share accounted for by the United States decreased to 56 percent.

Ninety percent of the troops in Europe and 75 percent of the tanks and combat aircraft are provided by the Europeans. In comparing arms expenditures, it should also be taken into consideration that several of the European partners, including the Federal Republic and France, maintain armies based on compulsory military service; the costs for conscripts are lower than those

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for professional soldiers. Much more important, however, is the fact that armies based on compulsory military service provide the opportunity of mobilizing reservists. Thus the European forces can be increased from their peacetime strength of three million men to six million in case of mobilization, while the United States and Canada can only build up their forces of 2.2 million to a level of three million.

The unity of the Alliance, as President Kennedy clearly recognized many years ago, would be strengthened if we succeeded in transforming an Alliance of two North American and 14 European states into an Alliance resting on two more or less equal pillars: North America and Western Europe. Achieving this goal is a task that is primarily up to the Europeans. Those in Europe who complain about dependence on America are in reality complaining about insufficient progress toward European union. It is not the United States that is denying Europe equal status in the Alliance, but the Europeans themselves: through the inability to unite, i.e., to subordinate national interests, as necessary, to the European interest, and thus through the inability to join together in formulating and defending European objectives within the Alliance. Seen in this light, a policy toward European union is also a policy for strengthening Western unity as a whole.

From the very beginning the Western Alliance has been not only a military alliance, but above all a political community based on shared values. Hence, whatever strengthens consultations within the Alliance also strengthens the Alliance itself. With this in mind, I have suggested since 1980 that informal meetings of the NATO foreign ministers be set up, in which issues might be discussed by the foreign ministers alone, without a set agenda and without the usual array of civil servants. I consider it very significant that such meetings have now been agreed upon, and that the NATO foreign ministers will gather for the first informal meeting at the beginning of October in Montreal.

The cornerstone on which the Alliance rests is the German-American friendship. This cornerstone remains firm. There are doubtless some Germans who see "the two superpowers" as equidistant. And there are doubtless Germans who do not seem to recognize a threat, in spite of the Soviet divisions stationed along our borders.

But the important thing is that those Germans are in the minority. Precisely because they do not represent the normal position, however, their opinions and actions are regarded as newsworthy. As a result of the concentration of reporting on this

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minority in the American and European media, the impression is created that this group is representative. Just the opposite is true. All of the opinion polls taken during the past years have shown consistently that the overwhelming majority of Germans are on the side of the United States. I might quote two results of a poll taken by the Gallup organization in several European countries and the United States in February 1982 for *Newsweek* magazine.

This poll showed that the percentage of those who are positively inclined toward the United States is by far greater in Germany than in any other European country surveyed: 73 percent of Germans have a favorable opinion of the United States. Furthermore, 74 percent of the Germans made it clear that if they had to choose between fighting and accepting Soviet domination they would prefer to fight. To quote one more figure: in the most recent Bundestag elections only 0.2 percent of Germans voted for communist parties. These figures should be recognized, instead of talking ourselves into the danger of German neutralism and conjuring up the specter of a new Rapallo. The Federal Republic of Germany is a reliable partner in the Alliance. It has made its full contribution to our joint defense of freedom in the past, and it will continue to do so.

VIII

The Western democracies have a long period of constant effort ahead of them. The dual strategy of securing a balance of power and of openness for cooperation places demands on us for which we have not been prepared by our past historical experience. This dual strategy means that we must view the Soviet Union as both a potential opponent and a possible partner. It requires that our citizens make the necessary sacrifices for the cause of armament, without allowing themselves to be led into a mood of confrontation. And it means that we must negotiate and cooperate with the Soviet Union without losing our awareness of the basic dangers that exist.

The understanding and support shown by the citizens of the Western democracies for the complexity and ambivalence of the dual strategy, and our countries' success in mustering the necessary measure of rationality and self-discipline, courage and cool-headedness—these are the conditions on which the resolution of the long-term East-West conflict will depend.

Mankind is today living in a transitional period in which the forces of the old are in conflict with the forces of the new. The nuclear weapons situation forces the nuclear powers to renounce

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war against each other. The situation of global interdependence, calling for new orders which are not based on force, also points in the direction of renouncing the use of such force.

In the past, international order usually meant domination by one side and the subordination of the other. The order of the future, however, must and can be based only on equal rights of all countries and the nations' right to self-determination. Today every country is dependent on reliable access to the markets of others, to their technology and to their raw materials. All countries need the impulses for their own growth provided by the growth of others, and they need cooperation for the protection of the ecological balance which is threatened throughout the world. But all of this can no longer be achieved through power politics. Force can only bring about one thing today: chaos. Stable cooperation, in contrast, can only develop in an order in which all countries work together of their own free will, because they all recognize that order as just and fair, and contribute to maintaining it in their own interest.

All this is self-evident, but it is equally evident that today's community of nations remains far removed from this kind of order based on partnership. In world politics it is still the struggle for power and supremacy that is prevailing, however anachronistic this may have become. The Soviet challenge and the response provided by our dual strategy should be seen against this broad backdrop. The question of whether the Western democracies will muster the strength for a policy which, over a long transitional period, maintains a balance of power and at the same time holds out a hand offering cooperation—this question, more than any other, will be decisive in determining the future of mankind as a whole.

In the past centuries the Western countries were promoters of progress in the world. They must continue to fulfill this task. This is our historical responsibility. But there is also a vision which can give us the strength to endure the long period of struggle: the vision of a pluralistic world of cooperation in partnership, the vision of genuine peace in the world.

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Amos Perlmutter

BEGIN'S RHETORIC AND SHARON'S TACTICS

If one looks long enough at recent events in Lebanon, one can see emerging the new face of Israel's Begin government, a face markedly different from the first government of Menachem Begin. That first Begin government, which toppled a decaying and increasingly ineffectual Labor Party, had its moderate and restraining elements whose crowning achievement was the Camp David Accords. The then Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, along with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, were the reins on Begin's often frightening rhetoric, steering Begin away from the effects of his worst instincts.

Weizman is no longer in the public eye and Dayan is buried. What has taken their place is a Cabinet dominated by a brash, recalcitrant, and pugnacious government whose chief symbol is Defense Minister Ariel (Arik) Sharon, Begin's sword and man of action. Sharon has taken Begin's rhetoric, his aspirations and his dreams for his own, and brought them to a place that closely resembles a political quagmire where not many Israelis, perhaps not even Begin, had expected to wind up.

Begin, a fanatic and firm believer in the concept of "Eretz Yisrael" (or Complete Israel), a stolid and implacable opponent of any sort of Palestinian national movement, has found the perfect instrument to carry out in vivid action what lies at the core of his rhetoric. Whereas the likes of Weizman and Dayan restrained, modified, and manipulated Begin's instincts, Sharon frees them and carries them to their logical conclusion.

As a result of the war in Lebanon, the Palestine Liberation Organization has been deprived of its independent military operations base. Thus it can no longer realistically avail itself of the military option. Politically, the PLO may have reaped some public relations rewards from its long stay in West Beirut, but, realisti-

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cally, its role as a political symbol for the Palestinian cause has been considerably weakened. Nor will any host Arab country allow the PLO to establish itself as a military force in its land. As a political force, the PLO may find different homes in different Arab countries; but this, of course, is not the purpose of the PLO, which was established as an autonomous movement, independent of the Arab states and their politics.

The incursion into Lebanon has resulted in a total redrawing of the political map of Lebanon and a virtual occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel. Sharon is taking Begin at his word and even going beyond that by attempting to create a new political order in Lebanon, one divided among Israel, Syria, and Christian-Muslim Lebanese forces. By so doing, he has virtually assured a prolonged Israeli and Syrian military presence in Lebanon. The game has gotten away from Begin, the long-range strategist, who is being impaled by the forceful actions of his defense minister.

Ironically, in this intervention in Lebanon, which has had unexpected and long-term political and military consequences, lie the seeds for a new arrangement for Lebanon, a de facto division of Lebanon. This would mean, if not a politically stable Lebanon (was it ever thus?), at least a politically maintainable Lebanon divided between Christian and Muslim forces and protected by a tacit arrangement between Syria and Israel. Perhaps unwittingly, Begin and Sharon will have created a situation where the United States can recapture significant political leverage over Israel, its principal client-state in the Middle East, and come to terms with the Baathist-Syrian Alawi-dominated regime in Damascus. Thus Syria could be added to Egypt as an American asset.

II

The late David Ben Gurion once described Begin as "a romantic fool, essentially a windbag full of rhetoric and metaphors." How close to the truth Ben Gurion's judgment is can probably be best left to psycho-historians of the future. What is true is that Sharon has managed to hold Begin captive to his own showy rhetoric, and, in that sense, has managed to manipulate Begin just as much as Weizman and Dayan did.

Begin and Sharon share the same dream: Sharon is the dream's hatchet man. That dream is to annihilate the PLO, douse any vestiges of Palestinian nationalism, crush PLO allies and collaborators in the West Bank, tighten Israel's grip on the West Bank and eventually force the Palestinians there into Jordan and cripple, if not end, the Palestinian nationalist movement.

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That, for Sharon and Begin, was the ultimate purpose of the Lebanese war. Sharon, with at least Begin's acquiescence, had other goals, most of which have been realized: the defeat of Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley and the destruction of the Russian-made surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), the occupation of the strategically crucial Beirut-Damascus road and the encirclement of Beirut, goals which some of Begin's own Cabinet and certainly his political opposition were not privy to.

Sharon's plans, however, went further and are even now in the process of being implemented, almost willy-nilly, by the practical, physical results of the war. Those plans, and those results, which Begin may not have wanted or envisioned, are dictated by the military presence of the two most powerful forces in Lebanon—Israel and Syria—the near elimination of the PLO as a factor of any kind in Lebanon, and the fragility, ineffectualness, divisiveness, and chaotic nature of what is undeservedly called a central Lebanese government, which, whether Christian- or Muslim-dominated, will have to be propped up and protected by Israeli and Syrian military forces.

In effect, what is bound to happen, what is, in fact, happening, is a division of labor in Lebanon between Israel and Syria, which will produce a tripartite division of Lebanon. Before Israel embarked on its drive, the PLO controlled at least 20 percent of Lebanese territory. Another 45 percent was controlled by Syria, and still another 25 percent was controlled by Lebanese Christians, while Israel's surrogate, Major Saad Haddad, himself a Christian, controlled less than ten percent in the south. That equation has been altered dramatically with the near-complete physical and territorial elimination of the PLO in southern Lebanon.

The altered equation looks like this: A combined pro-Israeli Lebanese segment (Christian-Shi'ite and some Druze), dominated by the Phalange, controls most of central Lebanon, including Beirut, the Beirut-Damascus road and down to the Litani River, including about 40 percent of Lebanon. This area was formerly dominated by the PLO and Syria. Syria still retains control of approximately 35 percent of Lebanon, mostly in the north, and including the north central Bekaa Valley. Major Haddad's area of control has swelled to 25 percent and extends to Beaufort Castle and up the Litani River. Included in that territory is control and administration of Tyre and Sidon, the capitals of southern Lebanon.

This, of course, is neither an ideal nor an ultimate solution. But

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given the consequences, it points logically to an opportunity for a Syrian-Israeli rapprochement, which may turn out to be the unforeseen fruit of the Lebanese war. There exists, or will exist, a de facto political realignment for a new, though not necessarily stable Lebanon. Lebanese security and, to a large extent, Lebanese foreign policy will be maintained and dictated by the tacit—but politically viable—arrangement between the forces that now and in the near future will dominate Lebanon: Syria and Israel.

Given the strong presence of both Israel and Syria in Lebanon, it is logical to assume that each has a basis for negotiation, a basis that has existed since 1973. Both Syria and Israel now have tangible territorial properties up for exchange—Syria in the Bekaa Valley, Israel in the Golan Heights—and both are now in control of sizable parts of Lebanon. It is reasonable to assume in the wake of the war, which has left a bitter political taste in the mouth of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, that Syria will continue to try to be the status-quo Arab power it has shown itself to be since the 1975–76 Lebanese Civil War.

Syria still is threading its way through the intricate world of Arab politics. Assad now knows he can expect little real help from the Soviet Union, and he knows too that the PLO would be a millstone around his neck. Assad can assume that a rapprochement with Israel will eliminate a military threat to Damascus, and he needs to consolidate his still shaky power at home while reinforcing his ties to the so-called moderate Arab world. He may be quite willing to sever his ties to radical Iran and the U.S.S.R. in exchange for, say, U.S. aid and military assistance and Saudi financial resources.

In short, the results of the war now emerging could turn into political and diplomatic gains for the United States. The prospects are not boundless, but an arrangement between Syria and Israel, normalization of U.S.-Syrian relations, maintenance of Syrian-Israeli forces to keep Lebanon from falling into political chaos, and a Lebanon free of civil war, would be of significant benefit to the United States.

The possibility of such a political result probably has not been envisioned either by Begin or his military alter ego, Sharon. It would indeed be ironic if the results of all their dreams and planning, if the final result of Begin's rhetoric and Sharon's actions, were to turn into this.

To find out just how these possibilities came about, it is necessary to look at the origins of Begin's first and second governments, how the two differed, and at the rise of Sharon himself.

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III

The second Begin government is without a doubt the most hawkish government in Israel's history. The ruling quadrumvirate of Begin, Sharon, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan are all hawks in the Herut political tradition and philosophy, supported by National Religious Party (NRP) radicals, and sustained by the Eretz Yisrael true believers in the Renaissance Party. The Herut ruling party, the NRP and Renaissance form the base of the second Begin government's foreign policy and security policies. What the results of the June 1981 elections did was to legitimize Begin's new government and his foreign policy. His narrow victory was not exactly an overwhelming mandate; it seemed to indicate, nonetheless, that the electorate would at least allow Begin to fulfill his dream of a Complete Israel. The war in Lebanon is the logical outcome of that aspiration.

There is a profound difference between the current, or second, Begin government and the Begin Cabinet that existed prior to Weizman's resignation and immediately after the 1977 elections. Weizman was the last of Begin's first Cabinet members who continuously defied, modified or resisted Begin's most intransigent inclinations.

The pre-1981 and especially the pre-July 1980 Cabinet was a Cabinet composed of powerful, ambitious, and charismatic politican-generals whose roots, if they had any, were not with Herut or Likud ideologues, but lay, at best, with Labor. Except for Begin himself, the first Cabinet had no Herut nucleus. It never really worked successfully as a collective but rather was dominated by Begin's powerful personality. Yet, on the surface, the Cabinet when first introduced was both impressive and at times efficient, even though it looked like a political oddity.

Although the Cabinet was theoretically part of the Likud government, its strongest members were for all intents and purposes outsiders. Moshe Dayan, a Labor Party renegade, became foreign minister. Ezer Weizman, who was no Herut veteran despite having been Begin's campaign manager, became defense minister. Dayan and Weizman were vital forces in working out the Camp David peace formula for Israeli rapprochement with Egypt. When it came to negotiating Camp David's Accord B (on the Palestinian autonomy), Dayan's concept of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal of its military government in the West Bank and Gaza proved unacceptable to Begin. Dayan, having failed to persuade

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Begin of a new approach in implementing the Palestinian autonomy, resigned on October 9, 1979. Weizman lasted until July 1980 and then resigned over the same issue.

With the disappearance of Dayan and Weizman, there was no longer any serious opposition to Begin, particularly on matters of foreign policy and security. The muzzles and restrainers were beginning to come loose, as Israeli policy toward the Arabs and Palestine became increasingly dogmatic, aggressive and single-minded. This is clearly evident in the October 1980 decisions on the bombing of the Tamuz II Iraqi nuclear reactor, and in the shocking July 1981 raid on Beirut which, ironically, Sharon alone opposed, fearing that air attacks—as opposed to land operations which he favored—would provoke a very negative public reaction.

By October 1980, when the initial decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor was made, the second Begin government was in place with hard-liners Begin, Sharon, Shamir and Eitan at the helm. The most crucial military and political decisions after October 1980—the nuclear reactor bombing, the Syrian missile crisis, relations with America on the basis of a "strategic consensus" directed against the U.S.S.R., the Beirut raid, and reactions to PLO operations emanating from Lebanon—were made by this quartet, all of them pointing the way to the eventual invasion of Lebanon.

The most significant event in giving the second Begin government its final, harsh look was the appointment of Sharon as defense minister in August 1981. Sharon had craved the defense ministry before, and was turned aside. But this time there was no way Begin could refuse him.

The Begin-Sharon relationship goes back a long way, to the aftermath of the 1973 War, and it has not always been amiable, symbiotic and friendly. In fact, it was often marked by mistrust and betrayal. Sharon was very much aware of Begin's authoritarianism, his unwillingness to tolerate opposition or competition, traits Sharon shares but does not admire in others. Sharon refused to join Herut, even though, as a war hero, he was considered a political asset. To overcome Begin, Sharon in July 1973 created the Likud Right and Right-of-Center coalition, hoping that Begin's Herut would be swallowed up by the Likud electoral bloc. The exact opposite happened: Begin outmaneuvered Sharon, who left the coalition in 1974 in frustration, showing once again that Sharon is impatient with the political process. In 1977 Sharon began a flirtation with the Israeli Left and formed his own party, Shlomzion (The Peace of Zion). Electorally, Shlomzion was a

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spectacular failure, gaining only two seats, but those seats were crucial to Begin, who needed both of them to form his coalition government.

Sharon dissolved Shlomzion, joined Herut, and Begin rewarded him with the benign-sounding agricultural ministry. It became the first, but not the last, instance in which Sharon turned into Begin's sword. Begin invoked "Judea and Samaria" at every turn, but it was Sharon, in his role as agricultural minister, who turned the words into action, in his own inimitable style, carrying out Begin's accelerated settlements policy in the West Bank.

The settlements implanted by Sharon, a hard-nosed veteran in dealing with Palestinian nationalism, were, for Begin, the acting out of his dream of Eretz Yisrael. Yet, even then, with Sharon dutifully and perhaps more enthusiastically carrying out Begin's policy, Begin balked at the prospect of totally embracing Sharon. He did not offer Sharon the defense ministry that Sharon so badly wanted. The Liberals and Herut veterans opposed Sharon vehemently. Even Begin reportedly said, "Sharon would surround the prime minister's office with tanks if he didn't get the defense ministry." When the ministry became vacant with Weizman's resignation, Begin took the ministry for himself. Sharon was keenly disappointed and showed it, but, subdued, pulled in his horns. Tanks, as it turned out, were not necessary. Sharon's growing popularity among the changing Israeli electorate proved crucial for the politically beleaguered Begin in the 1981 elections. In a close election, Sharon turned out to be a critical electoral asset and was rewarded—in spite of much hue and cry from the Labor Party—with the defense ministry.

From the beginning, it was obvious that Sharon would be the blunt instrument of Begin's policies, the man who did the dirty work and, if necessary, the villain for any actions that backfired. He ousted by force the Israeli settlers in the Sinai because, pragmatically, a quiescent Egypt was needed for any future course of action in Lebanon. He further dampened the spirit of Palestinian nationalism by ousting pro-PLO mayors in the West Bank.

All of this presaged the Lebanese action, which had been in the planning stages for a long time before Sharon began to grapple with it, twist it, and enlarge it. In fact, the operation was the brainchild of two diverse individuals—Eitan and Weizman—and the 1978 Israeli bid to crush the PLO was stopped at the Litani River only by the intervention of President Jimmy Carter. The invasion all along had been carefully planned and nurtured by Weizman and the Israeli general staff, so that by the time Sharon

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took over the defense ministry, Israeli generals were already busy planning a large-scale invasion of Lebanon.

Weizman, it must be repeated, was different in style and aspirations from Sharon. Sharon encouraged Begin's most extreme and cherished ambitions, principally the destruction of Palestinian nationalism in any form, and, specifically, the total destruction of the PLO. Weizman had planned a limited operation to drive the PLO out of Katyusha rocket range and to widen Major Haddad's fiefdom in the south up to the Litani River.

Sharon has never quite understood the meaning of the word "limited." Upon taking the Lebanon operation in his grip, he widened its scope and planning. It took some time—there was U.S. envoy Philip Habib's patient but essentially inconclusive shuttle diplomacy and the resultant truce with the PLO, which, if it did not chasten Begin, certainly slowed him down. Two things, Sharon saw, were needed. The first was some sort of tacit U.S. acquiescence to a limited Israeli operation in Lebanon. Begin and Sharon felt they had secured this by allowing the United States to go forward with then Secretary of State Alexander Haig's "strategic consensus" policy, whereby Arab moderates and Israel would come under an American security umbrella, the first cornerstone of which was the sale of AWACS (airborne warning and control system) planes to Saudi Arabia. The Israelis later agreed to a watered-down, open-ended "memorandum of understanding" signed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Sharon, which Begin and Sharon interpreted as the price for the AWACS sale. This they perceived as amounting to U.S. acquiescence to any subsequent Israeli military action. Meanwhile, Sharon went ahead with planning for the Lebanese operation, in typical Sharon style.

To the Cabinet, and perhaps even to Begin, the operation was presented as a vital security need whose time had arrived, which would move the PLO out of southern Lebanon, thus making the border settlements secure. To that end, Begin aptly called the operation "Peace for Galilee." Even liberals from both major political parties could not object to these motives, and Begin knew that within that kind of framework it would have national approval.

It is here that the ghost of Moshe Dayan and his like becomes almost visible. Sharon was dealing with Begin and with a basically civilian Cabinet which he (and there is no other word for it) hoodwinked. Dayan and Weizman, both generals, would have immediately known the implications of such an operation and where it might lead—straight to the outskirts of Beirut. But there

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was apparently no one—probably not Begin either—to question where all this might end.

Once the prerequisite excuse—the assassination attempt on Israeli Ambassador to London Shlomo Argov—was found, Sharon had his war, and this is where Sharon's tactics converged with Begin's rhetoric. While Sharon was Begin's perfect instrument to carry out his rhetoric, Begin, in turn, was Sharon's perfect target. Sharon interpreted the go-ahead for the Lebanese operation—which he had presented as "limited"—to mean unlimited flexibility. The evidence is that Sharon and his Christian allies were already on the move toward Beirut, long before his troops occupied southern Lebanon, a sure sign that he had planned to reach Beirut all along. Whether Begin was privy to Sharon's planning, approved it, or originated it is another question. Certainly it is a long way from "Peace for Galilee" to a "New Order" in Lebanon.

Begin soon found that Sharon was going beyond what he, the Cabinet, and even the General Staff had envisioned, not to mention the Americans, who viewed the possible attack on West Beirut as unacceptable. President Reagan's staff cabled Begin from Europe asking for a cease-fire. Cramped by world opinion and by the Americans, Begin warily halted Sharon's momentum and offensive into Beirut. But instead of a call for the mere cessation of hostilities, Israel received an American demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon, with serious implications for the future. Who could remove Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon? Certainly not the United States alone, and the U.S.S.R.'s leverage over Syria is by no means greater than America's clout with Israel.

What Sharon succeeded in doing—which may have gone beyond the scope of even Begin's aspirations—was to create a new political order in an unstable Lebanon. What exactly is the scope of Sharon's New Order in Lebanon and for the Middle East? What are the implications of the Lebanese war for U.S.-Israeli relations? And what are the implications for the Syrian-Israeli relationship of the New Order arising from the quagmire which Sharon has created?

IV

The prospects for the creation and survival of a stable Lebanese central government are, I believe, minimal, which accounts at least in part for the massive rearrangement which Sharon has engineered. Stability in Lebanon is at best an uphill task, a bleak prospect.

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The existing Lebanon is a remnant of the old Ottoman Empire, an Ottoman system of Vilayats which was destroyed during the last Lebanese Civil War—instigated by the PLO—a civil war in which sides changed rapidly. From interviews with the leading political and military leaders of the various Lebanese factions—Christian and Muslim—one cannot help but reach the unfortunate conclusion that what passes for the current Lebanese government is a paper government which will never coalesce into the real thing. The old 1943 Christian-Muslim multi-ethnic pact is now gone, as is the Lebanese constitutional arrangement which reflected that pact. One cannot help but feel after talking to Sunni, Maronite Christian, and Druze leaders that Lebanon still has all the aspects of a society wracked by fratricidal and internecine struggles among warring factions of warlords, godfathers, thugs and traditional feudal leaders. Politically, Lebanon still seems like one huge group of extended families, each vying for its own interests, prejudices and concerns.

As Edward Shils writes in his essay, "The Prospect for Lebanese Civility":

> Lebanon is not a civil society. It has many of the requisite qualities, but it lacks the essential one: the politically relevant members of Lebanese society are not inclined to allow the obligations which arise from their membership in the society to supervene when they feel that interests which they regard as vital are threatened. These interests are the integrity of their communities of belief and primordial attachments—of kinship and locality—and the opportunities and possessions of the constituent groups or individual members of these communities. . . . The consequences of these actions for the Lebanese society as a whole are too frequently regarded as being of secondary significance. . . . Lebanese society lacks that attachment to the national society as a whole, that sense of identity, the consensus that should embrace much of the population on issues that touch seriously upon the interests of the communities which make it up. . . . As a result of this situation, Lebanese society revolves around an empty center. It has representative institutions which are able to conduct debates, but they are precluded from making decisions.[1]

In short, there is no political there there.

Lebanon is made up of political groups, inasmuch as it exists under a system of *zu'ama* or clients, as Arnold Hottinger notes in his essay "*Zu'ama* in Historical Perspective." Hottinger describes the Phalange, for instance, as a political group that operates across a broad spectrum of Christian society, but he sees Lebanon as being dominated by a system of patronage, in the persons of *za'im*

[1] Quoted in Leonard Binder, ed., *Politics in Lebanon*, New York: John Wiley, 1966, p. 2.

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or leaders. He writes:

> In contrast to political groups, groups like the followers and associates of the As'ad family, or Sa'ib Salam, or the Frangieh in Zgharta, among others, appear to me as client groups, not as parties. They give support to their local leader (*za'im*) in the hope of obtaining from him either economic advantages or help in their dealings with the authorities as circumstances may warrant. They vote and campaign for his person, not for his program (which in most cases is rudimentary or nonexistent). The political attitude of the *za'im* only enters into their consideration insofar as it has to conform with the general communal outlook of the group he claims to represent.[2]

This is a perfect representation of the fragmentary nature of the Lebanese political structure and the groundwork for what is actually happening in Lebanon now: a political division by outside forces. The political ascendancy of foreign forces in Lebanon has a long history, beginning with the Crusaders, the Arabs, the Ottomans, the French, and now the Syrians and Israelis.

The current war in Lebanon has resulted in far-reaching changes. For one, the Israelis have strengthened (however insufficiently) the power of the Christian Maronites, thus laying the groundwork for Sharon's New Order. The real fruit of the Lebanese war, however, is a more equal division of power between Christians and Muslims, neither one of which can gain power on its own. The Christians cannot survive as a political force without the protection and presence of Israel, which means a prolonged Israeli military presence. The division of labor already described is in place, although it does not by any means constitute a formal agreement between Syria and Israel, but has rather emerged from the logic of the military situation.

V

What exists is an opportunity for extensive and exhaustive American diplomacy to reassert itself in the Middle East, now that Lebanon is being maintained by Syria and Israel. The opportunity is nothing less than an arrangement between Israel and Syria, an arrangement that had its roots in the 1973 War and which could now lead to a more promising buffer zone between Israel and Syria in Lebanon.

Syrian-Israeli relations since the end of the 1973 War have been curious: cautious, promising and paradoxical, and, on the surface,

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 86.

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highly illogical. But, considering the volatile Middle East, they have nevertheless maintained a certain stability.

The result of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy between the end of the 1973 War and mid-1975 was, almost by accident, an uninterrupted ceasefire arrangement between Israel and Syria, which had not been broken until the Israeli incursion into Lebanon this past summer. As a matter of fact, during its tenure from 1974 to 1977, the Rabin Labor government not only accepted the division of the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel, but, somewhat reluctantly, encouraged Syria to occupy the parts of Lebanon being infiltrated by the PLO. Rabin's hope was that a Syria-dominated Lebanon would maintain and contain the PLO and that this kind of Lebanon would be a safer neighbor for Israel than one where the PLO was in control. This was, of course, when Syria was siding with Christian forces against the PLO in the interminable Lebanese civil war. In fact, Rabin's government encouraged Syria to come closer to Israel's northern border, in hopes that Syria would bring an end to the PLO "Fatahland" and pacify the Israeli-Lebanese border in the same way that the Israeli-Syrian border had been pacified after 1973.

A number of events changed the arrangement: the deterioration of Syrian-Christian relations, the new PLO-Syrian alliance, the emergence of the Begin government in Israel, and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Syria reacted with a growing and solid support of the PLO. In order to solidify the security of Damascus, Assad installed the missile system in the Bekaa Valley, straining the tacit peace between Syria and Israel. But, it is important to note, Assad and Begin were careful with each other, with neither going over the edge. Assad showed considerable restraint during the 1978 Israeli incursion into Lebanon, in which Israeli forces studiously avoided contact with Syrian forces; and when Begin's government annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, Assad reacted with rhetoric and complaints, not with military action. Syria was acting as a status-quo Arab power, not as a belligerent and recalcitrant Arab neighbor. During all the Israeli attacks against the PLO, the bombings of Beirut, and even when Israel downed Syrian MiG jets over the skies of Lebanon, Assad was careful not to react with a military challenge against Israel.

The reasons for this are many. Assad's political strength at home eroded after Syria's occupation of Lebanon. His Alawi-Baathist government was faced with serious challenges from other minorities, challenges that grew into near-revolutionary proportions and culminated in the Hamma Sunni fundamentalist mas-

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sacre in mid-1981 and added to Syria's increased "isolation" in the mainstream Arab world. Isolation here is a cautionary term because Assad never really severed his ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, even when he officially tied Syria to Khomeini's Iran in its war against Iraq. The Gulf states and Saudi Arabia did not view this as an anti-Arab action, but rather as an anti-Iraq alliance.

Even more illustrative of the fact that Syria is acting as a status-quo power is Assad's reaction to the Israeli attack against the Syrians in the east-central Bekaa Valley. At one point, between June 22 and June 28, when three Israeli columns moved toward Beirut, the Damascus-Beirut road, and the Bekaa Valley, Assad's four divisions were up against three and one-half Israeli divisions and had an advantage in tanks of 600 to 450. Yet Assad did not take advantage of the situation to "discipline" Israeli forces when they split into three vulnerable columns.

The situation, even though it resulted in the loss of the SAM missiles and over 100 planes for Syria, was symbolic of the continued arrangement between Syria and Israel. It never boiled over into all-out war, although the danger existed. Assad, after all, was fighting in Lebanon, not in Syria. Israeli commanders had clear orders not to violate Syrian territory. Neither side took real advantage of situations of military superiority.

Assad's chief objective in this war was for Syria to retain a territorial and important role in Lebanon, an objective he has achieved and one which Israel so far has respected. Syria still holds 35 percent of Lebanon. But, by putting up a respectable and somewhat costly resistance during the war, Assad has also increased his importance and prestige in the Arab world without resorting to total war against Israel. Assad is ever the realist: he recognizes that it is Israel, and only Israel, which can force him out of Lebanon. In addition, both military forces have a healthy respect for one another and know that an all-out confrontation would be costly in terms of casualties.

The pragmatic incentives for Syria to come to terms with Israel are many:

1. The conflict between Iran and Iraq has led to many interesting developments in the Middle East jigsaw puzzle, one being that Israel and Syria have found a common enemy in the person of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
2. The removal—via Camp David—of Egyptian military power as a counterforce against growing Israeli might.
3. The apparent Soviet decision to abandon the Arabs, which

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was so evident in its action, or lack of action, in the Lebanese war and in its tilt toward Iran in the ongoing war with Arab Iraq.

4. The ineffectiveness of the oil weapon.

5. The obvious impotence of U.S. power and diplomacy to affect events in the Middle East.

All of these factors, in addition to Assad's political problems at home and the sure knowledge that a real war with Israel would result in the division of Syria and its ouster from Lebanon, are food for thought for the Syrian leader. He knows that he can restore his image and prestige in the Arab world. It is also obvious to him that the Gulf states are eager to lure him back to the Arab camp, particularly since he still dominates 35 percent of Lebanon. It is an opportunity for Assad, and I seriously doubt he will pass it up. He appears to have already tactically and tacitly accepted shared hegemony of Lebanon with Israel.

For Israel, a stable Syria ruled by an Alawi clique giving lip service to Baathist ideology is preferable to an anti-Israel, Sunni-Arab-dominated Syria and certainly preferable to a Lebanon still dominated by the PLO. Sharing the rule of Lebanon with Syria guarantees Israel's northeastern frontiers.

Thus, if we look at Israel and Syria between 1973 and 1982, the drift is clear. They certainly have not launched an all-out war against each other. In fact, they have in a decade's time established tacit building blocks that, if maintained, could lead to a serious Israeli-Syrian rapprochement. Their respect for each other's military power and, despite some interruptions, their maintenance of a de facto status quo could be enhanced by their tacit but nevertheless joint condominium over Lebanon.

Theirs is not equal to the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, but it is certainly not unlike Israel's relationship with Jordan, with which Israel has maintained the status quo since 1967. Moreover, while Sadat and Egypt needed the Americans acting as mediators and guarantors of the Camp David peace treaty, the Syrian-Israeli agreement would require less U.S. help. Syria and Israel have already learned to respect each other's border security problems. Now that Israel has demonstrated that it is the military power par excellence in the Middle East, the Syrian incentives for confronting Israel have considerably declined. Yet even if an argument to the contrary is advanced that Syria is a Baathist Arab ideological regime, Syria's tactical alliance with Iran debunks this assumption. Syrian nationalism and pragmatism, the course chosen by Assad, forces it to consider Iraq a greater threat to Syria than Iranian nationalism. For that matter, when it comes

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to Syria's security in Lebanon, the Arab "cause"—the Palestinians—is not Assad's supreme concern.

By sharing the maintenance of Lebanon with Israel, Syria becomes Israel's partner. Thus, without U.S. or foreign intervention, the de facto Syrian-Israeli arrangement in Lebanon may lead to the elimination of Syria as Israel's last serious military adversary.

But the fulfillment of any such Israeli-Syrian partnership would be largely contingent on the resolution of the dispute over the Golan Heights. For Begin, the Golan is not part of Eretz Yisrael and is, therefore, a negotiable territorial item. The Golan is an element of security, not ideology. Begin's announced reason for his annexation of the Golan last year was the old "security" argument; but he basically went ahead with the annexation as a retaliation for the deployment of Syrian SAM missiles in the neighboring Bekaa Valley. At the same time, Begin made it clear in public that the Golan was not forever to be part of Israeli territory and that it would be open to negotiation in the future. The day when Begin's Likud government would be willing to surrender some of the Golan territory in exchange for a Syrian withdrawal from the south-central Bekaa Valley is not a sorcerer's dream but an act that could stem from the logic of the consequences of Israel's invasion of Lebanon.

The price the Israelis can dangle in front of Syria is both symbolic and pragmatic: Syria would recognize Israel, or at least maintain the status quo, discipline the PLO, and retain control of northern Lebanon. The Syrians would have to sever connections to revolutionary Iran in exchange for closer ties to the Gulf States. When it comes to territory, the Arabs have already shown themselves willing to negotiate. The Golan and parts of the Bekaa Valley are of value to Syria just as the Sinai was to Egypt, a tangible reason to come to terms, as in the uncomfortable but de facto division of Lebanon.

VI

The war in Lebanon may turn out to be the last Arab-Israeli war, though certainly not the last war in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf.

Before examining the details of this opportunity for Arab-Israeli peace, it must be said that the PLO is neither an asset for the United States, nor for moderate Arabs, nor for Syria. It is an obstacle to peace, not an instrument of peace. Given the removal of the PLO from Lebanon, the seeds for a rapprochement between

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Israel and Syria do exist, as do the seeds for a viable Lebanon. I think this is indicative in Assad's reluctance to fight for the PLO and the Arab cause to the last Syrian soldier, just as Egypt had grown weary of suffering huge casualties in two wars with Israel.

It was the approach of Anwar Sadat, after all, and not that of the rejectionist Gamal Abdel Nasser which has been vindicated in the Lebanon war. Egypt, rather than a victim of the war, is now a key intermediary in the Lebanon conflict. Thus, peace with Israel can produce considerable assets for an Arab state, even a supposedly radical one like Syria, which could only enhance its influence with the Arab world and in Lebanon.

Assad can probably see this and has good, sound practical reasons for seeking closer ties with Israel, which will, not coincidentally, mean a closer relationship with the United States. Assad is still on shaky grounds politically in his home base, and is much more concerned with gaining and consolidating power and territory than with leading the Arabs against Israel. He knows that the Soviet Union is not the staunchest of supporters when it comes to the crunch and that the Soviets have probably written off their Arab clients.

The situation is ripe, and Assad and Syria have paid more than their token price in blood and materiel and can now move toward accommodation with Israel.

Implicit in this is an opportunity awaiting the United States. The so-called New Order, when looked at imaginatively and correctly, provides some leverage for the United States. The chance exists for the United States to turn Syria toward the Western camp, away from Iran, the U.S.S.R. and the Arab rejectionist front. It is an opportunity, very similar to what Kissinger created after the 1973 War between Israel and Egypt, to stabilize Israeli-Syrian relations, strengthen Lebanon, and beef up the Arab anti-Iran alliance, thus depriving revolutionary and aggressive Iran of valuable Syrian support. The real leverage that the United States has to offer is military assistance and protection to Syria and a Lebanon now free of the PLO, thus reasserting some U.S. control over events in the Middle East. U.S. diplomacy should not be limited to acting as the PLO's Salvation Army in West Beirut.

In addition, four decades of Arab-Israel and inter-Arab strife clearly indicate that substantial territorial exchanges can modify ideological proclivities, even ones as extreme as those held by the Baathist Assad and Herut's Begin and Sharon. The Sunni Arab world is facing its greatest challenge since Ottoman days in the

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persons of the implacable Khomeini of Iran and the messianic Begin. The Israeli nation is really tired of war, as is evident in some of the doubts that emerged during the Lebanon war. And a resolution of the conflict in Lebanon would be another way for Syria, the moderate Arabs, and the Gulf states to buy security against Iran.

Peace, in fact, is the hidden light beneath the rubble that the Israelis, Syrians, and the PLO have left in Lebanon. It would indeed be ironic if Begin's rhetoric, carried out to the extreme by the tactics of Sharon in order to solve the Palestinian problem, resulted in a peace which had been encouraged by U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East. One suspects that is not what either Begin or Sharon perceived when they launched "Operation Peace for Galilee."

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Ghassan Tuéni

LEBANON: A NEW REPUBLIC?

It is hazardous to write about postwar Lebanon while the war is still going on, to write about the day after tomorrow when tomorrow may bring still more bloodshed. Yet it is not unrealistic to outline what the Lebanese deem most desirable for Lebanon and what may still be feasible, under conditions not beyond human control.

At the outset, one must point out that an analysis of Lebanon today cannot be narrowed down to the relatively simplistic question: What after the Palestinians? If it is to have the slightest claim at comprehensiveness, such an analysis must still address problems that almost ten years of war have left not only unsolved, but unexplored. Other issues, more commonly dealt with on a day-to-day basis, are the consequences of the Israeli invasion and the presence of the Syrian "peacekeeping" force. Immense, and probably immeasurable at the present stage, these consequences range from the geostrategic to the purely human, not excluding such aspects of Lebanon's national life and policy as reconstruction, political reforms, the restructuring of forces, the realignment of alliances, and so forth.

This essay does not, of course, pretend to present a complete analysis of what will now be called again—as in the nineteenth century—the Question of Lebanon. But at the very least, we would hope to present a Lebanese contribution to an ongoing debate, or rather game, conveniently dubbed the redrawing of the map.

II

It may be pertinent to preface this essay with two preliminary considerations:

First, to understand the Question of Lebanon—as probably all the Middle East—and grasp the essence of the political entity that

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is Lebanon, we must look at the realities of today from the perspective of history, not geography.

Second, the Question of Lebanon, so conveniently considered for over ten years now as a "sideshow" of the Middle East, has now suddenly burst onto center stage as the epitome of all that riddles the region, the one point of encounter of all its wars and all its revolutions as well. From the second consideration flow two subsidiary remarks that have acquired, for the Lebanese, and many others as well, axiomatic value:

1. Peace in Lebanon cannot, and indeed should no longer, wait for peace everywhere else in the Middle East through a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not only is it a moral imperative for the Lebanese; it is a pragmatic necessity for regional and international security.

2. Leaving the Question of Lebanon unsolved or unattended, pending the settlement, by war or by peace, of other related issues, may be found to serve the cause of flexibility in negotiating a regional package. Yet the Lebanese will always be able, at this stage in their suffering, to reject, nay even to prevent, any territorial, demographic, political, economic or security compensations at the expense of their territorial integrity. The Lebanese feel today entitled—and may, more than ever before, have the means—to claim that the Question of Lebanon should be addressed as such, on its own merits, and as an integral whole, not as part of a broader complex.

III

The "map drawers" may here ask a very pertinent question: does Lebanon have the means of resisting not further conquest—which has become superfluous—but a peace settlement, the price of which can only be a piece of territory? Can Lebanon resist not Israel alone, but a combination of Israel's and Syria's security concerns, let alone the ambitions of both? And, finally, how will Lebanon overcome the trauma of a second Palestinian dispersion inside its territory, without allowing that dispersion to destabilize its society and probably develop again into a new revolution? Such questions, we submit, would not have been asked had Lebanon not been considered—and probably still is by some—not only as a "sideshow," but as an accessory to other parties' strategic and national interests.

What better proof of this can there be than the very name given to the Israeli invasion: "Peace for Galilee"? To occupy almost half of a country, destroy its capital, disrupt its economy, ferociously

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kill its civilian population by the thousands—for the sake of "Peace for Galilee"—is indeed a very strange notion of peace!

But the real tragedy is that previous wars were not so different. For ten long years, and probably since 1968, Lebanon has been hostage to everybody else's wars and revolutions: Israelis versus Palestinians, Palestinians versus Syrians, Syrians versus Israelis, Egyptians versus Syrians, Syrians versus Iraqis, Iraqis versus Libyans, Libyans versus Egyptians, let alone the various forms of superpower confrontation. Over the years, so enormous was the investment in military hardware, in ammunition, in manpower, in efforts and expenditures, that no further proof is needed to show that what was at stake was beyond Lebanese interests and problems, and the means by far surpassed Lebanese capabilities. The major injustice done to the Lebanese—over and above the human, physical and political sacrifices—has been to describe these past wars with clichés such as Muslim-Christian, or Leftist-Rightist confrontations. What we were witnessing, in reality, were external conflicts projected upon internal divisions, thus causing the delicately balanced structure of Lebanon to explode.

A close examination of the 1975–76 "civil war" will reveal that then—as at every time there has been a civil or religious war in the Lebanon—it "coincided" with at least one regional problem for which the internal socio-economic or political crisis in Lebanon served as vehicle. Although the conflict of 1975–76 took the shape of an intercommunal struggle between Christians and Muslims—and as such could therefore qualify as a "civil war"—the Palestinians were both an object of the conflict and the third and finally most important protagonist in it. Palestinians have been a refugee presence in Lebanon since 1949, but it was in the mid-1960s that they became significant as a military and political presence. Seen by Christians as a threat to the equilibrium of the "National Pact," they were called upon by Muslims precisely to reestablish that equilibrium that the Christians were accused of having abused. The Muslims called upon them not as mercenaries, of course, but as natural allies, as the projection of their own idealism, as the political-military embodiment of their own ideological approach to both Lebanese and Arab politics.

The Palestinians, however, had their own interests, their own agenda. They were allies of the Muslims, but they were also the army of their own sacred cause. In retrospect, at least, the ensuing conflict assumes the guise of inevitability. Lebanon, having no ambition to play a part in the Palestinian wars and relying upon its 1949 Armistice Agreement with Israel, felt immunized from the conflicts external to its own interests. But the Palestinian

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sacred cause, first protected within Lebanon, was then projected from it in offensives conducted by the Palestinian revolution and its own leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The state and the revolution clashed. The "logic of government" demanded the application of restrictions, while the logic or dialectic of revolution drove it to replace the state and to exercise the prerogatives of government. In this perspective, the "enemy" of the sacred cause was not the Christian faction but the Lebanese state, and the Christian party only inasmuch as this party was assumed to have "ruled" the state. In this paradoxical "war of substitutes," the Palestinians had two enemies: the Israelis and the Lebanese who, by this logic, became Israel's objective ally. For the Lebanese, the Palestinians became the substitute enemy—for the Israeli enemy that the Lebanese were not fighting.

This situation was further complicated by the entry of the Syrian Army in 1976. Having come into Lebanon as peacekeepers and as a force for containment, their role has evolved during the years, and they have neither "tamed the shrew"—to wit, the PLO—nor been the catalysts in the schemes for "national unity," as they claimed they would be.

Losing progressively their deterrent credibility, the Syrian forces soon discovered that they were becoming a coercive and sometimes offensive force. They were involved in disputes which they were supposed to arbitrate and control, and security even in areas under their apparent full control was constantly deteriorating, with feuds erupting even between factions and groups whose loyalty to Syria should have been beyond question. Such political complications added to the military difficulties and drew the Syrian regime itself into the worst possible quagmire. All three parties—Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese—were now immersed in the quicksands of an ever more illusory peace, with grave consequences for the stability of the whole Middle East.

The situation deteriorated most in South Lebanon, which the Syrian peacekeeping forces never fully entered. Indeed, the Syrian presence should have protected South Lebanon against Israeli incursions by preventing Palestinian infiltrations and attacks. Yet, a "red line" was drawn, north of the Litani River, in tacit agreement with Israel (as admitted later) beyond which the Syrians would not go. Consequently, the "south of the South" became an arena of confrontation among Palestinians, Israelis and Lebanese culminating in "Operation Litani," the Israeli invasion of 1978, which the Syrians watched with great aloofness. This situation led many analysts, particularly some Israelis, to describe Syrian-Israeli relations in Lebanon as an "open-game

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strategy," which allowed, without any direct contact, a complementarity of objectives between the two parties.[1]

The fact that the present Israeli theory of "symmetrical withdrawal" from Lebanon, i.e., simultaneity with Syrian withdrawal, has prompted a similar Syrian theory is extremely interesting in this context. One is entitled to fear that if symmetrical withdrawal proves impossible or difficult, the theory would naturally lead to a "symmetrical presence," not to say a symmetrical occupation.

To the Lebanese, this is today the principal threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. The danger is, needless to say, accentuated by Lebanon's limited leverage on both the Syrians and the Israelis to force them to withdraw.

This analysis, we trust, establishes with sufficient clarity that destabilization in Lebanon is not inherent in the communal structure of Lebanese society and the built-in mechanisms of internal conflict so often mentioned.

Admitting the problems, the deficiencies and the failures within our society, one must assert that it is the uncalled-for and unexpected addition of external contradictions that caused this framework to explode. The "National Pact" between the Lebanese was only broken by the strain of the triangular conflicts among Palestinians, Syrians and Israelis, on top of the weighty presence of the Palestinian diaspora—a diaspora in revolt—which prevented the Lebanese from pursuing their common, communal evolution. Indeed, not only did the demographic weight of the Palestinian diaspora (already about 500,000 by 1975) unbalance Lebanese society, but the political and ideological consequences of the Palestinian revolutionary presence were more than the Lebanese democratic system could cope with. Overpowered from the outside, many Lebanese were lured into acting as surrogates in their own homeland.

IV

In prefacing this essay, we said that one must look at the Question of Lebanon from a perspective of history, not of geography. And we should add: nor of geopolitics.

To anticipate reasonably what postwar Lebanon can be, we need to remember what it has been. It is not evident that everyone who discusses the Middle East today understands that past; in fact, it is evident that many do not, that they view Lebanon from a perspective that distorts it. When approaching the Middle East,

[1] See, for example, a recent study by Zvi Lanir of the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. "Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: A Precedent for an 'Open Game' with Syria?"

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one must remember that it is history, not geography, that has determined and molded national identities. To apply the classic Western concept of natural frontiers to the so-called nation-states of the area is to ignore two basic sociohistorical realities. First, the notion of nationality in the nineteenth-century European sense, which prevails in many analyses of current affairs, is alien to Middle Eastern culture. Second, political societies in the Middle East have not been forged inside natural frontiers—desert boundaries, mountain chains or rivers. They have, rather, been constructed around historical capital cities, strongly homogenous and well structured, such as Damascus or Baghdad, which played through the centuries a catalytic role, often by conquest.

Having developed in this environment, Lebanon, however, was distinctive until it assumed its present political form in 1920. It was not the capital city of Beirut that was the real center of Lebanese identity, but the mountain heartland, Mount Lebanon. In fact, as a city, Beirut had a number of competitors in Lebanon, some of them with prestigious names that reach far back into history: Tyre, Tripoli, Sidon and Byblos. It was only after the Republic of Lebanon was proclaimed in the wake of the First World War that Beirut assumed a novel dimension. It then became the point of encounter between two distinct ways of life as well as two approaches to government and politics: the very partisan politics of nonurban Mount Lebanon and the soft, tolerant cosmopolitan outlook of the east Mediterranean mercantile cities, marked by the nostalgia of their past empires.

This Beirut encounter created new demographic and socioeconomic realities, admittedly not without some violence. The lack of an integrated political development led to excessive government centralization. This, in turn, drained wealth and culture into a city that soon became a monster of rapid but disorderly growth, expansion and prosperity. Already overdeveloped before the explosion of oil wealth in the Arab world in the 1970s, the new Beirut became, as a major capital city, the rival of Damascus, Baghdad and even Cairo, and easily surpassed the barely emerging cities of the Gulf or the historical relic cities of the Peninsula.

When viewed in this perspective, the National Pact, Lebanon's unwritten constitution since 1943, can be seen for what it really is. It is not only an alliance between Christians and Muslims, which is how it is usually described. It is, in fact, the organic and structural expression of the emergence of a new society and a new culture; it is the framework within which the natural contradictions of such an evolution were expected to be resolved.

Without pretending that these contradictions were close to

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resolution before the wars of the last seven years, one can point to areas where real advances were made, to substantial accomplishments. Under conditions where religious pluralism can only with difficulty be pursued, let alone achieved, Lebanon has marked out a respectable course. In addition, it has been a place in which Eastern and Western cultures could mix with benefits to both. It has, however, weakened, after having been a working democracy characterized by a respect for political freedom and civil liberties. As in other countries the achievements, and at times even the efforts, of Lebanon have fallen short of its ideals. But no one should lightly dismiss those achievements, the framework within which they were attained, nor the promise they hold out not only for Lebanon but for other countries as well.

I mention these achievements, which I take to be of a high order, not to recall yesterday's golden past whose fading light serves only to illumine the shards and fragments of a society that might have been—for I do not believe that is an accurate description of Lebanon at this moment, however battered it is. Nor do I mention them to dispel once again the recurring myth that the wars in Lebanon are essentially civil wars of a religious character. (There will, apparently, always be naïfs who believe this, but not only naïfs may still do so.) I mention them to emphasize the fact that within the framework of a delicately balanced society, with many conflicting needs, these things were achieved.

V

It will ultimately be up to the Lebanese to demonstrate that a half century of regained independence and communal life was not just another accident of history, that their national integrity and historic identity are not just another sublime, magnified question mark in the tortured geography of the Middle East.

It will be incumbent upon the Lebanese to prove that they are not negotiable nor dispensable. The current view, after the Israeli invasion, is that they are. At best, the destiny of Lebanon, we are told—again by the mapmakers—is to become a Syrian-Israeli condominium, at worst to explode and be partitioned between Syria and Israel, with probably a reduced homeland for the Christians in the middle.

Partition is, of course, a word that has often been invoked in discussion about Lebanon. It was already experienced in the nineteenth century, specifically in 1842, when Lebanon was divided into two statelets (*caĭmacamats*), one Christian and one Druze, both under Ottoman suzerainty and enjoying international guarantees. The result was the disastrous "religious wars" of 1860,

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in which the "foreign powers" were said to have played a major instigating role—until they were called on to intervene and put an end to bloodshed and reunite Lebanon.

Partition was again discussed in 1975–76 as the natural outcome of the war, and possibly its latent objective. But it never went beyond de facto situations where local self-appointed authorities exercised power but never claimed legitimacy, while the legitimate central government continued even when it lost all but the outward attributes of power and authority.

Yet, none of the local "governments" which resulted from so many local coup d'états ever went so far as to wage a war of secession or to advocate separatism. Even those on the Muslim side of Lebanon who had a tradition of "unitarianism"—namely, a yearning for so-called Syrian or Arab unity—reinterpreted their Arabism in a manner that emphasized their attachment to an independent, united Lebanon. Their criticism of the central government was addressed not to its legitimacy, but to its inertia vis-à-vis the dislocation of the state. There was, all along, a unanimous call for a strong united Lebanon, but differences as to how its unity would best be structured. Partition was thus self-defeated.

But what is meant now by partition is not the familiar and old-fashioned notion of dividing Lebanon between Christians and Muslims, into two or possibly three parts. Today, the term has taken on quite different meanings. It is suggested that the aims and interests of a number of outside countries would be best served by redrawing the map of Lebanon to correspond to the "new" existing realities. On this map Syria would be allowed to annex those provinces in the northeast of Lebanon that it has long coveted. In the south, Israel would be allowed to absorb, however gradually, those territories it could control up to the Litani River. The balance of Lebanon, which would be no more than 40 percent of its present territory, would form the new Republic. Composed of both Muslims and Christians, the new Republic would, for a variety of political reasons, be dominated by Christians.

A similar but more sophisticated approach is a condominium. This would leave the map of Lebanon untouched, but actual sovereignty over significant portions of Lebanon, roughly similar to those described above, would be wielded by Israel and Syria. This arrangement would not necessarily need to be formalized; it would only need to be recognized and accepted by those whose interests are most deeply involved—the Lebanese excepted—and who have the ability to support this approach.

To some people this latter approach appears practical, more prudent. It would allegedly have the advantages of partition

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without the concomitant disadvantages. Furthermore it corresponds to the actual conditions that now exist and that have, mutatis mutandis, existed for some time in Lebanon. Assuming that the PLO would not be operative as a military presence in Lebanon, that the disparate religious and ethnic factions cannot unite, that a stable central government is unlikely, the task of achieving stability in Lebanon would fall to its strong neighbors, Israel and Syria. It is, we are told, a "realistic" proposal.

VI

It would be unrealistic to expect the Lebanese to accept either approach. Indeed it has been their general historical tendency to enlarge their country rather than reduce it. Already, in the seventeenth century, their Princes had conquered parts of Syria, and later became the allies of Egypt in campaigns against the Ottoman Empire.

But the simplest objection one could express to the so-called condominium, whether de jure or de facto, formal or unexpressed, is that the fate of Lebanon would be placed in the hands of others. And a Lebanon so divided would not even contain, let alone resolve, the regional tensions that in the past have exploded into actual conflict, both inside and outside Lebanon.

Syria, it is true, has never abandoned its irredentist claim to at least those northeast provinces which, it asserts, became Lebanese only after the Constitution of the Republic in 1920.[2] Syria has often been encouraged in this claim by varying ideological and strategic considerations, ranging from the traditional romantic yearning for "unity," which many Lebanese feel, to the desire to bolster its own security by integrating into its defense system its "soft underbelly"—to wit, the Bekaa Valley or northeast Lebanon.

But were Syria to attempt to follow this course, could anyone guarantee that the Bekaa and its inhabitants would not become a destabilizing factor inside Syria? And is Syria today the "dream image" which attracted, half a century ago, the romantic drive toward unity that many Lebanese Muslims felt? Is Damascus today perceived as the pole of attraction of that unity, and does its present system offer Lebanese Muslims sufficient incentives to seek secession from Lebanon and unity with Syria? We need not dwell on how Syria's other neighbors would view this action.

[2] These provinces were not part of independent Mount Lebanon of 1914; neither were they part of any Syrian political entity. They had, however, been Lebanese in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when Mount Lebanon was much larger, and later became part of the Ottoman Vilyet of Beirut.

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Similar questions can be raised about Israel's claims. True, Israel has not formally avowed territorial ambitions in Lebanon. However, ever since the borders of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine were drawn under the French and British mandates in 1919, Zionist literature has consistently maintained that the Jewish National Home, and later Israel, needed the water of the Litani and the land south of it. And Israel itself has dealt with the issue as if the population living there—which is Arab not Jewish, and in its majority, Muslim not Christian—were a negligible entity, eventually disposable, not significant, and almost nonexistent.

Nevertheless, and assuming one were to ignore all the rules of international law (non-acquisition of territory by force, etc.), high among the objections to absorbing this area into Israel is the fact—which Israel itself surely recognizes—that the people of the area would not readily be absorbed. They would add to the internal problems of Israel, of which it already has its fair share.

Only movements of population, cataclysmic shifts and their dramatic consequences, could enable Israel and Syria to partition Lebanon and absorb parts of it—let alone the shifting of populations within Lebanon itself, so that each country would supposedly receive the most friendly, or the least intractable, Lebanese. But the entire proposal is too unrealistic, too unworthy to merit a close examination of how one would manage the necessary dislocations of settled populations. Hence, if the aim of the mapmakers is to ensure an area of stability, one could hardly think of a more counterproductive course.

Even the eventual peace negotiations on the present issues, deemed difficult in an environment of a constantly shifting morass of conflicting interests, even these negotiations would take on added complexities and complications.

Furthermore, it is extremely doubtful that a shrunken Lebanon could become a haven of stability, working out, as its promoters purport to expect, a course of action independent of the pressures previously imposed upon it by such compelling problems as Palestinian claims to a homeland and the Israeli denial of those claims.

One further aspect of the question merits independent examination: the attitude of the Christians in Lebanon, now a political majority, who are expected to feel reassured of their future in a shrunken Lebanon that they will dominate. In a world swept by Islamic fundamentalism, the Christians of Lebanon, and Arab Christians in general, may be naturally provoked to opt for some form of "militant Christianity"—and some indeed have.

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Borrowing from history, one might be tempted to qualify this as the new Crusaders' choice. Yet, are we not entitled to fear that a Crusading community can only lead to further confrontation, and hence to isolation? By rejecting the present sociopolitical pattern, militant Christianity provokes counter-rejection. And though one has to admit that this is a choice that has probably been forced on many of us, yet many of us have also refused it for fear that it will isolate the Christians of Lebanon, and imperil other Christians everywhere else in the Middle East.

But to reject such a choice does not mean to opt for a form of "Resigned Christianity," wherein the 12 million Christians of the Arab world will have to accept living, willingly and wittingly, as resigned Churches. Their closed societies may become, as some probably have already, ghettos that will lead to a fossilized form of Christianity. Disenchanted and not harboring any political ambitions, such closed societies may be content with their contribution to culture and tradition, abstracted from political concerns.

The Christians of Lebanon will not, and need not, accept such an extreme as the only alternative to militancy and a Christian-dominated state of their own—a Christian Israel, as it were. The option, which is probably the ideal synthesis of the two previous attitudes, is to transcend both confrontation and resignation.

Opting to preserve the testimony of God in the "realm of man," the Christians who choose coexistence and an intercommunal state are choosing an assertion of equal rights, including political rights, but with tolerance and in dialogue, not through confrontation. In the Arab World, known more and more as the "Household of Islam," Arab Christians have always assumed a historical mission, which today is more important than ever before: having an impact on Islam, not by proselytism, but, as they have done for centuries, with a message of culture and progress, let alone the preservation of the ideal values derived from Christian faith and heritage.

Of course, the only possible sociopolitical framework for this option, this mission of testimony and survival, is the secular state. Yet, the question with which we are now, more than ever, confronted is: Can Islam accept the notion of the secular state, of the separation between religion and politics?

Whence the challenge, the challenge for Christians to remain Christians. Not Christians having freedom of access to places of worship—as is the notion in the West—but Christians significant in society, active in politics, and capable of transfiguring other groups, to create together a new form of social as well as economic and political life. In this, as well as in the more earthly political

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perspective, it is the return to Lebanon in its basic constitution which remains the only path to peace, and the road of wisdom and creativity.

VII

But postwar Lebanon should not be a return to the status quo ante. It will be a nation formed by all the Lebanese, brought together once more, in a new social as well as political contract. To ensure the survival of Lebanon, moreover, one must hope that a system will be devised by virtue of which it should never again be allowed to be the arena, the battlefield, where friend and foe alike find it convenient to wage their wars. The safety and security of Lebanon, the defense of its territorial integrity, the protection of its sovereignty, the assertion of its independence, should not remain contingent upon extraterritorial considerations of any sort, whether regional or international.

Hence, a defense of Lebanon must not be merely a defense of land and people, but, beyond that, a restructuring of its democratic institutions, integrating a traditionally pluralistic society into a unity that resists conquest and destabilization.

None of these goals can be realized if the postwar Lebanon does not become a strong Lebanon, differing in significant ways from that which it succeeds. There can be no return to the past, nor should there be. The decade of conflicts has shattered some aspects of Lebanese life and has weakened others, but it has introduced possibilities of change that were not there before.

Let us, then, consider more specifically three key areas of action and policy: the demands of reconstruction, the making of a new and reformed government, and external affairs. What are the possibilities to be exploited, and the things to be done?

Reconstruction. Even the casual eye can discern the destruction of and the need to repair the center of Beirut, the industrial suburbs, many villages and towns, the highways, the vital infrastructure, etc. These will require the material and manpower that such work always requires. But the restoration must not be done in a mechanical fashion, innocent of the social environment in which it takes place.

The allocation of resources will influence the role of Beirut, the regionalization or decentralization that has taken place and should be fostered, the nature of the economy, and the relation between different regions that have been unevenly affected by the war. Apart from its most evident, visible manifestations, the restoration will have long-range economic and political consequences for Lebanon. It must be carried out, therefore, so that it

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will strengthen the entire fabric of society and the new government that will usher it in. The ensuing economic development must have a social objective: the re-creation of the middle class, as the backbone of Lebanese democracy, which was deeply shattered by the war.

Organic and Structural Reforms. There is some truth in the assertion that Lebanon had become a central government with legitimacy but no authority, and local, functioning governments with authority but no legitimacy. But that truth is stretched to distortion when the conclusion is drawn from it that these "statelets" will find it impossible to unite under a new republic. What is overlooked in this judgment is that none of the de facto local governments advocated separatism or independence, but rather a degree of autonomy plus a share in the future government commensurate with their special communal, or regional character. They wish to have a part in shaping the new National Pact.

The present situation will allow Lebanon to engage in a conscious policy of devolution. The growth of Beirut did drain the provinces of energy and vitality. The balance was upset not only by excessive administrative centralization but also by economic centralization. A policy of devolution would advocate and support a diffusion of public sector efforts into the regions, both in terms of planning and spending. It would extend to these regions much that was in contention.

However, a new equilibrium must be created. The strength of the new Republic will not lie in the concentration of power. The new Lebanon will be strong by virtue of what binds together the component parts. Its task will be to harmonize, not to suppress, the particular interests of the different provinces, classes and cultures. Granting that there is some coincidence between regions and ethnic and religious communities, the new National Pact will be based upon regions.

Because it will be truly pluralistic, the government must be democratic. The structures of democracy are varied, but it is possible to suggest some structural reforms that would strengthen the new government. Among these are: the election of the president not by parliament but through universal suffrage to break the monopoly of the ruling class; the creation of a second legislative economic and social chamber representing the corporations, which will counterbalance confessional representation; the establishment of competence, not religion, as the criterion in the selection of civil servants. Such reforms, if enacted, would strengthen the Republic. But we are speaking of realities, not

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utopia, and there is another issue that must be considered—the army.

A strong central government, particularly one that is structured along the lines outlined above, must have a strong army. A number of the de facto local authorities have formed their own militias, some better equipped than the government's army. However, though limited in its operations, and unable to confront a coalition of private forces, the Lebanese army is still the strongest *single* force in Lebanon. In order that it become what it should be—the shield of legitimate authority and an integrating force—the local militias must, in stages, be brought under the jurisdiction of the central government, to be finally absorbed into the government's armed forces. Apart from assuming the normal responsibilities of providing security, the militias could perform needed social functions, including reconstruction. A program of conscription would transform the present character of the army, rejuvenate it and gradually transform it into the powerful instrument the state needs. It would be able to assume the functions assigned to the Arab Deterrent Force and various peacekeeping forces that have been stationed in Lebanon. I should add that those who lightly discard the idea of a strong Lebanese army have not seen Lebanese fighters in action.

External affairs. The reconstruction and reforms that are desirable for the development of postwar Lebanon are obviously demanding. Although Lebanon will necessarily deal with other countries, for some years its energies will be turned inward. It must seek the basis of stability and strength within itself. This it will be able to do if it is allowed to act as a free and independent nation. It will not be able to do so if, with whatever good intentions, others attempt to impose upon it some variant of partition or condominium. That is less likely to happen as the major actors recognize that a strong and peaceful Lebanon will benefit the entire region. A dismembered Lebanon will not only be weak but will have had planted within it the seeds of further regional violence.

To be able to follow such a course, many advocate that Lebanon should become neutral. Assuming that both Israeli and Syrian troops have been withdrawn from Lebanon, and that Lebanon is now free from the constraints of harboring the forces of the Palestine Revolution (PLO), it is not impossible to envisage a stable Lebanon, free from foreign intervention, insulated from the conflicting policies and concerns of its neighbors—a threat to none, and a friend to itself. Yet this does not necessarily mean a neutral Lebanon.

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The question of neutrality, understood as equidistance between Israel and the Arab world, including the Palestinian cause, will remain very delicate. A proclaimed neutrality, with the prospect of a separate peace treaty with Israel, would send out a series of wrong signals. It would be provocative in the Arab world, of which Lebanon is a part and in which it must find its way. Instead of contributing to the unity of Lebanon, it would possibly disrupt it. Egypt, 15 times the size of Lebanon, is testimony to the power of Arab isolation. Lebanon will need all of its intimacy with the Arab world to involve that world in the efforts of reconstruction, let alone Lebanon's natural economic and financial interests in its Arab environment, and the sustenance of its unique cultural role. Lebanon cannot and should not be expected to withstand the strain of isolation that neutrality would entail.

On the other hand, identification with the Arab world does not mean that Lebanon should again accept, in the name of the Palestinian cause, a burden that even radical Arabs refused to take up in defense of the Palestinians in Lebanon. After all the sacrifices Lebanon has made, it can without fear of criticism establish itself as a nonbelligerent state, belonging to the Arab world, but not alone carrying the burden and the curse of the weakest link. Lebanon's freedom, if and when strong, should never again be allowed to be taken hostage by those to whom it was extended.

VIII

Only in unity can such liberty be preserved. Partition, dominion, condominium and a return to the sideshow may represent advantages to many. None of those advantages will flow to the Lebanese people. What is immediately and strikingly clear is that, like the measures that led to the war, such proposals have little regard for the history, culture and life of the Lebanese. As peace plans, it is now clear, they are as disruptive of the integrity of Lebanon as were previous military actions within Lebanon and across its borders.

A Lebanon restored to peace, to its own peace, a Lebanon restored to sanity, a Lebanon restored to dialogue is not only the end of the peace process but will and should become the beginning as well. A Lebanon restored to peace will be a useful instrument, probably the only creative instrument in promoting a dialogue between nations and a healthier approach to international relations, as well as to cultural coexistence in the area—which is the historical perspective of durable peace.

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Having no illusions about what it can do, Lebanon knows what it can prevent. Ten years of war, and a century or two of struggle to establish Lebanon in its present form have proven how impossible it is to create an equilibrium in the Middle East—a balance, of power, of wealth and of culture—without a peaceful Lebanon.

Peace in Lebanon is not only an elementary right of the Lebanese but a necessity for regional and international security.

IX

Such measures as I have outlined here I do not put forward lightly. They demand vision, faith, determination, skill and hard work. But the Lebanese people are capable of responding to the challenge.

Indeed, is not the beginning of the response the now-demonstrated ability to elect a new President, however controversial, in strict respect of constitutional forms and while the Palestinians were still evacuating and the Israelis and Syrians exchanging ambivalent signals? This act of self-confidence engages Lebanon in what may become a long process, not altogether devoid of tremors.

However, 12 years of wars and revolutions, two or three invasions, the continued weighty presence of foreign armies—such a context of violence cannot be absorbed or transcended instantly and in total serenity. Even the most stable societies have needed long years to overcome syndromes of much lesser dimensions. The Lebanese resiliance must be given the chance it is asking for, an opportunity to survive what so many others have not.

In time the earth that is scarred and soaked with blood will put forth flowers and trees. Where instruments of destruction are now displayed with insolence and where bodies still lie unrecovered under the rubble of civilization, there will be houses and factories. Wounds will be healed. And a nation, formed by all the Lebanese, will be brought together once more, not in a transient political contract only but in a more lasting historical compact: a covenant between generations, past and present, and the generations yet to come.

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Harold H. Saunders

GAN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE

Given the summer's immersion in day-to-day death and destruction in Lebanon, we need to begin putting the Israeli-Palestinian War of 1982 in larger perspective. For better or worse, it will mark a turning point in the history of Israel, in the course of Arab-Israeli relations, in U.S.-Israeli relations, in the political character and orientation of important Middle Eastern states, and in the U.S. position in that critical area.

To understand the significance of the war, it is necessary first to assess what Israel set out to accomplish by sending its forces into Lebanon. As is usual in almost any war, it had both immediate war aims and ultimate political objectives; although the two usually overlap, and did in this case, it is useful to distinguish between them.

The initially stated Israeli war aim was to clear a zone in southern Lebanon of weapons and fighters within reach of northern Israel. This war aim—"Peace for Galilee"—was understandable in view of past attacks on Israel's northern communities and the growing stockpile of Palestinian equipment in the region.

Within a few days, as Israeli forces moved rapidly north to lay siege to Beirut, Israel's stated war aims were expanded to include the eviction from Lebanon of the military presence and political headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This aim had a plausible basis as part of protecting Israel's physical security; it also conformed to the widespread desire of most Lebanese to be rid of the disruptive PLO apparatus there.

Even before the move north, the Israeil air force carried out sharp and effective attacks on Syrian antiaircraft batteries, engaging and destroying Syrian aircraft as well. These operations plainly reflected an objective of neutralizing Syrian forces and in the process discrediting Soviet assistance and equipment.

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It also became evident that Israel had objectives in terms of the political structure of Lebanon itself. At a minimum, it sought to preserve and enlarge an Israeli-dominated buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Moreover, Israeli authorities sought to have their Maronite Christian allies emerge in control of Lebanon, or to lay the foundation for a lasting Israeli-Syrian condominium there.

But the ultimate political objectives of Israel's leaders did not stop there. The physical removal of the PLO apparatus from Lebanon was seen as a means to a larger end—one frankly avowed in the statements of these leaders for several months. That end was the destruction of the organized Palestinian movement. With a fragmented and dispersed PLO, Israeli leaders foresaw the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza—deprived of outside moral support—coming to accept permanent Israeli control there, in a situation in which much of that Palestinian population could be induced (or gradually coerced) to migrate across the Jordan River into Jordan.

In short, the most important Israeli objective was to resolve the Palestinian problem once and for all, by making the remaining Palestinians merely an ethnic minority within an enlarged Israel, and ultimately by transforming Jordan into a Republic of Palestine, with an accepted Palestinian diaspora elsewhere. As Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir has stated frankly in these pages, the only Palestinian "homeland" is to be Jordan, as "eastern Palestine."[1]

Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian War was fought mainly over whether an organized Palestinian movement would survive in order to negotiate peace between Israelis and Palestinians as two people with equal rights. It was not fought only to determine how many Palestinian fighters should be where in Lebanon. The Palestinians' objective was to emerge from the fighting in some way that would prove that even Israel's military might could not destroy the Palestinian national movement or impose Israel's solution on it.

This definition of the central issue behind the war will be controversial. But it is amply supported both by the way Israel conducted the war and by the long-standing aims of the men who now rule Israel, Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, and their principal colleagues.

As this is written, it seems clear that Israel has achieved its war aim of evicting the PLO headquarters and military presence from

[1] Yitzhak Shamir, "Israel's Role in a Changing Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, p. 791.

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Lebanon, and that the practical situation there will lend itself to lasting achievement of the war aim of militarily securing Israel's northern communities. Moreover, Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Maronite Christian Phalange and the candidate obviously favored by Israel, has just been elected President of Lebanon.

It remains to be seen what Lebanon will become, and whether its future will be determined by military pressures and force or by negotiation and peaceful processes. This is the immediate issue that will start to be addressed as this article is in press, but that is unlikely to be quickly resolved. The war has underscored the urgency of restoring peace and stability in Lebanon for Lebanon's sake.

But it is critical that no one be derailed into thinking that the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been or will be resolved in Lebanon. The war did not destroy Palestinian nationalism, and four million Palestinians remain in the Middle East and elsewhere.

What this invasion has done is to firmly establish the need for Israeli-Palestinian peace on the peacemaker's agenda along with peace between Israel and its neighboring states. The future of Lebanon is indeed of crucial importance—and, as we shall see, cannot even in itself be separated from the future of the Palestinian issue. It is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict above all that must now be addressed, and set on the way to solution, in all of its aspects and in the context of an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The war has posed the issue sharply: Will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict be resolved by negotiation in the near future or by force over time? Will Israel impose its sovereignty over the remaining land west of the Jordan River occupied in 1967? Will the Palestinians dedicate themselves to continued warfare? Or will both parties commit themselves to achieve peace in the land west of the Jordan, as envisioned at Camp David, through fair negotiations involving Israelis and Palestinians?

How the Palestinian problem is dealt with by the United States in the wake of the war will affect the U.S. position in the Middle East for some time to come. U.S. interests in the wider sense require a comprehensive strategy for an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace which looks well beyond the crisis in Lebanon. At the heart of a comprehensive strategy must be a process for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Such a strategy can succeed only with the continuous and determined involvement of the President of the United States and his Secretary of State. The decisions they make and their perseverance in carrying out those decisions will be evidence to the rest

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of the world of the ability of the United States to use its power wisely and justly. If they cannot respond effectively, a decade from now Americans who care will be arguing over who lost the Middle East.

The purpose of this article is to assess the balance of forces in the aftermath of the war, to identify next steps in Lebanon, to analyze what an Israeli-Palestinian peace process requires, and to suggest the elements of a comprehensive U.S. strategy for helping to move toward an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace. It may seem absurd to write of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process just after Israel has tried with all its power to destroy the structure of the Palestinian movement in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as in Lebanon. But how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dealt with now will determine whether Israelis and Arabs capture a last chance to negotiate peaceful relations in this generation. The alternative is another generation of conflict which could well end in a nuclear holocaust.

II

The question after any war is what the new balance of forces is and how it can be used to build something positive from the rubble. Opportunity does not automatically spring from that rubble. Opportunity comes out of destruction only when statesmen with a vision of peace and growth work with greater creativity and tireless diligence to fashion hope from the ashes.

At this moment, it is by no means clear that the 1982 war has ended: there remain serious possibilities that fighting will be renewed, and a high probability that isolated actions will continue. Let us assume, however, that there is no renewal of organized military conflict, and look candidly at the impact of the war on the principal actors.

First, this war has again demonstrated that, in Arab words, "Israel is the superpower of the Middle East." With Egypt absent, there is no Arab military constraint on Israeli leaders who are willing to use their power to the fullest and who seem to believe that Israel's future can be assured by force alone. As just noted, Israel's attack on Syria's Soviet-supplied air defense missiles seemed designed to show that the Arabs could not rely on Moscow for help. Israel's open dismissal of President Reagan's repeated appeals to stop the bombardment of Beirut and to give the negotiations conducted by Ambassador Philip Habib a chance seemed designed to show the Arabs that they could not expect the United States to impose peace on Israel.

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In Arab eyes, Israeli military encirclement of an Arab capital and the related Israeli objective of remaking the political life of an Arab country imposed a new character on what they see as Israeli expansionism. Thoughtful Arabs, looking to the future, put high on their agendas the need to show Israel that it cannot count on getting its way by force. In the end, most Arabs still look to the United States to reestablish some restraining influence over an Israel they regard as out of control.

Second, a central question is how the Palestinians will emerge. If an organized Palestinian movement survives in the aftermath of the war, preserving what institutions exist in the Palestinian community and able to play a political role, a peace process could begin sooner than if the movement is atomized or divided by internecine struggles. If Palestinian leadership were eventually to settle in Cairo rather than Damascus, it would receive greater support in pursuing a political course. Whether leadership committed to peace or to a continued guerrilla campaign emerges from the crisis, and whether most Arab states will agree that Palestinian military action from Lebanon and terrorism elsewhere should cease, will depend heavily on whether Palestinians and other Arabs see a real diplomatic alternative.

Ambassador Habib, to his great credit, seems to have kept the door open for Palestinian leadership to build a new future. The Palestinian movement is not dead politically. In some Arab eyes the PLO has emerged from the crisis as the only heroic party, having demonstrated that Israel with all of its power could not destroy the symbol and the organization of Palestinian nationalism. Whether the leadership will pull itself together and show its ability to act with a coherent strategy on the diplomatic stage, only time will tell.

Third, with the headquarters and military arm of the PLO gone, Lebanon can return to dealing with the problems which were already beginning to divide it before the new PLO influx that began in the early 1970s. It is now being said in many quarters that the enlarged and militarized PLO presence in Lebanon was the sole cause of the armed conflict there that began in 1975–76 and continued at substantial levels of violence thereafter. Even in Lebanon it has not been popular to say that there are grave Lebanese problems which have only been exacerbated by the PLO presence. But the plain fact is that many Lebanese have voiced concern privately for more than a decade that the 1943 French-influenced compact underlying Lebanon's political organization and integrity was distintegrating—and that Lebanese leaders in a position to restore that integrity were more interested in en-

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hancing their own power than in strengthening the unity of Lebanon.

With the organized Palestinians a less significant factor, Israel and Syria are still in positions to inhibit free and constructive Lebanese efforts to build a new Lebanon. A critical issue as the new balance of forces is shaped will be whether Lebanon is freed of international intervention so that Lebanese will have a fair opportunity to reestablish the integrity and independence of their state, or whether Israel and Syria will try to enhance their own power by carving out semi-permanent positions for themselves in Lebanon. That option is already being discussed in Israel, and many Arabs are already anticipating such an Israeli move.

Fourth, it is necessary to assess carefully the attitudes of the Arab states. The war has not changed the readiness of Egypt, Jordan, and some other moderate Arabs to pursue peace with Israel on a reciprocal basis or to work with the United States toward that end, but it has caused all of them to question seriously whether Israel will negotiate a just peace and whether the United States will take a position independent of Israel's. It is widely believed that the United States acquiesced in Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and few Arabs believe that the United States could not have prevented Israel's heavy bombardments.

It may still be possible to produce a statement by moderate Arab nations of their readiness to make peace, but it seems unlikely that the entire Arab world could unite on such a position. The moderates will probably have to move on their own. Iraq could well move toward the moderates, given its dependence on moderate Arab support against Iran. There will, however, continue to be a small group of states like Libya, South Yemen, and some of the more extreme Palestinian groups, who will reject any initiative to make peace with Israel. The positions of Syria and Algeria remain question marks. The position and leadership of the United States will be an important factor in the decision of each Arab state.

Much has been made of the reluctance of Arab states to accept the PLO apparatus now being evacuated from Beirut. And it is clear that each of these states will be careful to assure that the PLO does not come close to achieving within its borders the independent strength it achieved in Jordan in 1970 or subsequently in Lebanon.

But this does *not* mean that Arab support for Palestinian self-determination and a state in the West Bank and Gaza, or for the PLO as the only organization which speaks for the Palestinians, has declined. Even those Arab governments and groups that have

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come to accept the existence of Israel, within essentially its pre-1967 boundaries, likewise accept and support, however belatedly in historic terms, the reality and force of Palestinian demands for a homeland of their own. In their view, that homeland should include the West Bank and Gaza, which would be freed if Israel withdrew from territories occupied in the 1967 War. In the wake of the 1982 war, there is already much evidence that underlying Arab support for the Palestinian cause has been increased by Israel's conduct of the war.

Moreover, there are often practical reasons for such support from Arab governments, especially those with large Palestinian populations. They see a dispersed Palestinian people as a politically disruptive force as long as their aspiration for a homeland of their own is unfulfilled. For that reason, among the others just stated, they will continue to press for an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Iran's military successes over Iraq and its strong support of some factions in the PLO give moderate Arab leaders added incentive for wanting to develop a political alternative for the Palestinians that has a realistic chance of producing results.

In sum, the war has created, or intensified, attitudes that are often conflicting and that could now move in either direction. On the one hand, they could be channeled to produce a new process leading toward an Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Administration in Washington is again becoming directly engaged in the problems of the Middle East. Israel has demonstrated clearly what its objectives are, and has posed sharply for the United States the question of what the U.S.-Israeli relationship has become. The PLO has been forced to face the fact that its only hope for achieving its objectives is through political and diplomatic effort. Moderate Arab governments are deeply enough concerned about the radicalization of the Middle East that they may be prepared to support a Palestinian peace initiative.

Peace can come, however, only if statesmen work hard at it. The new balance of forces if left alone could more likely harden into the causes of a new and more terrible conflict before the 1980s end. After each major conflict—in 1949, 1956, 1967, 1973—opportunities have briefly existed for leaders of vision. The psychological humiliations in 1949 and 1967 made it harder for Arab leaders to negotiate. Limited Arab successes in 1973 opened the door to negotiation. If Israel's crushing military actions were now to be followed by a continued application of force by Israel in Lebanon, and the unchecked continuation of Israel's present policies in the West Bank and Gaza—so that there existed no apparent possibility of movement toward a negotiated resolution

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of the Palestinian issue—the 1982 war will have left the parties further apart than ever. We could look forward only to all the possibilities and dangers this would entail, including Arab alienation from the United States and progressive radicalization in the Arab world, and organized and unorganized violence growing both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

III

A critical step in achieving a balance of forces conducive to peace will be restoring Lebanon's political and territorial integrity and its self-government. This is of overriding concern for the sake of the people of Lebanon, who have suffered too long.

Obviously, there is an immediate need for a massive program of humanitarian and economic aid to help the Lebanese rebuild their country, and this should be undertaken by the widest possible group of nations, with the United States playing an important role. However, such a program will not have lasting effectiveness unless there is a new political consensus within Lebanon.

Restoring Lebanon's integrity is essential also in establishing the basis for a wider peace. Israel must withdraw quickly and completely before its occupation of south Lebanon hardens. Israel's remaining credibility as a nation claiming to want a negotiated peace with its neighbors on the basis of respect for each other's sovereignty depends on it. Consolidation of Israel's position in Lebanon will be a final confirmation that Israel with U.S. support intends to resolve issues by force, not by negotiation. Israel's withdrawal is not an issue for compromise.

Moreover, there will remain in any circumstances a Palestinian population of at least 500,000 in Lebanon. If that population (which is bound to include some remnants of the PLO military and political apparatus) sees no prospect of movement toward a Palestinian homeland—and especially if it sees Israel acting to deal with the West Bank and Gaza by pressure and force—it is bound to become again a serious disruptive force within the political structure of Lebanon.

It follows that, while there may be a tendency to think of the issue of foreign forces in Lebanon as a "Phase II" of negotiations to wind up the 1982 war, and of the Palestinian issue as "Phase III," in practice the two issues must be addressed simultaneously. There will be pressures, and a clear Israeli interest, to pursue the two problems in sequence. This must be avoided, from every standpoint and because the issues are in fact interlocked. Moreover, we should keep in mind the vivid lesson of 1974–75, when the issues of immediate withdrawal from Egypt and from the

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Golan Heights were addressed while the Palestinian issue was put to one side. The result, of course, was the Rabat decision of late 1974 that installed the PLO as the only Arab-backed negotiating partner for the West Bank and Gaza, removed Jordan from the play, and generally hardened Arab positions on the Palestinian issue. It was a mistake that must not be repeated.

If Israel is to withdraw safely, two steps related to Lebanon will be required. First, a strengthened peacekeeping force must be put in place quickly, with an effective mandate to assure a zone of peace above Israel's northern border until a Lebanese force is able to do so. Second, all parties to the conflict must support a new compact for Lebanon. Syria and Israel must end their intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs. Syrian and Israeli withdrawals should be worked out on parallel but separate tracks because the backgrounds of their respective involvements raise quite different issues. Lebanese factions need to agree to reconstitute a workable central government. This will require agreement on new relationships among them, reviewing and revising the 1943 compact as they think necessary.

Finally, it is important to move quickly to help both the Lebanese and the Palestinian homeless. The Palestinians pose a special problem because their plight raises the question of how and where they should be provided new housing and new communities. Confronted now with resettling a fourth (1948, 1967, 1970, 1982) wave of Palestinian refugees, the United Nations and those who support its Palestinian relief program face again the question of building "temporary" housing for several hundred thousand people. Israel is already insisting that camps should not be rebuilt in southern Lebanon.

If there is to be a real effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, housing could be truly temporary. If not, perhaps these people are entitled to more than makeshift quarters. Whatever is done about their housing, it has long been agreed that those refugees who cannot or do not want to return to property in Palestine are entitled to compensation for property lost. Israel will then raise the separate question of the claims of Jews who lost property when they left Arab countries.

In short, as the world deals with another group of Palestinian refugees, it must consider whether now is not the time to establish a framework for dealing with the refugee problem in the context of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

IV

If we are going to try to develop an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, it is important for us to understand what such a process

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will involve. In 1977–78, the United States was dealing with two negotiating partners, Israel and Egypt, who were prepared to work on a negotiated approach to the issue of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, even though they clearly differed on the ultimate political solution for the area. Now, however, it is clear that there does not exist a willingness on the Israeli side to seek a true negotiated approach, and that the Arab side does not see any possibility of progress in the face of Israeli attitudes. Moreover, the Arab states other than Egypt have declined to participate in the Camp David peace process, and only Egypt and Jordan have made clear their acceptance of the existence of Israel.

In short, after several years of detailed Egyptian-Israeli negotiation, we are now back near the beginning of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in a pre-negotiation phase dealing with attitudes that block negotiation. We are used to running in third and fourth gear. Now we need to shift directly back to first. Unless we understand that the first need is to change basic attitudes rather than to negotiate texts, any next steps to launch an Israeli-Palestinian peace process will start us up a dead-end street.

Today the government of Israel is seen, with reason, as pursuing a peace imposed by force and by the passage of time rather than a negotiated peace. As one Egyptian speaking this July put it in retrospect, "The fifth Arab-Israeli war started within days after Camp David, when Prime Minister Begin announced that the government's policy of building new settlements in territories occupied in 1967 would continue." This signaled that key issues would be dealt with unilaterally outside negotiation. Anyone who has seen the massive concrete blocks of settlement apartment buildings in the West Bank and ringing Jerusalem will understand the impact of the Israeli government's actions. Step by step, the Begin government extended its control over land, water, administration and the movements of daily life in the West Bank and Gaza.

In August 1981, when the second Begin government was formed and Ariel Sharon became Defense Minister, the government announced openly that its policy was to assert Israel's claim of sovereignty over all the land west of the Jordan River—not to negotiate a peaceful and just settlement of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects as agreed at Camp David. The Israeli administration in occupied territories intensified its campaign to restrict the authority of democratically elected Palestinian officials and, eventually, to remove them from office, to break their ties with the Palestinian national movement outside the occupied territo-

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ries, and to set up an alternative group of compliant local Palestinian administrators.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon, to repeat, was designed to destroy once and for all any hope among the people of the West Bank and Gaza that the process of shaping the Palestinian people into a nation could succeed. It was designed to break any final resistance to total Israeli control and to pave the way for making life so difficult for those who valued their freedom and political self-expression that they would eventually leave for Jordan.

For their part, neither the Arab states (apart from Egypt and Jordan) nor the PLO have been prepared formally to accept Israel's existence as a state. Such acceptance of Israel is indeed central to peaceful resolution of the conflict.

A critical missing ingredient in the peace process is a clear-cut statement by Arab and Palestinian authorities of their readiness to make peace with Israel provided Israel will make peace with them. Attitudes within the PLO and Arab governments have moved toward acceptance of Israel. In contrast to the Arab position adopted in 1967—no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiation with Israel—a number of important Arab leaders today will state privately that they are prepared to live at peace with Israel. Their formal public positions, however, are evasive on that point and do not present Israelis with an offer of peace Israelis can call realistic.

Moreover, the PLO and Arab governments except Egypt rejected the two-stage negotiating process agreed to at Camp David and refused to start negotiations unless the outcome of the negotiation was assured before the negotiation began. When Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, in August 1981, put forward a position including both a stated objective and a transitional process for achieving it, Arab leaders could not agree to support it, and the Saudi government itself would not authoritatively and unequivocally say the plan provided for recognition of Israel.

No one with any experience in the Middle East can minimize the depth of feeling on both sides that lies behind these attitudes. They date back to the creation of Israel and the division of Palestine in 1948, and although there has been a great deal of change in the 1970s in underlying Arab attitudes, those in Israel have tended to harden since 1977. The essential point of disagreement is whether Israel and the Palestinians each have valid claims in the area defined in 1948 as Palestine.

Today, in *Israel*, there may be serious challenge to a definition of the Palestinian problem which acknowledges both Israeli and Palestinian claims *in the same land.* Many Israelis fear that accepting

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a Palestinian claim would dilute their own claim to all the land west of the Jordan River. Again and again in Israel one hears the sincerely stated view of early settlers that the Palestinians were doing little with the land when the Jewish settlers came. In their view, the Palestinians became active only when they wanted to share in gains the Israeli settlers were achieving. Arab states, they recall, either did not regard the Palestinians as a separate people or did not support them in establishing a state of their own when Jordan controlled the West Bank, and Egypt controlled Gaza, from 1949 until 1967.

Palestinian nationalism, in their view, is the product of terrorism and intimidation by the PLO under Yasser Arafat, and with the PLO's defeat in Lebanon, Palestinian nationalism will decline as an effective political force. The Israelis from the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine have either set aside the question of their long-term relationship with the Palestinian Arabs or have vaguely envisioned some kind of coexistence which Israel would dominate. Even those who are prepared to accept partitioning the land west of the Jordan River between Jews and Arabs for the most part see the Arab role being played by Jordan and not by Palestine Arabs acting independently. Most Israelis have never thought of a negotiated settlement with Palestinian Arabs as an equal partner.

At the same time, Israelis are not monolithic in support of their government's plan to assert Israel's claim of sovereignty over all the land west of the Jordan River. Many other Israelis see Israel facing an impossible future if they pursue that course. Incorporating 1.2 million Palestinian Arabs within Israel along with those already there, with appropriate civil and political rights, would eventually produce a large enough Arab population to destroy the Jewish state. Incorporating those Palestinians without civil and political rights would require measures that would violate the principles and practice of human rights which are at the heart of Jewish tradition. And driving large numbers of Palestinians out of the West Bank and Gaza by force or pressure goes against the moral code and self-image of their country held by many if not most in Israel, as well as among its supporters abroad.

Palestinians and other Arabs, wherever they are, strongly hold the view that Israel will achieve peace only when Israel comes to terms fairly with the Palestinian people and respects their right to self-determination as the Jewish people have enjoyed their own. The rights of Palestinians as a people are belatedly recognized in some form by a majority of the world's governments. Palestinians do not want a state in Jordan, because it is not the land of their

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fathers. They do not understand why Zionists, who rejected a Jewish homeland in Africa, fail to comprehend why Palestinians want a homeland in the land where their homes have historically been. They do not understand how an Israeli Prime Minister who led violent resistance against British rule can credibly voice moral outrage at the people Israelis displaced when those people assert their rights through the means available to them. They do not understand how a Jewish government with centuries of persecution behind it could think that attacking several thousand Palestinian fighters could destroy the nationalist determination of almost four million people. They do not understand how Jews, of all people, can be insensitive to what it means to be a stateless person.

In short, the attitudes that must now be brought together have deep roots, and it will take enormous effort to bring them to the point where a serious negotiating process could get underway. At a minimum, Israel must demonstrate its willingness to accept a negotiated approach, and its abandonment of the present policy of seeking a de facto solution in the West Bank and Gaza by force—while the PLO and the Arab states must join Israel in reaffirming their support of the basic territorial provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, as well as declaring formally their acceptance of Israel within essentially its pre-1967 boundaries.

In essence, both sides must perceive that the attitudes and formal positions of the other side now make a negotiating process more promising than any realistic alternative. It is *not* essential, at least for the renewal of a serious negotiating process, for both sides to agree at the outset what the ultimate result would be. This, and the ways to move to it, are exactly what the negotiation would be about.

V

How, then, can the necessary changes in attitude come about? Here the position of the United States is central. An active U.S. role is vital in helping to establish the basis for negotiation, and it is essential for the United States to reaffirm its own view of the Palestinian problem.

The issue is whether the United States supports a just settlement for the Palestinian people or whether it buys the argument of Begin's Israeli and American supporters that the Palestinian people are an artificial creation and that peace is only possible if they are dispersed and suppressed by force. Now is the time to thrash out among ourselves our answers to the questions that are

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endlessly argued. Are the Palestinians a people who will remain an effective political movement? Can they be destroyed or controlled by force? Can they be settled outside Palestine, or will their irredentist objectives persist with growing support from most of the world? Can the United States or world Jewry support an Israel built on subjugation and dispersal of another people?

For years after 1947, the United States approached the "Arab-Israeli" conflict in terms of relations between existing states. After the Partition, Jordan had assumed the Arab role in the West Bank and Egypt in Gaza, while the leadership and many members of the Palestinian Arab community were dispersed and the institutions of that community disintegrated under the impact of the war and dispersion. The Arab states did not support the creation of a Palestinian state.

Then, in 1967, the situation began to change—although Resolution 242 reflected the viewpoint of the past in referring to the Palestinians only as refugees, not as parties to the conflict or parties to the peace. Only in the late 1960s did it become abundantly clear that there was a strong Palestinian national sentiment, so that the United States, along with others, came again to think of the "Palestine problem" as a central part of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That problem, simply stated, is how two peoples—two national movements reflected in Zionism and Palestinian nationalism—can live together in peace and security with claims in the same land. Palestinian national rights gained increasing recognition internationally, as did the PLO itself.

Yet throughout these 35 years the position of the United States has been totally clear on the territorial question. In 1947, the United States voted for the U.N. resolution to partition the Palestine Mandate west of the Jordan River into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem set aside as a separate entity. After the 1967 War, when Israel occupied all the land west of the Jordan, the United States voted for Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the conflict, in the context of peace and recognition. In 1978, the United States was partner to negotiating the Camp David Accords, which reaffirmed Resolution 242. The question today is whether the Administration stands by that position and is prepared to use its influence to reaffirm it as the basis for peace negotiations.

If the United States holds to its longstanding position, while Israel continues to assert the position now taken by Prime Minister Begin and his government, then Israel and the United States clearly have a difference vital to their relationship. The United States can in no way interpret Resolution 242 or the Camp David

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Accords as endorsing Israeli sovereignty—whether de facto or by formal claim—imposed by force over all the land west of the Jordan River.

A sustained U.S. dialogue with Israel is thus essential to reestablish a relationship of mutual respect based on common interests. A collision is in neither nation's interest. There is no question about the fundamental U.S. commitment to the security of Israel. As of the summer of 1982, however, there was no understanding between the United States and Israel of what "Israel" the United States is being asked to support, or what American interests in the Middle East must be protected if the United States is to remain able to support Israel over the long run.

For almost 30 years, Israel and the United States operated on the shared premise that Israel should be accepted as a Jewish state in Palestine and that the land west of the Jordan River should be divided between Israel and an Arab entity. Since 1967, the United States has strongly supported negotiation as the only realistic way to produce an Arab-Israeli settlement. That was also a shared objective until the recent period. When two friendly nations begin operating from widely different premises without talking seriously with each other about where they are going together, they are jeopardizing their relationship. There has not been a real discussion of these fundamental, long-term issues for at least two years.

In Lebanon, Israel appears increasingly to have acted without regard or respect for the interests of the United States or the expressed concerns of its President. In fairness to Israeli leaders, they may have thought over the past year that they had the silent assent of, or even a green light from, Washington, at least for their initially stated war aim. Now the war in Lebanon has forced the Administration to define for itself and for Israel somewhat more precisely what the limits of its support for Israel are. Until the United States makes absolutely clear in word and deed, in a spirit of mutual respect and commitment, what it will and will not support in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States will continue to look like an Israeli satellite and will risk a historic collision with Israel.

No one can say whether or how far the present government in Israel would alter its position in the face of a reaffirmed U.S. view. There are those who say flatly that Begin will never give up the West Bank—and clearly it would take not only formal statements but extensive actions to persuade the world, the Arab states or the Palestinians that Israel had in fact abandoned the objective of maintaining absolute and permanent control in the West Bank and Gaza. It is essential that Israel return convincingly at least to

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the negotiating position of 1977–78, although it may not be necessary at the outset for Israel to commit itself to a Palestinian homeland west of the Jordan.

In parallel with the enunciation of a firm U.S. position and a new and visible dialogue between the United States and Israel to the above ends, it is incumbent on the Arab states and the PLO to make the necessary declarations of acceptance of Israel and willingness to make peace. Today Israelis who would be willing to negotiate peace on the basis of withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 can point to no Arab position that offers a basis for negotiation. Authoritative, unequivocal statements by the Palestinians, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with Egyptian and other Arab support, could begin to change Israel's own perceptions of its alternatives. The Israeli people would have to decide between trying to negotiate peace and retaining territory through another generation of conflict—a choice they faced after President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in late 1977.

Many reasonable Arabs question why the Arabs should make this first move, before Israel commits itself to Palestinian self-determination or a Palestinian homeland west of the Jordan. The response is simply a practical question of whether they want to seize the initiative in an effort to break the present impasse. It is difficult for them to do so when they feel they are acting from a position of military inferiority. What they have not yet understood is that an offer of peace could be far more effective than military weapons in changing the balance of political forces within Israel as well as in the United States.

There are strong Arab voices in the wake of the war in Lebanon—at least in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian movement—arguing for such a move. Moderate Palestinian leaders—both in the PLO and in the West Bank—were seriously talking this July about how to make clear at least to the United States their readiness to negotiate peace with Israel. Their problem was to do so in a way that would not make them look as if they were capitulating at Israeli gunpoint. Having now withstood the onslaught of vastly superior military power and having proved that Israel cannot destroy the Palestinian movement or impose a solution by force, the time may be at hand for them to declare a political victory and to capitalize on it by seizing the high ground on the diplomatic front.

At the same time, moderates in those countries are virtually pleading with the United States to promise convincingly that it would respond positively to such an initiative and put its weight on the scales on the side of a negotiated settlement of the Israeli-

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Palestinian conflict. Moderates need some sign to show radical opposition and doubters that a political course can produce results. If they can show no such evidence, they deeply fear a sharp increase in radical or Islamic fundamentalist influence in their countries.

In sum, once the United States has reaffirmed that its aim is peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, the first objective in launching an Israeli-Palestinian peace process is a convincing commitment on both sides to mutual acceptance and to a negotiated settlement rather than one imposed by force or by exploiting the passage of time. The support of the United States is critical in crystallizing such commitments.

VI

The changing of attitudes on both sides is central to the resumption of any Israeli-Palestinian peace process. But at the same time it is useful to look briefly at the possible mode and participation for negotiations, and at objectives that should initially be sought.

The obvious existing framework is of course that of the Camp David Accords of 1978. Israel and Egypt then agreed that "the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts." This affirmation of purpose, subsequently ratified by the Israeli Knesset, remains important, and could indeed—if reaffirmed in credible fashion—be itself part of the declared change in attitudes required.

That half of the Camp David Accords that provided for an early peace treaty between Egypt and Israel has now been carried into effect. However, the second half, concerning the West Bank and Gaza, has not.

It is important to recall what was agreed at Camp David both concerning the Palestinians and concerning the specific stages of agreement and action for the West Bank and Gaza. First, it was specified that the parties

> recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. . . . Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

And the key provisions concerning the West Bank and Gaza read as follows:

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. . . in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements, the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. . . .

These new arrangements should give due consideration to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved. . . . As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period.

In the fall of 1978, negative Arab reactions to the Accords were such that Jordan declined to participate, and there has never been any progress in enlisting the participation of Palestinian representatives, because of three interrelated facts:

— It has not been possible to produce an agreed statement of the powers and responsibilities a Palestinian self-governing authority would exercise, so that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have never been able to commit themselves on whether they would stand for election. If they were given serious responsibilities, they could achieve general support from the Palestinian diaspora. If not, responsible leaders would refuse to serve as quislings.

— Israel has removed from office freely elected mayors in the West Bank and Gaza, and has taken an adamant position against any dealings with the PLO, irrespective of any PLO acceptance of Israel and of the specified Security Council Resolutions, on the ground that the PLO is basically an illegitimate "terrorist" organization.

— The PLO itself has declined up to now to declare openly and authoritatively that it accepts Israel and is prepared to pursue a negotiated settlement if Israel is prepared to do so.

The Camp David framework is not just "the only game in town." Its concepts of a transitional period, transitional authority, and two-stage negotiations may still be the only practical approach. A series of bilateral negotiations may also be more practical than any wider multilateral forum.

Having been ratified by the Israeli Knesset, that framework remains a solid foundation to build on. If other moderate Arab states wish to participate, this should not present insuperable difficulty. But, at a minimum, ways must be found to maintain

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Egypt's engagement and to enlist the participation of Jordan and of Palestinian representatives, which under present circumstances almost necessarily means a role for the PLO.

If attitudes can be changed so that each party will commit itself to a negotiated approach, then agreement must be reached on how the negotiation will be carried out. Questions such as these must be dealt with: To what extent must the big issues, such as borders or principles like self-determination or security and recognition for all, be agreed before negotiations begin? To what extent can agreements on limited issues be reached as building blocks and confidence-building steps toward larger agreements before final issues are resolved? Will the parties negotiate directly with one another? Or will they work through or with a mediator? Which parties will negotiate?

Large differences remain among Americans, Arabs and Israelis on these key points. Careful diplomacy would be required to iron these out, at least to the point where serious negotiations could resume.

Turning to the substance of such negotiations, the Camp David Accords did not resolve the key issue of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. The concept was that there should be genuine autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and withdrawal of Israel's military occupation and its civilian administration, as an *interim* arrangement before the final status of those territories was to be negotiated with full Palestinian participation. But that approach faltered when Begin indicated, by word and preemptive action, that he sees only Palestinian autonomy under Israeli sovereignty as the long-term Israeli-Palestinian relationship, while moderate Palestinians would accept a transitional period and an open relationship with Israel and Jordan, but only when they were assured that they could exercise their right of self-determination—which in principle could be a choice for a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, or conceivably for some form of federated association with Jordan.

It would of course be a major breakthrough if, in the course of stating their respective commitments to a negotiated peace, the two sides implied understanding on the shape of a possible solution. But the obstacles to such an understanding are formidable.

In the 1960s and early 1970s, leaders of the Palestinian people proposed a binational state in Palestine with rights guaranteed for Arabs and Jews. Since Israelis insist on a separate state, however, the Palestinians in the last half of the 1970s began to take the position that they are prepared to accept a state of their

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own in the West Bank and Gaza in land from which Israel had withdrawn under Security Council Resolution 242. The latter position has not been stated unambiguously, but there is little question that it remains the mainstream view of the Palestinian people as endorsed by the Palestinian National Congress. The conflict in Lebanon seems to have reinforced this view—while the eviction of the PLO apparatus from Lebanon may also have led many in the PLO, and in the Palestinian movement generally, to conclude that the objective must now be sought by peaceful political means.

The original option of a unitary binational state west of Jordan could now be renounced as part of a declared acceptance of Israel. But this would still leave what is presently Palestinian insistence on a separate state—a possibility rejected not only by the present Israeli government but by an overwhelming consensus of present Israeli opinion.

In short, it may be necessary—as at Camp David—that the two sides "agree to disagree" on the ultimate political structure of the West Bank and Gaza, and approach the problem—again as at Camp David—in two stages, looking to an interim period in which the situation could evolve so that the voice of Palestinians resident in the West Bank and Gaza would be clearly heard and they could participate in the second stage of negotiations, which would take up the final status of the territories.

An agreement which created genuine autonomy for a freely elected Palestinian self-governing authority as a transition device could not be dismissed lightly by the Arab world. The autonomy negotiations to date have achieved more than most realize, but they have yet to achieve these breakthroughs on key issues which would cause Arabs to question their current conviction that autonomy would only be a cover for long-term Israeli control of all territory west of the Jordan River.

The U.S. government has a choice between making a routine effort to achieve an agreement on autonomy and making a determined and sustained effort to achieve a real autonomy agreement that could launch the five-year (or other) transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza. A U.S. decision to help produce genuine autonomy would for the moment shift the focus of the autonomy talks from an Egyptian-Israeli negotiation to an Israeli-U.S. exchange. Such an exchange could be intense and difficult to sustain.

Moreover, it seems unlikely that the PLO or Arab governments will simply accept the Camp David framework (or an enlarged

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version) without some dialogue of their own with Israel or the United States on what the purposes of a negotiation would be. In Arab eyes, Camp David did not provide assurance that a transitional period would not allow Israel to complete its de facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. strategy for an Arab-Israeli peace would not be complete if it did not now pursue an active dialogue with all Arab parties to the conflict, thus authoritatively establishing that they would negotiate peace with Israel. That position, to repeat, needs to be put forward publicly in a way that could force events as Sadat did when he went to Jerusalem.

Thus, it is apparent that the pursuit of a serious negotiating process will continue to have all the difficulties that have beset it for the past decade. The problem must in all probability be approached in stages, and with the hope that a base of trust and confidence can be created, and that over time the positions of both sides would evolve so as to permit the exercise of self-determination by the Palestinians and the creation of a political structure with full safeguards for the future security of Israel.

VII

In trying to launch a negotiation of this sort, the United States would be moving on four tracks simultaneously. It would work to resolve the Lebanese problem in such a way as to restore Lebanese integrity. It would attempt to restore the grounds of common purpose in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. It would try to develop a clear expression of Palestinian and other Arab readiness to make peace with Israel. It would try to achieve an interim first step on the ground in the form of genuine autonomy for the one million Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza while consulting with representatives of the larger Palestinian movement.

Working on these four tracks is not a strategy to achieve a quick success. It is more like the strategy of a basketball team working the ball carefully back and forth across the court, forcing opponents to commit themselves, creating opportunities one at a time, and systematically building the score. It requires leadership, management, skill and grueling perseverance. Its objective is to begin changing the balance of forces, increasing the incentives to negotiate, and making the possibility of progress seem realistic.

In the garden of President Sadat's residence on the Nile just north of Cairo, I was talking with an Egyptian colleague during a break in one of the 1974 Kissinger shuttles. He was lamenting

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that the United States had not been decisively involved in the search for an Arab-Israeli peace between the 1967 and 1973 wars. "We're sure involved now," I replied. "Yes," he said, "but it took a war to get you here."

It is tragic when our nation, which aspires to leadership for peace, freedom, justice and human rights, cannot marshal the same energies and political courage to prevent war and to make peace that we seem to marshal after a war to put our shattered interests back together. It is dangerous in the wake of war if our nation has no larger vision of peace or strategy for leading toward peace. I know how hard it is to decide which way to move next, when there are so many uncertainties. I also know that drift underscores weakness and enlarges danger, while leadership and competence can increase strength and lead toward peace and security. War changes conditions, but peace follows only when leaders tirelessly pursue a strategy of building peace from those new conditions.

However the tragedy of Lebanon may rest on the consciences of responsible Americans, we have now had the 1982 Israeli-Palestinian War to "get us there." The questions in the wake of Israel's final withdrawal from the Sinai, Israel's accelerated program for dominating the West Bank and Gaza, and the Israeli-Palestinian War are whether and how an Israeli-Palestinian peace process can be generated and what the strategy of the United States and the quality of its leadership will be.

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Stansfield Turner
and George Thibault

PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED: THE NEED FOR A NEW MILITARY STRATEGY

The U.S. military establishment is at a historic turning point. It can continue with the same strategy that has dominated its thinking, training and procurement for the past 32 years. That is a concept of prepared defenses and predeployed forces in Europe and in Korea, along with forward-deployed naval forces, on the assumption that being ready for those requirements will automatically be adequate for whatever other contingencies may arise.

Alternatively, it can recognize that the world has changed since the late 1940s, and take those changes into account by revising its strategy through placing more emphasis on the flexibility needed to move forces to wherever the United States may require them. Such a strategy would call for greater stress on our capabilities to use the seas and be prepared for unexpected military contingencies, rather than just for the clearly defined problems of defending Europe and Korea.

The Reagan Administration has declared that it wants naval superiority and that it wants to accelerate the Rapid Deployment Force that has been building for more than two years. It has directed an abrupt shift in defense resources to these ends. The Navy will, for instance, take the largest share of the next defense budget if the Congress agrees.

Still, one does not get the feeling that a serious debate is taking place or that an express decision to reorient our military strategy has been made. Instead, we see clear indicators of strong resistance to any shift in strategy: from those elements of the military that would have to change most and their supporters in Congress; from defense contractors who build the equipment we have been using for years and whose interests might be adversely affected; and from traditional Atlanticists who abjure any tampering with our long-established security relationship with Europe.

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II

Foreign Affairs has just published a strong argument against change by Ambassador Robert Komer that typifies the resistance of Atlanticists.[1] Mr. Komer argues for a "coalition" strategy which places primary reliance on working closely with our allies to build a common defense for Europe and Korea and for any other areas where we have vital interests on the periphery of the Eurasian land mass. He acknowledges that our present coalition strategy is not working well enough and suggests a program of "rejuvenation" that would call for the allies to carry a greater share of the defense burden and to effect numerous efficiencies. He recognizes as well that sea control is indispensable to all of our overseas military activities.

What he resists is a shift to a "maritime strategy" that would go beyond controlling the seas and would use the seas to project power against the Soviet Union. Here he is on solid ground and is justifiably concerned. One use of maritime power under this concept would be attacks by aircraft or missiles from ships directly onto the Soviet homeland. Another use would be "horizontal escalations" or attacks on Soviet interests outside the homeland, e.g., their merchant marine, Cuba or South Yemen. This concept of a maritime strategy worries him because he does not see the Navy's ability to inflict damage on the Soviet Union by either form of attack as being significant enough to warrant diverting resources from the Army and Air Force, as is already called for in the President's defense program—a trend he sees as likely to be intensified in the light of future political pressures to limit overall military spending.

The maritime strategy Mr. Komer describes is not a maritime strategy that would be useful for the United States today or in the future. Yet, it is easy to see how he could interpret the term in this way. What he criticizes is, in fact, the direction that the U.S. Navy is moving under the Administration's defense program. Quite simply, the Navy is asking to do more of what it has done so well ever since World War II, projecting power onto hostile shores with aircraft based on aircraft carriers. A continuation or expansion of such a strategy, however, is not adequate: today's needs for our Navy are much broader and more in line with a traditional maritime strategy where control of the sea lanes and of the air lanes above them is a primary focus.

Why do we need to pay more attention to our use of the seas

[1] Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1124-44.

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and the air? It is because the shortcomings of our traditional coalition approach to military strategy are becoming more and more apparent. On the one hand, the coalition approach has not prevented the balance of military power in Europe from continuing to shift against NATO. On the other hand, the United States has consistently failed to meet its military requirements in other areas of the world. If we look back at the only uses of U.S. military forces in combat since World War II, we can hardly be proud. Korea was perhaps a tie; Vietnam a loss; the *Mayaguez* and the Iranian hostage operations disasters. It is difficult to believe that the degree to which Europe has dominated our procurement of equipment, doctrine and training did not contribute heavily to our shortcomings in these quite different environments and quite different tactical situations.

Since 1980, we have had an express national policy of overcoming these deficiencies, at least for the Persian Gulf area. Yet two and a half years later we are still woefully short of being ready to field a Rapid Deployment Force for Persian Gulf contingencies. Do we not owe it to ourselves to ask whether a different strategy might not enable us to be ready for unexpected contingencies in the Third World while still making our proportionate contribution to the coalition effort in Europe?

Flexibility for Third World contingencies would certainly mean a greater emphasis on our maritime capabilities. Being able to move on and over the seas is the sine qua non for moving all forms of U.S. military power to wherever they are required. The question is whether we can afford such flexibility without imperiling the programs that presently support our defense of Europe and Korea. The answer, in a word, is "yes" if we reorient the U.S. Navy to an appropriate maritime strategy. The first step in verifying this conclusion is to analyze what it would take to develop an adequate capability for sea control.

Sea control is the capability to use the seas when we need and want to, i.e., to be able to move forces and merchant shipping and aircraft across the seas at the times and to the places that we find necessary. It is not well recognized that improving our sea control capability is essential to even our present strategy of fixed coalition defenses; it is here that the Navy can make its most significant contribution to any conflict in which the United States may become involved.

First, for a long time we did not foresee a credible opponent to contest our use of the seas. We let the Soviet Navy, which surely

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could undertake such an effort today, creep up on us.

Second, it has been popular to wish the problem of controlling the Atlantic sea lanes away on the grounds that any war in Europe would be short. The argument is that a conventional war in Europe would either escalate into a nuclear war quickly or be terminated for fear that it would go nuclear. By this reasoning, since we would need to provide supplies and reinforcement by sea only in a prolonged conflict, sea control is no longer important in a European war. However, we have made it clear to our European allies that we do not intend to fire intercontinental nuclear weapons from the United States at Moscow as an automatic response to a conventional attack against NATO. Europeans have likewise made it clear that they would not endorse a response that involved only the use of shorter range nuclear weapons inside Europe. Would the Soviets initiate the use of nuclear weapons if they were winning on the conventional battlefield? Consequently, if a conventional war in Europe should grind to a stalemate, there might be neither the will nor the incentive on either side to resort to nuclear weapons. In any event, it would be foolish to count on a short war when we have two historical examples of long wars in which control of the Atlantic sea lanes became vital.

Sea control takes on added importance in a more maritime strategy where preparing for intervention in the Third World against opponents other than the Soviet Union is important. We have only to look at how different the recent experience of the British in fighting Argentina was from our experiences in Korea and in Vietnam. There we were able to utilize our big aircraft carriers close to enemy shore lines with impunity, because the enemy had very limited capability to challenge us. Today even a few Exocet missiles, such as the Argentines employed in the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*, would give an adversary adequate capability to attempt an attack.

One lesson of the *Sheffield* is that navies should distribute their power and value over as many ships as possible, rather than concentrating them in just a few. Advocates of large carriers have distorted this issue by pointing out that a large U.S. carrier would have performed better than did the small British carriers in the Falklands situation. This is an oversimplification. The British designed their small carriers specifically for the role of sea control in the North Atlantic, on the assumption that land-based aircraft from the United Kingdom would provide the necessary long-range air reconnaissance for the carriers. They could have devel-

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oped radar surveillance and other defensive aircraft suitable for their small carriers if they had designed their carriers against a different set of assumptions. Beyond that, since any new U.S. carriers purchased today will not be delivered for seven to ten years and would be expected to serve in the fleet another 30 or more years thereafter, the questions we must ask are whether we expect that such ships will be needed and useful that long, and whether there are better alternatives.

What makes prolonged usefulness of these large carriers seem doubtful is the amount of attention they will attract in any conflict at sea. The two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers which the Administration has requested in the next budget cost $3.4 billion each, exclusive of aircraft. The value of each is about seven times the average value of all the other ships in the same budget. Under these circumstances, an enemy is almost bound to seek out and attack these high-value ships. What's more, because of this concentration of value and offensive capability, if a naval task force were denuded of its carriers today, it would have no offensive striking power left. For simple survival our naval power must be distributed over more ships.

The key argument against this is that large carriers are needed to be able to venture close enough to the Soviet Union to launch attacks on it. Attacks on Soviet ports and airfields are advertised as the best way to gain sea control. The idea is to bottle up and destroy the Soviet navy and its air arm right at home. This tactic would require sending a force of aircraft carriers and attendant supporting ships straight toward the principal Soviet naval base complexes.

It is hard to believe that thoughtful military planners would actually do this. With modern reconnaissance techniques, such a major force would be detected long before it arrived within striking range of a Soviet base. The Soviets would have time to minimize their forces left in port or on airfields and to put the rest on full alert. By the time the carriers were within 1,600 miles of Soviet air bases, they would be within range of over 90 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s land-based bombers. Yet, the Soviet bases would still be over 1,000 miles beyond the range of carrier aircraft.

Traveling at 25 knots for those last 1,000 miles, the carrier force would be subject to Soviet air bombardment for nearly two days before it was close enough to strike Soviet bases. The force would also be subject to attack by submarines and surface ships with long-range missiles that would have been deployed along the route. In short, we would be fighting the Soviets on their turf at

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times and places of their choosing, well before we could assume the offensive.

At a point 400 to 500 miles from the Soviet bases, the carriers could finally launch an attack with whatever aircraft were left after two days of Soviet attacks. (Here one must also note the inexorable trend in the last few years to fewer attack aircraft on our carriers, as the need for defensive and support aircraft—such as early warning, antisubmarine and tankers—has increased.) Most Soviet ships and aircraft would have left their bases or airfields when they received warning of the approach of the carriers. Thus, if the carriers wanted to destroy them, the carriers would have to remain in that exposed position and continue attacking long enough to catch the ships and planes that come and go as they require repair, replenishment or refueling—a considerable period of time. Unless nuclear weapons were used, even the attacks on base and airfield facilities would have to be repeated as repairs were made. With the carrier task force in a forward position long enough to do the job correctly, the chance of losing part, if not all of it, would be high simply because the trends of technology give the attacker who employs the new stand-off weapons like Exocet a considerable advantage today.

The loss of three or four of the Navy's 12 to 13 carriers, in what would have to be a gamble to suppress the Soviet Navy in this manner, would be a major catastrophe. No President could possibly permit the Navy to attempt such a high risk effort. There simply would be inadequate fallback forces to handle other threats, especially to the North Atlantic sea lanes.

These trends are what place a high premium on having numbers of ships. Sea control is ultimately a war of attrition and losses are inevitable. There is nothing unusual about this. We anticipate attrition in tank warfare and in air warfare all the time. We cannot afford as high attrition in ships because they are more expensive, but we must expect some. The tactics of defense at sea favor smaller ships. The smaller the target, the more difficult for the enemy to detect, identify and home a weapon onto it. Telltale signatures increase with size. A large ship offers a large radar return, puts off more heat, disturbs the earth's magnetic field more, and is more visible than a small ship. Ships whose signatures stand out from others in almost any dimension are more likely to be singled out by homing weapons. In the sea battles around the Falklands, the Argentine Air Force appears to have sunk a British supply ship when it intended to attack one of the two small carriers nearby. Here the fact that the carrier was similar in size

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to the merchant ship, rather than much larger, may have saved the carrier.

The counterclaim is that a 100,000-ton aircraft carrier can be protected with various layers of tanks, watertight compartments and other protective measures. What is not mentioned is that our damage predictions today have not yet taken into account the shift from ordinary bombs to the more lethal weapons such as that which sank HMS *Sheffield*, wherein fire damage was more significant than the traditional explosions. Advances in the accuracy and lethality of modern weapons are certain to make traditional protective measures less and less successful. Considering the *Sheffield* and what a single missile did to it, one has to think of how many more inflammable and explosive vulnerable points there are on a carrier than on a destroyer. The approach of treating our carriers as though they can be made invulnerable is reminiscent of the unsuccessful efforts prior to World War II to protect our battleships by ringing them with more and more layers of steel.

All this is not intended to obscure the fact that carriers are critical to exercising sea control. The only argument is whether they need be super carriers. Plentiful air power at sea is one of the cardinal requirements of good sea control tactics. Aircraft are the best counter to the increasing ranges from which an enemy can attack ships. Aircraft at high altitude can extend the range of a ship's radars and other sensors to provide earlier warning of an impending attack by ships, submarines or aircraft. Satellites and land-based aircraft can help, too, but the commander at sea needs organic tactical reconnaissance as well. Further, aircraft at sea can reach out quickly to attack an aircraft, ship or submarine which is on the verge of launching an attack with long-range missiles. Ships are far too slow to do this.

The key reason for having large carriers is to accommodate large, high-performance aircraft. The trends of technology are driving us away from such aircraft and as a consequence will permit us to move the necessary air capability onto smaller ships. For instance, the Navy is already pointed in this direction with its F-14 air defense aircraft. The F-14 has good maneuverability for aerial combat at close quarters. It also has a radar and missile system that permit it to attack an enemy aircraft, and to a lesser degree missiles, 60 miles away or more. Clearly you do not need to be able to dogfight if you are going to attack from a distance of 60 miles.

The day of the missile in such engagements is just beginning.

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They will soon dominate the air battlefields, even in the rare instance when aircraft may find themselves engaging at dogfight ranges. Thus, the F-14's successor could well be an aircraft with only modest speed and maneuverability, but a superior missile system. Such an aircraft could be based on a carrier one-third the size of present carriers, and even smaller.

III

If large aircraft carriers are not appropriate to the sea control mission, what about the other missions within a maritime strategy? The next mission in a maritime strategy would be to build a greater capability to intervene with force in unexpected and remote areas. We did not anticipate using our forces in Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf of Thailand (the *Mayaguez*) or Iran (the hostage rescue effort). Today we are concerned with the Persian Gulf and southwest Asia in general. We would be rash to think that we can forecast where our national interests will be challenged next. Instead we must build in flexibility for the unexpected.

Because of this uncertainty as to where we may need to intervene in the future, one of the cardinal points of maritime strategy must be capability for forcible entry. There may be instances when we would be welcomed, as in response to a local government's request for support against external aggression. It is difficult to believe, though, that we would want only to be capable of intervening in such favorable circumstances. Presumably, we will not consider any intervention unless vital national interests are at stake. Therefore our intervention capability must be able to stand on its own.

The only way to make a significant forcible entry without reliance on bases in the general vicinity is from the sea. Without assurance of friendly air and land bases, international waters provide the only available staging area. Only if we have adequate amphibious assault capability, then, can our intervention potential stand on its own. With the size of our amphibious forces today and the likelihood that we will not have time to converge them all at the scene of a given contingency, the best we can hope for from our amphibious forces is that they be able to seize a point of entry for follow-on forces. We must be able to reinforce an amphibious landing rapidly by airlift from the United States, or from U.S. forces in Europe.

This concept of following up an amphibious entry with airlifted forces requires a substantial shift in U.S. Marine Corps doctrine. Rather than the traditional, large-scale amphibious assault with

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wave after wave from the sea, the Marines would be tasked to conduct smaller, rapier-thrust operations expressly to open the door for the Army and Air Force. The objective would be for the Marines to establish just enough of a foothold ashore to permit immediate insertion of airlifted ground forces and land-based air forces. Consequently, our amphibious forces should be reshaped into integral packages of naval ships and Marine Corps troops to support battalion landing teams of about 1,800 to 2,000 men. The concept should be one of having many of these units and then aggregating them for larger requirements. This is almost the opposite of the present concept of readying three division-size amphibious forces and scaling them down in size for smaller contingencies.

We would also need to take steps to minimize the vulnerability of amphibious forces during the difficult period of offloading troops and supplies across the beach. During the amphibious phase in the Falklands, the British lost three warships to air attacks even though the Argentine Air Force was unable to sustain a high level of effort. There is an urgent need to reduce the time required for offloading because that is when amphibious ships are most vulnerable. Accelerated procurement of Hovercraft-type landing craft that travel at very high speed is one possible step; improving the techniques of offloading without the ships ever stopping or anchoring is another. Most of all, though, the Falklands experience reminds us that good air support is essential to amphibious operations.

That brings us back to the question of large vs. small carriers. As noted with regard to sea control, there is not an overwhelming requirement for large carriers to perform the air superiority role. Much the same applies with respect to the bombing support which aircraft must provide to amphibious assaults by attacking airfields, troop and tank concentrations, beach defenses, etc. Even against Third World powers, let alone the Soviet Union, attacks by manned aircraft against such targets are becoming less and less likely. Attrition rates when modern air defense weapons are properly employed can be very high. The Israelis recently destroyed Syrian air defense batteries in devastating fashion, but it would not be wise to assume that we would always have the marked advantages of skill, training and equipment that they enjoyed.

The fact is that the vulnerability of manned aircraft in penetrating anti-air defenses is going up more rapidly than the countermeasures which such aircraft can employ. Fortuitously, however, the need for a man in the aircraft is decreasing and un-

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manned missiles will be able to penetrate defenses much more successfully. We already have superlative remote sensing capabilities for detecting the targets we want to attack. We could, for instance, place an unmanned reconnaissance drone over a battlefield and collect far more data than a pilot and his bombardier could possibly absorb. Alternatively, weapons themselves can carry televisions and other sensors and send back data as they attack. The wonders of modern microprocessing will permit us to digest and then transmit such data almost anywhere.

In short, we can keep track of an enemy target even if it moves, and can guide a missile right to it from long range with high accuracy. Substituting an unmanned missile for a manned aircraft in the terminal phase of an attack permits us to buy simpler and lighter aircraft for use on our carriers. The aircraft's task would be to carry the weapons to the perimeter of the threat area and then launch them into the targets. The day need not be far off when such aircraft can be launched from ships that are smaller than small carriers, and this would permit distributing the Navy's air striking power over even a much wider number of platforms.

If such aircraft are not in being today, it is because we are in the situation of which came first, the chicken or the egg. On the one hand there has been resistance to the small carrier because the new short-takeoff and vertical-takeoff aircraft types needed on them are not yet available. On the other hand, the funding for the development of such aircraft has been miniscule because there are no ships which need them. With the seven- to ten-year lead time for building new carriers, we should easily be able to outfit small carriers with most of the appropriate aircraft. It will probably be necessary, though, to build our first small carriers large enough to have catapults and arresting gear and thus be able to handle today's lower performance aircraft until their successors with vertical-takeoff capabilities arrive.

Spreading the Navy's striking power over more ships would help avoid a problem of the past. History shows that military commanders in the field have a tendency to back away from opportunities if the odds of winning are not very high and the consequences of defeat would be high.[2] This tendency has already

[2] The battle of Jutland in World War I, while indecisive for more than a single reason, is one example. Both the British and the German admirals, not realizing at that point in the war that the decisive naval battles would be fought for the use of the Atlantic and not for the decimation of the other's fleet, engaged each other rather halfheartedly. Each had the better part of his battleships on the scene, saw the consequences of losing them as being severe, and thus was extremely judicious about exposing them. Each risked little and each accomplished little.

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beset a U.S. Navy whose fighting power is concentrated in its few large carriers. It would be difficult to deny the Navy's recent lack of willingness to volunteer to risk its key ships in forward positions, such as the Persian Gulf, during situations of tension.

Further, when we look at the potential of nuclear weapons at sea, we have to take vulnerability of small numbers very seriously. In fact, naval tacticians think very little about nuclear weapons at sea, probably because the consequences are so unthinkable. There is no easy answer to the nuclear prospect. Small carriers are just as vulnerable to a nuclear weapon as large ones, perhaps slightly more, but their advantage is that if there were more of them it would be more difficult to take them all out, except by a massive worldwide strategic attack.

IV

Small aircraft carriers are more appropriate, then, for both the sea control and the intervention missions. Yet carriers and amphibious forces cannot, as has been pointed out, meet all of the intervention requirements by themselves. Thus, a major element in the new strategy should be to retrain and re-equip the Army and Air Force with the flexibility for worldwide intervention in mind, rather than just the static defense of Europe and Korea.

Increased airlift is the prime requirement. That means more cargo aircraft. It also means lighter and smaller types of equipment to make any number of cargo aircraft go farther. Lighter combat equipment is necessary also to be ready to operate on a wide variety of terrains. The heavy equipment we have built for the plains of Europe will not do well in some jungle or mountainous areas. All of this calls for nothing less than a new mentality and new doctrine for ground forces and land-based air forces.

There is a lot of serious discussion today by people like Senators Sam Nunn and Gary Hart to the effect that accenting maneuverability with lighter tanks, artillery, etc., with the accuracy and effectiveness of new lighter weapons, could actually improve our European defense posture. Whether or not this is so, a reordering of U.S. ground and air forces in Europe toward mobility need not weaken NATO's defensive posture. If heavy forces continue to be required, more of this element of forward defense in Europe will have to fall on the shoulders of our allies. The U.S. contribution would shift more to one of being a mobile reserve to move into gaps or toward areas of heaviest attack. That would include an improved capability to bring reinforcements into Europe from the United States, or wherever, since our forces would be tailored to mobility.

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V

The obvious and genuine concern of people like Mr. Komer is that these three shifts—toward sea control, amphibious projection and more mobile follow-on ground and air forces—will decrease our readiness in Europe, either by making our allies feel that we are no longer concerned with their security, or by drawing away so many resources that the U.S. contribution will be weakened unacceptably. Neither need be the case.

Obtaining allied acceptance of a shift in responsibilities would not be easy. However, even a continuation of a "coalition" strategy for Europe faces almost identical problems. Mr. Komer calls on the allies both to contribute more to the common defense and to suppress their nationalism by pooling weapons procurement so as to reduce costs. Both of these objectives have been urged on the allies for years with little result. There is no reason to think that the coalition strategists are likely to be any more successful today in spurring the allies on.

For 32 years NATO has had a much larger economic capacity than the Warsaw Pact and an even larger population, but it has steadily fallen behind in military preparedness, despite what is still a disproportionate U.S. contribution. As long as the allies continue to believe that one way or another we will carry at least as much of the load as we now do, they are unlikely to do more themselves. Our declaring an intent to shift over time to a maritime strategy, of the kind proposed here, could provide the impetus to the Europeans to take their responsibilities more seriously. Surely they do appreciate the dire threat to them of a cutoff in their supplies of oil from the Middle East. As we go about assuming the military responsibilities of the entire Alliance for the Middle East, they should understand that an adjustment in our contribution in Europe will be necessary. If they are unwilling to make up the difference in these circumstances, we are unlikely to be able to persuade them to do so by any other devices.

There is, of course, the possibility that the Europeans will not cooperate with either a maritime or a coalition strategy, so that the Alliance will gradually disintegrate. If so, a coalition strategy would be meaningless and we would have to rely entirely on a maritime strategy. Let us hope that we will not be forced into such a move. Moving now, gradually but deliberately, toward a maritime strategy would be the best insurance we could take against this eventuality.

The second concern about a maritime strategy, that it might draw down resources for the Army and Air Force unacceptably,

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is not well founded. It is the kind of defensive argument that is raised within the Pentagon bureaucracy whenever it appears that one of the Services may gain a percentage point or two of the budget at the expense of the others; the cataclysmic impact on the others is always exaggerated. What a shame it would be if a sounder military stategy for the nation were precluded because we cannot overcome the bureaucratic inertia that opposes shifting the allocation of resources between the Services even a point or two!

It is true that adopting a maritime strategy would require a shift of resources toward the Navy in order to make up for our present deficiencies in sea control capabilities and to broaden our intervention capabilities beyond Europe and Korea. Substantial increases are already planned for the Navy, but for a Navy built around 15 large carriers intended for power projection by tactical air power. Changing to a true maritime strategy, stressing sea control and the other missions described here, would not cost any more and would offer some compensating offsets.

Within the Navy itself, a larger number of smaller carriers probably would not present any savings, and might even cost somewhat more because of additional operating costs for manpower, fuel, etc. The larger number of small carriers, however, would carry fewer attack aircraft than would the smaller number of large carriers. This would save money, and is an acceptable trade-off since the missions of this strategy would place less emphasis on air attacks into heavy defenses. The primary saving in the new strategy, however, would come from not buying highly sophisticated aircraft to deliver highly sophisticated stand-off weapons, and from a gradual shift to less expensive aircraft for both the Navy and the Air Force. Similarly, emphasis on lighter tanks and similar Army equipment could result in savings also.

The key point is that there will be pluses and minuses all across the board. The financial adjustments will be no easier to make than the strategic ones, but there is no prima facie case that the costs should rule out this new strategy. Ambassador Komer premised his case against a maritime strategy on the assumption that the cost of a new Navy would in time starve the other Services. His analysis may have been correct for the type of Navy required for a maritime strategy built around a few super carriers for projecting power. That need not be the case with a true maritime strategy, built around many smaller ships for exercising sea control and spearheading interventions, and that also takes advantage of modern technology.

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Another point important to remember is that none of these changes need be, nor in fact can be, precipitate. It would take years to shift the Navy from large carriers to small, to restructure the Marines and to obtain more air and sea lift. We will have large carriers, for example, as the backbone of the fleet well into the next century even if we build no more. We will go through a considerable transition period in which large carriers and smaller air capable platforms will have to complement each other. This necessary transition period is also a hedge against the needed technologies not developing as well or as fast as anticipated, though these technologies are all in sight already. The same kind of transition period would be needed for the Army and Air Force.

What must come quite quickly, though, is a willingness at the highest level in the U.S. military to look at the security needs of the United States with an open mind, uninfluenced by loyalties to military service or branches of services and unfettered by conventional solutions. Military doctrine and training must be critically examined in the light of the very different world which exists today than existed when virtually all of our present major weapons systems, platforms and doctrine were conceived, 20 or more years ago. It is only with such a change in attitude that an improved understanding will come of how to use existing equipment better and when new equipment is needed to fulfill our intervention responsibilities while still maintaining our obligations in Europe and Korea.

The single security threat that brought the Alliance together has now been fragmented by the prism of arms proliferation, the rising expectations of nationalism, and the realization that even the smallest countries in the Third World can play a major role in world events. The United States has always built its military forces to counter the Soviet threat, assuming that the same military forces would be able to handle lesser problems as well. Today they can do neither. Tomorrow, with a maritime strategy, they would be able to do both.

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François de Rose

INFLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Are the bases on which Western security in Europe has rested since the Atlantic Alliance has been in existence threatened? Is it true that with the change in generations there is less and less realization in public opinion of the solidarity in destiny of the peoples on both sides of the Ocean? Is it likely that a substantial withdrawal of U.S. forces on the Old Continent could be imposed on the Reagan Administration by Congress? Did the President say what is in the plans of the Pentagon, or did he make a slip of the tongue, when he mentioned the possibility of a nuclear war limited to Europe?

These questions were already on the minds of many responsible leaders in the West, and in the fairly large community of people who reflect on the problems of security, when four prominent American personalities came out, in these pages, with a proposal to move to a declared commitment of "no first use" of nuclear weapons by NATO. A few weeks later Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, speaking at the United Nations Special Conference on Disarmament, committed his country not to make such first use and urged the Western powers to make a similar announcement.

The suggestion of the four Americans was answered in the Summer issue of *Foreign Affairs* by such qualified persons as General Bernard W. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, and Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and General Franz-Josef Schulze of the Federal Republic of Germany.[1] But, since it raises the most fundamental issue—whether the defense and deterrence concept upheld by the Alliance for more than 30 years is still valid or should be modified—the discussion is likely to last quite a while.

If a Frenchman now ventures to offer a few ideas on this matter,

[1] The original article was by McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982, pp. 753–68. The relevant articles in the Summer 1982 issue are "The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade," pp. 1145–56; and "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," pp. 1157–70.

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in spite of France's position in the Alliance which has made her remain silent on these questions for more than 15 years, it is in the first place because the present French government, in power since the spring of 1981, has shown more public concern over the problems of defense within the framework of the Alliance than its predecessors. President François Mitterrand has come out openly in favor of the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles, thus backing the December 1979 decision of the NATO Defense Council; moreover, all French political parties (except of course the Communists) have expressed a commitment to a policy of closer cooperation with our allies. And, second, because, rightly or wrongly, this writer, now confined to his own wisdom or folly, thinks that there is now, more than ever, both a need and a possibility for a substantial "rapprochement" between France's and her partners' thinking on the problems of deterrence and defense in Europe in the coming decades.

II

Contrary to what one might think, the Soviet declaration of "no first use" is not the most important element in the debate. In the first place, there is no possibility of offensive Western military action to which it might be relevant. Whatever their genuine or pretended fear of being encircled, the leaders in the Kremlin could never believe that the Western powers would take the initiative of aggression in Europe. There was a time when the U.S. monopoly or superiority in nuclear weapons could have lent some plausibility to that fear. That time has passed forever and has now been replaced by the situation characterized by the end of the "balance of imbalances"—Soviet superiority in conventional forces being no longer compensated by American superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals.

Moreover, from the standpoint of any Soviet military action, the Soviet position is too obviously tailored to fit Moscow's problems. It is generally admitted that in conventional warfare the offensive requires a numerical advantage—and today the balance in tanks and aircraft favors the Warsaw Pact by roughly three to one. But the use of that numerical advantage for offensive operations requires large concentrations of forces. With an agreement on no first use of nuclear weapons, these concentrations could take place at no risk, thus favoring the only camp that could be the aggressor.

Finally, the use of force would be a violation of the commitments taken under the Charter by all members of the United Nations.

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One has to consider that that pledge is either to be trusted or not trusted. In the first case there should be no fear of any kind of war. But why, in the second, should anyone believe that the "no-first-use" commitment would be better kept than the "no war" one?

This being said for what relates to the Soviet stand, let us now return to the proposal of our four Americans, one which poses to a Western mind a more acute dilemma.

Far from having any quarrel with the Four over their plea for an improvement in the level of conventional forces, there is every reason to support their view on that point. In that sense it is certainly to be regretted that the negative part of their proposal—an eventual formal commitment to no first use (premised on an adequate conventional posture having been achieved)—should have attracted so much attention that it completely overshadowed the positive aspect, which was their insistence on the need for conventional buildup.

It is the thesis of this article, to be explained later, that such a buildup should not be carried out, as their article suggests, as the ultimate measure to insure NATO's security in itself, but rather as part of an across-the-board updating of NATO's current doctrine of deterrence and defense. Such an updating would be consistent with, indeed proceed from, the view that the Alliance should avoid at all costs putting itself in the position where it would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons from the very first hours of conflict. At the same time it would rule out a formal commitment to no first use as militarily, morally and diplomatically wrong and self-defeating.

III

Let us briefly review some of the arguments made to condemn the basic threat on which deterrence against Warsaw Pact forces has rested for more than 30 years—that of using nuclear weapons as late as possible but as soon as necessary, as West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt once put it, with the inherent risk of escalation.

It seems that it is that risk of escalation which creates the major problem, since it means the possibility of general holocaust. Surely this is the case, but it means also that the territory of the aggressor itself would be somewhere on the path of destruction as operations escalated from a European to a global scale. We can readily agree with the Four that there is a quantum jump from conventional to nuclear warfare. But the risks of the latter could not be limited to

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the Old Continent. This may explain why, in the minds of Europeans, it is indeed the instantaneity and globality of the dangers involved in any initiation of nuclear exchange which have spared our planet the disaster of a Third World War. While agreeing that the way to achieve that result—avoiding war altogether—is less attractive than the result itself, the result is, in the last analysis, what defense policy is all about.

Militarily, then, any NATO commitment to no first use appears highly dangerous. Moreover, one would like to know if the argument is carried to the point where we should aim at being able to defeat the Warsaw Pact in an open battle. When the threat ran in the opposite geographic direction, Napoleon and Hitler were driven back to their capitals although they had started by invading deeply inside Russia. It would be difficult to envisage a reversed scenario in a war that would begin with an initiative of the Red Army crossing the Elbe westward from its peacetime deployment in the center of Europe.

Accordingly, since the basis of deterrence must rest on the risk that the aggressor would suffer intolerable losses as a consequence of the fighting, that risk, in the case of the Soviet Union (or of any superpower), can only come from the eventual use of nuclear weapons. If NATO adopted the no-first-use proposal, the prospect of being utterly destroyed would be immense for the Europeans. It would be nonexistent for the Russians. No wonder it should now be an official position for the Kremlin.

The Four consider that there would also be a quantum jump in immorality in the decision to use nuclear weapons.

It is difficult to argue about moral issues. But one can legitimately consider that the sin lies with aggression and not with preparing to defend oneself with whatever means, even if that "whatever" includes the atom. The ultimate evil would be in a doctrine that would guarantee immunity for the aggressor and devastation and loss of freedom for the peace-loving nations. To make the world safe for aggression would be the apex of immorality.

Finally, in diplomacy, there is always, in the background of any confrontation of will and interests, the capacity that one has, or does not have, to say "no" to the demands of the other side, and the knowledge that one can, or cannot, without taking enormous risks, bring the matter to a showdown. If the risks are almost negligible for one side and boundless for the other, the game is entirely rigged and the former is sure to win, be it on small or momentous issues. It is not too much to say that the whole picture

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of international relations would be altered to our permanent disadvantage if the no-first-use proposal were to be adopted.

To be sure, the Four say that to "keep the firebreak between nuclear and any other kind of conflict is in the deepest interest of all mankind." Yet the interest of mankind is to prevent, to deter, any kind of war. And it appears for the time being that deterrence must rest on the plausibility that the fire, once started, would not stop.

In short, nothing could be more contrary to the interests of the free world at large—which these four American personalities served with such distinction in the past—than a shift of the Atlantic Alliance to a defense doctrine that would put uneven risks between East and West in any emergency.

IV

Unquestionably, important changes have taken place in the balance of forces in Europe since the NATO strategy of flexible response was first established in 1967. The question is whether it is possible to frame a new or modified defense concept and a set of force postures that would at the same time restore confidence in deterrence, not be based on the assumption that nuclear arms would have to be used at once in all eventualities, retain the threat of escalation, and strengthen mutual trust among the allies.

This should indeed be possible if every member of the Alliance is ready to take a fresh look at the problem. It will be seen that this "every member" includes France to a large extent.

Let us in the first place address ourselves to an argument which has been partly responsible for the difficulty public opinion has in understanding the need to improve the level of conventional forces. That argument is the hypothesis of a Soviet first strike destroying the key defensive points of NATO in Europe and/or the land-based missiles in the United States.

Whether the technical capacity to perform such a "surgical operation," as it is sometimes referred to, exists now or will exist in the future is not the point, although there is no surgery that does not shed blood. And to think that the destruction of some 600 targets, in an area as densely populated as Western Europe, with nuclear weapons could be realized without extensive damage requires much stretching of the mind.

But what makes one deeply skeptical about the likelihood of such a course of events is not so much military as political considerations.

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To take that initiative, the leaders in Moscow would have to believe that it would not entail the risk of a major confrontation with the United States. In other words, that the American government and people would accept becoming, on the face of the earth and in a matter of minutes, a second-class power whose status and influence in international affairs would be dictated in the Kremlin.

It seems very unlikely that such an assumption could become the rationale of Russian policy. If it did, it would mean that the global relation of forces, military, moral and political, had so deteriorated that the die would be irretrievably cast against the West and nothing could save us.

Yet a fixation on this unreal possibility paves the way for the attitude of "what's the use?" of any defense effort, in some sections of public opinion. Does it make sense, it is asked, to spend such enormous amounts of money on equipment, nuclear or conventional, if it can be destroyed in a matter of minutes? Isn't it better to adhere to the pacifist philosophy and hope for the best?

Technicality has to be the basis of any planning of defense decisions. But not to the point where technical feasibility, when it exists, would make one ignore political possibilities or impossibilities.

The reasons that call for a conventional buildup are both military and political. First, if the NATO conventional posture is such as to rule out a surprise attack, any aggression would have to be preceded by concentrations and massing of land units giving warning of something being prepared against which we should get ready to react. A warning is not always properly understood, and there are cases, such as Egypt's early successes in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which show that even a government as cautious as that of Israel may fail to read the writing on the wall. Human errors can never be discarded. But it is one thing when a would-be aggressor can be sure that the gates are open before him, and quite another when, to proceed with his plans, he must bet on a wrong interpretation by the other side.

To have a NATO military posture that would, in all cases, compel the Red Army to give such warning is therefore an absolute requisite, so that Western forces may take their alert stations, both first-line troops and reinforcements.

The second reason is that, the lower the conventional defensive capacity, the sooner the West would face the dilemma between using tactical nuclear weapons or surrendering. With the debate now raging over such use, there is little doubt that in any crisis

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and before any fighting had broken out, Western governments would have much more freedom of movement if it were known that their decision to resist pressure did not mean immediate nuclear war.

Moreover, reasoning on this problem generally fails to take into account that any failure by the Red Army to crush in a very few days the armies of the West could create very serious problems with its lines of communications. The logistic support for any operations against Western Europe is contingent upon free movement through the satellite states. Recent events in Poland alone, including the care Moscow has taken to use the Polish army and militia as proxies to suppress a situation almost unanimously supported by the people, shows that things might become very sticky if, on the hypothesis of a major war in Europe, Soviet rulers could not be sure of immediate victory.

And Poland is not the only country in Eastern Europe where peoples would be ready to run risks if there were hope of getting rid of a regime which is not only imposed by a powerful neighbor, but is also a blatant economic failure and the negation of those nations' cultural values.

A buildup of NATO's conventional forces would therefore be a double action move: it would remedy one of our weaknesses and increase one of the Soviet Union's. In the central terms of deterrence, the benefit would be great.

It is beyond the scope of these reflections to examine in detail how the Western nations could reach the level of forces required to achieve those goals. Suffice it to recall that, with advanced electronics, the shortening of time that would elapse between acquisition of enemy targets, transmission and exploitation of information will bring substantial changes in favor of the defenders. The same applies to the possibility of blinding radars, destroying tanks, or attacking airfields, all with conventional armaments, not forgetting the use of the third dimension in land warfare through extensive intervention of helicopters.

As the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe has made clear in the already mentioned article, the necessary conventional posture does not exist now. "Currently," he says, "we must measure our ability to sustain combat in Europe in days, whereas we can estimate the Warsaw Pact's sustainability in weeks or months."

But, given adequate modernization of forces—which, SACEUR estimates, could be obtained with a yearly real increase of defense expenditure of four percent—the Alliance could attain the "capability to hold lead divisions of the Warsaw Pact conventional

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attack," conduct "an effective interdiction and destruction campaign with conventional means against its follow-on forces" and attack with first-line and reserve units such enemy forces as might or would have penetrated Western defenses.

V

Let us however envisage that, in spite of measures taken to deter war at the conventional level, the Red Army would cross the line, and that NATO was unable to stop it and faced being overrun. That is the time when the no-first-use theory would be unacceptable and when it would be necessary to consider the dramatic option: resorting to nuclear weapons or conceding defeat.

There is no reason for dismay at the present paradox of the Western powers being the ones that would never be the aggressor, but would nonetheless contemplate initiating the use of the most terrible weapon ever conceived, at the risk of global destruction. They are the defending side and, as long as defending their peoples is what governments are there to do and since deterrence remains the only rationally and morally justified attitude, it is necessary to have a clear-cut doctrine to handle the situation.

This is where an amendment to the concept of flexible response could be introduced, making first use less difficult and, one hopes, more efficient for deterrence. The idea would be that the Western powers, unable to defend any longer by conventional forces alone, and having maintained their determination to use nuclear weapons if and when absolutely necessary, would render indisputable the fact that this is in a defensive way, by restricting their first nuclear attacks strictly to invading forces (preferably, in my view, employing enhanced radiation weapons which would diminish collateral damages to friendly forces and environment).

But, as soon as the enemy replied at the *nuclear* level on forces or targets inside allied territories, NATO would immediately strike military objectives *inside the Soviet Union itself.* In other words, there would be no process of escalation in weapon yields or depth of attacks that destroyed Western Europe step by step before it reached the real enemy, the one responsible for the aggression.

Rather than a flexible response, the doctrine would thus call for an "inflexible response" against the use of nuclear weapons by the enemy, in the context of his aggression.

The purpose of this suggestion is not primarily to set at peace the minds and consciences of some sections of public opinion, however respectable their ethical misgivings. Rather it is to restore

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immediate deterrence by confronting the Soviet leaders with the impossible choice between either replying on American territory—a big jump toward all-out warfare—or abstaining from such a reply, which would amount to recognizing that the United States was a sanctuary when the Americans would have shown that, for them, the Soviet Union was not.

It may be argued that, by limiting the first use to Western territories, this doctrine still sounds like preparing to add nuclear devastation to conventional destruction for the West European side only. That would certainly be too high a price to pay for the sole benefit of proving that we are only defending ourselves.

But that is not the case. For, unless the Red Army accepted having its forward echelons submitted to nuclear fire without retaliation—which is hard to believe—it is the very successful outcome of any conventional attack against the West that would provoke, in short order, strikes at the Soviet Union.

This whole question has to be seen in the perspective of Moscow's aims, as revealed by its attitude over the present Euromissiles program—the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles now scheduled for deployment in 1983.

If no Soviet nuclear weapons could be used against Western territory without *immediately* provoking American nuclear attacks on targets within the Russian boundaries (confronting the Kremlin thereby with the dilemma mentioned just now), the coupling between European defense and American strategic forces would be more solidly established than ever. Soviet diplomacy directed against the Pershing II and cruise missiles aims to provoke that decoupling and to keep any weapons system capable of reaching the Western districts of Russia from being deployed on European soil—in other words to make full use of geography which puts an ocean between the most powerful member of our Alliance and the most vulnerable ones.

Inflexible response would nullify that accident of nature and even turn it to our advantage by making good the land continuity between Europe and Russia, placing the latter in the greatest danger of being contaminated by any war that broke out on the continent.

Another consequence of a new doctrine of inflexible response would probably be to allow a substantial reduction of NATO's short-range tactical nuclear weapons now deployed on the continent. Right now, about 60 percent have a range of less than 30 km with a majority with a range under 15 km. This clearly means that they would be employed inside Western territory against

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invading forces and/or immediately around the dividing line between the two Alliances. The need for several thousands of them would seem much less justified in the concept here proposed.

And finally, this has to be related to the strategy SACEUR wants to implement which, as we have seen, far from restricting military operations to defensive moves, contemplates massive conventional attacks inside enemy territory to prevent second and third echelons from joining first-line units. No fear on our side, no hope on the other should be entertained that a war, once started, could be limited, at any level, to the territories of the victims of aggression.

VI

Where would France come into that picture? It may be useful, here, to remind the reader of the special situation she has made for herself in the Alliance since 1966.

General de Gaulle decided then to withdraw French forces from the integrated NATO military structure. This means that French representatives to the North Atlantic Council no longer take part in decisions related to allied military policy, and that French forces are no longer assigned or earmarked for assignment to the NATO military commanders. The situation is a classical alliance relationship, not one of integration.

The reason given for the de Gaulle decision was that there was in integration an inherent risk of being automatically involved in a conflict to which the United States would be a party, but which might not call into operation Alliance commitments nor concern France's vital interests.

At the same time, General de Gaulle directed the Chief of Staff of French forces to conclude agreements with the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe that provided for effective cooperation of France's and NATO's forces in a crisis that fell under the provisions of the Atlantic pact.

In short, it can be said that France's defense policy as outlined then and maintained ever since is to meet two goals: (a) not to be involved in a conflict foreign either to her commitments or vital interests; (b) to be in a position to throw in her lot with her allies if these conditions are fulfilled.

Agreements to that effect, in the form of contingency planning, have been worked out, covering the cooperation of land, air and naval forces and the logistic support to be brought to the common cause, making good the geographical feature that puts French ports, airfields and lines of communication closest to the Atlantic.

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Both General Alexander Haig, when he was Supreme Allied Commander, and his successor, General Rogers, have said publicly that they have full confidence in the part French forces would play in a case of emergency, or worse.

Essentially, present contingency plans envisage that the land units which compose the First French Army are to act as a general reserve in operations against the Warsaw Pact. They consist notably of eight armored divisions deployed partly in the Western part of the Federal Republic and partly in eastern France—more or less on both banks of the Rhine, with none stationed at the frontier between the two military systems that face one another in Europe.

France also has nuclear weapons of strategic and tactical types with a deterrence strategy of her own. The strategic forces consist of five nuclear submarines (a sixth is nearing completion), each equipped with 16 missiles now in the process of receiving six warheads each.[2] There is also a land-based component of 18 missiles deployed in the south of the country and the aging Mirage IV bombers. The tactical forces are composed of 42 short-range missiles (the Pluton) equipping the land units and dual-capable strike aircraft.

The French strategic concept, as exposed in official papers, is entirely focused on deterrence. The First Army would engage the enemy with conventional means (provided of course that no nuclear weapons had been used to that point). But should the pressure exercised by the other side become irresistible (and it is admitted that, just as for the Alliance, the capacity to hold in the conventional field is now measured in days) the tactical weapons would be fired as a final warning (*ultime avertissement*) that, should the enemy press on with his offensive, the use of strategic weapons would become inevitable. Unlike the NATO doctrine of flexible response—and for the obvious reason that French tactical weapons are very limited in numbers—the French concept envisages no possibility of limiting a nuclear war, once initiated, to the lowest possible level of violence.

In the confrontation between the weak and the strong, the former can only present a problem to the latter if he can threaten him with risks so great that they bear no relation to the stakes.

[2] All figures quoted are taken from *The Military Balance 1981–82*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies. It must be remembered that there are no standardized units in the Atlantic Alliance and therefore divisions of different countries may present substantial differences in strength.

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This is the basis of France's deterrence strategy, which targets its strategic weapons on major demographic and economic centers in the Soviet Union. In any circumstances, deterrence of an aggressor stems from the prospect of damage to its own territory and from the credibility of the threat to inflict such damage. The element of credibility would, under the concept, arise from the calculation that French strategic retaliation against Soviet territory would be likely, if not inevitable, the closer operations come to French national territory and the higher the threat to French vital interests.

Does this difference in the doctrine adhered to by NATO on the one hand, and by France on the other, create problems? At one stage, doubts were voiced in the United States about the usefulness of French efforts to develop a significant nuclear capability. But the importance of the French deterrent is no longer in question now that the French nuclear force has attained a substantial size and quality evident to all.

In Paris, the NATO doctrine of flexible response has been criticized on the grounds that it risks decoupling European theater forces (both conventional and nuclear) from U.S. strategic nuclear forces, thereby weakening deterrence. This was an ill-founded objection, in the opinion of this writer, so long as American superiority in both strategic and theater nuclear weapons made possible the control of escalation and would have presented a more difficult problem to the other side than to ours.

Now that these conditions are no longer fulfilled, there is a need and an opportunity to reappraise the situation with the hope of bringing closer to one another the thinking of France and the other allies on these matters, while adding, for the common good, the positive part of each approach.

A basic consideration appears to be that coherence of the fighting capacities of all allied forces in the conventional field is likely to become more important for the future than divergencies over when and how to use nuclear weapons. Some differences are bound to remain in that field since, for instance, NATO's Euromissiles would be used, even in the concept of inflexible response, against military targets in the Soviet Union, which means in an essentially tactical way, while French long-range forces can only be used for strategic purposes, i.e., cities and similar centers of production.

But this is not all-important. Rather the opposite. For there would be no point in adding the relatively small number of French weapons to the overabundant American ones for the

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implementation of the same strategy, while, at the service of their own strategy, these weapons add to the global deterrent posture of the Alliance—as was recognized by the Ottawa Declaration of 1974. The existence of two independent centers of decision in Europe (Paris and London) must inevitably complicate the calculations of any would-be aggressor.

The situation is different in the conventional field. For if the Alliance, or rather the integrated forces under SACEUR, are to upgrade their strength, it would be of considerable importance, if French forces are to play their role of general reserve, that they be able to hold on in conventional operations as long as those fighting alongside them. The whole benefit of conventional upgrading might be jeopardized if French forces had to resort early to their nuclear arms.

The need for coherence in the conventional field is therefore obvious, and it follows naturally that land and air forces should meet the same problems with means and tactics that are more or less alike. The total strength profits by the increase in volume and quality of each component.

Equally important would be the role that France would have to assume in the logistic field. If the Western conventional posture is to provide for a greater capacity to stem a Warsaw Pact offensive, full use of French territory, facilities, lines of communications, etc., would be required. Contingency planning might well have to be reviewed in that light. Indeed, it could well be that the possibility of increasing the level of allied conventional defenses would be very much contingent on the part France assumed in the scheme.[3]

Assuming that this was done, French authorities would enjoy more freedom of initiative and decision as to when and where it would be necessary for them to give their "final warning." And even more so if that signal, instead of being, as it now appears, mainly tied to the operations and situation of the land forces, could also be given by the tactical airforce. (A new air-to-surface missile, now being developed, seems particularly well qualified for that type of mission.)

At the same time, a result of these measures would be to create more uncertainty, for the enemy, as to when and where would lie the danger of crossing the tripwire. This would extend deterrence, not only for France herself but equally for her allied neighbors.

[3] See Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1124–44.

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Needless to say, there is no way for France (nor for the United Kingdom) to give non-nuclear allies a guarantee that she would use her strategic forces in any case of aggression on their territories. But that notion of a guarantee, so often referred to, is awfully misleading. Even the United States, as soon as massive retaliation was out of the question, could not give the assurance it would reply with all-out warfare, should the U.S.S.R. attack Europe (and the same for Japan). Such was the meaning of Henry Kissinger's speech in 1979 in Brussels which caused so much emotion. What Washington has constantly said is that the independence and security of Europe are vital interests to America. And that was all that needed to be understood where it mattered that it was understood.

Clearly France is not in a position to speak that language. But French governments have been careful not to give definitions of situations which would be liable to strategic strikes. Recognizing rather the advantage of leaving the matter in doubt, they have made a point of declaring that threats to the nation's independence and vital interests are not limited to the danger of immediate invasion.

This is probably as far as one can go when it comes to defining the use of strategic arms. Yet it is inevitable that if this ambiguity works positively for deterrence with foes, friends might understandably regret that it could not be made more binding. This is an additional reason why an improvement in the coherence of France's and her allies' vision of the future requirements, in Europe, of their common security would be an important positive development all around.

VII

Revising one's stand over such momentous issues as a defense concept takes a long time. So does adapting a military posture to new situations. And financial constraints are always there to make choices enormously difficult.

Agonizing decisions are therefore inevitable. The question is whether we shall take them in a disorderly or concerted way. But it would be well worth the trouble, as it would prove our shared inflexible resolve to improve the security of the West in Europe for the coming decades. The political consequences could not fail to be quite substantial in our dealings with the Soviet Union and might include, in addition, a starting point for a more coordinated approach, by the Europeans, to the problem of defense of their continent.

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Such changes as here proposed would also have the merit of not being an attempt to put the clock back and try to steer our course as if nuclear weapons were not there to stay, which seems to be the case with the no-first-use proposal. It would rather take them into account in the light of the new relation of forces between East and West and of the changing political situation which is emerging on both sides of the ocean which has given its name to our Alliance.

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Carl K. Eicher

FACING UP TO AFRICA'S FOOD CRISIS

The most intractable food problem facing the world in the 1980s is the food and hunger crisis in sub-Saharan Africa—the poorest part of the world. Although the crisis follows by less than a decade the prolonged drought of the early 1970s in the Sahelian states of West Africa, the current dilemma is not caused by weather. Nor is the chief problem imminent famine, mass starvation, or the feeding and resettling of refugees. Improved international disaster assistance programs can avert mass starvation and famine and assist with refugee resettlement.

Rather, Africa's current food crisis is long term in nature and it has been building up for two decades; blanketing the entire subcontinent are its two interrelated components—a food production gap and hunger. The food production gap results from an alarming deterioration in food production in the face of a steady increase in the rate of growth of population over the past two decades. The hunger and malnutrition problem is caused by poverty—i.e., even in areas where per capita food production is not declining, the poor do not have the income or resources to cope with hunger and malnutrition.

Twenty-two of the 36 poorest countries in the world are African. After more than two decades of rising commercial food imports and food aid, the region is now experiencing a deep economic malaise, with growing balance-of-payment deficits and external public debts. The world economic recession has imposed a severe constraint on Africa's export-oriented economies. Prospects for meeting Africa's food production deficit through expanded commercial food imports thus appear dismal. African heads of state have held summit meetings to examine their economic, food, and hunger problems, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Organization of African Unity (OAU), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), World Bank, World Food Council, and Afri-

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can Ministers of Food and Agriculture agree on the alarming magnitude of the problem.

Donors have responded to these difficult problems by increasing aid flows to the point where African countries now lead the list of the world's aid recipients in per capita terms. Furthermore, the 1981 World Bank report, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, advocates a doubling of aid to Africa in real terms by the end of the 1980s. But the crisis cannot be solved through crash food production projects or a doubling of aid. Since the food and hunger crisis has been in the making for 10 to 20 years, viable solutions to the crisis cannot be found without facing up to a number of difficult political, structural and technical problems over the next several decades.

Key questions and policies which must be examined include: Why did the Green Revolution bypass Africa? What lessons have been learned from food production projects in the Sahel and the development strategies of the 1970s—integrated rural development, helping the poorest of the poor, and the basic needs approach? Are technical packages available for small farmers to step up food production in the 1980s? What is the record of agrarian capitalism and socialism? Can the Reagan Administration's foreign aid emphasis on private enterprise, technology transfer, institution building, and manpower development contribute to the alleviation of the food production crisis and economic stagnation in Africa?

II

Despite the fact that Africa is an extremely diverse region, several common features frame the boundaries for addressing its food crisis.[1] First, population densities in Africa are extremely low relative to Asia. The Sudan, for example, is two-thirds the size of India, but it has only 18 million people as compared with 670 million in India. Zaïre is five times the size of France and only has a small percentage of its arable land under cultivation.

Second, most of the economies are small: 24 of the 45 countries have fewer than five million people and only Nigeria has a gross domestic product larger than that of Hong Kong.[2] Small countries

[1] Before examining the causes of the food crisis, it is important to remember the complexity of the region and the fallacy of advancing Africa-wide strategies to deal with problems of food and hunger. Sub-Saharan Africa is composed of 45 countries with variable endowments of resources, colonial histories, and opportunities for development. Although a few scholars still discuss the "African case," most researchers wisely eschew generalizing about even a subregion such as West Africa—an area as large as the continental United States.

[2] Africa has a shaky data base and there is a need to interpret official statistics with caution.

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have special problems in assembling a critical mass of scientific talent and in financing colleges of agriculture and national agricultural research systems.

Third, the colonial legacy is embedded in the structure of agricultural institutions, the curricula of African universities, and how African policymakers view the role of agriculture in national development. All but two African states—Ethiopia and Liberia—are former colonies.

Fourth, Africa is an agrarian-dominated continent. In most countries, at least three out of five people work in agriculture. For the most part, land ownership is remarkably egalitarian as contrasted with Latin America.[3] Thus, almost all farms are small, with 5 to 15 acres under cultivation by family members. The performance of these small farms (smallholders) is the key to African agricultural development. Moreover, since agricultural output accounts for 30 to 60 percent of the gross domestic product, the poor performance of the agricultural sector over the past two decades has been an overriding constraint on development in the non-petroleum and non-mineral exporting countries.

Fifth, although more than half of the arable land that is idle in the world is in Africa, the land area in some countries is near maximum population density given present agricultural technology and available expertise on soil fertility. Much of the arable land in Africa is not farmed because of natural constraints such as tsetse flies which cause human sleeping sickness and virtually preclude the use of approximately one-third the continent, including some of the best watered and most fertile land.[4]

Looking at Africa's food production trends, population growth, food imports, and poverty, the overriding pattern emerges clearly: since Independence, Africa's historical position of self-sufficiency in staple foods has slowly dissipated. Over the 1960–80 period, aggregate food production in Africa grew very slowly—about 1.8 percent per year—a rate below the aggregate growth rate of Asia

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Accurate data on yields and acreage under cultivation are available for only a handful of countries.

[3] The uniform agrarian structure is partially a function of colonial policies which prohibited foreigners from gaining title to land in some parts of the continent, such as West Africa. But in some countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, colonial policies promoted a dual structure of large and small farms. In Zambia, 400 large mechanized farms produce an estimated 40 percent of the maize surplus—the staple food—while an estimated 545,000 subsistence farms produce the balance. Zimbabwe is a significant maize exporter following last year's record harvest. But the irony of Zimbabwe's maize surplus is that the bulk of it is being produced by 5,000 large farmers who control approximately one-half of the land at a time when there is political pressure to distribute land to the landless.

[4] Tsetse control is a long-term and costly activity which includes: clearing of vegetation which harbors flies, spraying, release of sterile male flies, and human settlement.

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or Latin America. However, the critical numbers are not statistics on total food production but per capita figures. The U.S. Department of Agriculture statistics in Figure 1 below show that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where per capita food production declined over the past two decades. In addition, the average per capita calorie intake was below minimum nutritional levels in most countries.

FIGURE 1

INDEX OF FOOD PRODUCTION PER CAPITA

(percentage of 1961-65 average)



SOURCE: USDA, *Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1981.

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The per capita figures reflect the fact that Africa is the only region of the world where the rate of growth of population actually increased in the 1970s. Recent reports show that the annual population growth rate in Africa was 2.1 percent in the mid-1950s, 2.7 percent in the late 1970s, and as Figure 2 shows, is projected to increase throughout the 1980s until it levels off at about 3 percent by the 1990s. Underlying the upward population trend is a young age structure. The average African woman produces six living children in her reproductive years.

FIGURE 2
POPULATION GROWTH RATES, 1950–2000



SOURCE: USDA, *Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1981.

There is little hope for reducing fertility levels in the 1980s because of a complex set of factors, including: the failure of family planning programs to date, the pro-natal policies of some states such as Mauritania, and the indifference of most African heads of state and intellectuals to population growth in what they consider to be a land-surplus continent. But explosive rates of growth of population cannot be ignored much longer. For example, Kenya is reported to have the highest rate of annual population growth in the world—more than four percent—implying a doubling of population in about 16 years. Encouragingly, Kenya is launching an Integrated Rural Health and Family Planning Program, a

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major multi-donor effort budgeted at $120 million, and the effects of rapid population growth are moving to the center of its debates on land use. On the other hand, in Senegal, where 95 percent of the population is Muslim, the government is moving gradually on population intervention as it expands demographic research and quietly opens child and maternal health clinics in urban areas. In sum, it is almost certain that most states will move slowly on population control policies during this decade. As a result, population growth will press hard on food supplies, forestry reserves, and livestock and wildlife grazing areas throughout the 1980s and beyond.

Food imports are another important dimension of the critical food situation. Many countries which were formerly self-sufficient in food significantly increased their ratio of food imports to total food consumption in the 1960s and 1970s. According to USDA figures, food imports are dominated by grain imports—especially wheat and rice—which have increased from 1.2 million tons a year in 1961–63 to 8 million tons in 1980 at a total cost of $2.1 billion. Significantly, commercial imports of food grain grew more than three times as fast as population over the 1961–79 period. Rising food imports are attributed to many factors: lagging domestic production; increasing urbanization; the accompanying shift of consumer tastes from cassava, yams, millet and sorghum to rice and wheat; availability of food aid; and overvalued foreign exchange rates which often make imported cereals cheaper than domestic supplies. Although data on food aid are imprecise, food aid represents about 20 percent of total food imports. Wheat, wheat flour, and rice dominate overall imports.

Given the intimate linkage of hunger and malnutrition to poverty, economists, nutritionists and food production specialists are coming to agree that food and poverty problems should be tackled together.[5] For if rural and urban incomes are increased, a large increment of the increased income of poor people (50 to 80 percent) will be spent on food. Unless food production is stepped up, an increase in rural and urban incomes will simply lead to increased food imports, possibly inflation, and an increase in hunger and malnutrition. Conversely, while expanded food production should be the centerpiece of food policy in Africa in the

[5] Africa's food and poverty problems should not be allowed to overshadow some impressive achievements of the continent over the past 25 years. Foremost is the increase in average life expectancy—from an estimated 38 years in 1950 to almost 50 years in 1980. This 30 percent increase is often overlooked by those who are mesmerized by rates of growth of gross national product. Moreover, the achievements in education have been impressive in Tanzania and Somalia. Another unheralded achievement is the vast improvement in the capacity of countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast to organize, plan and manage their economies.

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1980s, food policy strategies must go beyond crash food production campaigns to deal with poverty itself because expanded food production by itself will not solve the hunger problem.

III

From this overview, one can see that while most Africans are farmers and Africa has enormous physical potential to feed itself, there are substantial barriers to tapping this potential. Experts from academia, donor organizations, and consulting firms emphasize post-independence corruption, mismanagement, repressive pricing of farm commodities, and the urban bias in development strategies. Year after year, African heads of state point to the unfavorable weather in their appeal for food aid. In fact, the crisis stems from a seamless web of political, technical and structural constraints which are a product of colonial surplus extraction strategies, misguided development plans and priorities of African states since independence, and faulty advice from many expatriate planning advisers. These complex, deep-rooted constraints can only be understood in historical perspective.[6]

Colonial approaches to development facilitated the production and extraction of surpluses—copper, gold, cocoa, coffee, etc.—for external markets while paying little attention to investments in human capital, research on food crops, and strengthening of internal market linkages. For example, colonial governments gave little attention to the training of agricultural scientists and managers. By the time of independence in the early 1960s, there was only one college of agriculture in French-speaking tropical Africa. Between 1952 and 1963, only four university graduates in agriculture were trained in francophone Africa and 150 in English-speaking Africa. By 1964, there was a total of three African scientists working in the research stations in the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Moreover, the effects of colonial policies on contemporary land ownership patterns and agricultural research and training institutions are important contributors to the current food production and poverty problems. Many colonial regimes focused their research and development programs on export crops and the needs of commercial farmers and managers of plantations. The modest investment in research on food crops could be defended during this period because the rate of population growth was low—one

[6] See Carl K. Eicher and Doyle C. Baker, "Research on Agricultural Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Survey," *MSU International Development Papers*, No. 1, East Lansing, Michigan State University, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, 1982.

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to two percent per annum—and surplus land could be "automatically" brought under cultivation by smallholders. But with annual rates of population growth now approaching three to four percent in some countries, research institutions must be restructured to devote more attention to food crops and the needs of smallholders and herders.

The current crisis has also resulted from the low priority that independent African states have assigned to investments in agriculture and to increasing food production over the past 25 years. In that period African states have engaged in five key debates on food and agriculture. The first was over the priority to be given to industry and agriculture in development plans and budget allocations. As African nations became independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most of them pursued mixed economies with a heavy emphasis on foreign aid, industrial development, education, and economic diversification. For example, the late President Kenyatta promoted capitalism and encouraged investors "to bring prosperity" to Kenya. A small number of countries such as Mali, Ghana and Guinea shifted abruptly to revolutionary socialism in the early 1960s. But whether political leaders were espousing capitalism or socialism, they generally all gave low priority to agriculture. African leaders tended to view agriculture as a "backward" sector which could provide surpluses—in the form of taxes and labor—to finance industrial and urban development, and thought agricultural development would simply reinforce dependency. Agricultural policies in many countries (both capitalist and socialist) supported plantations, state farms, land settlement schemes, and the replacement of private traders and money lenders with government trading corporations, grain boards, and credit agencies. The effects of these policies on agricultural production were typically inhibiting, and in some cases, highly so.

The second debate was over the relevance of Western models versus the "political economy" (stressing dependency and class structure) and radical models of development. As Western economists assumed important roles in helping to prepare development plans and served as policy advisers in the early 1960s, Western modernization and macroeconomic models were introduced into Africa. The dominant models emphasized the industrial sector as the driving force of development and the need to transfer rural people to the industrial sector. These models had three major shortcomings. First, they assumed that one discipline—economics—could provide answers on how to slay the dragons of poverty, inequality and malnutrition. As Albert Hirschman reminds us,

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development is a historical, social, political, technical and organizational process which cannot be understood by means of a single discipline.[7] Second, the cities were unable to provide jobs for the rural exodus. Third, the macro models were unable to provide a convincing understanding of the complexity of the agricultural sector—the sector which employs 50 to 95 percent of the labor force in African states. Although these models were technically elegant, they seem remarkably naïve today because they assigned a passive role to the agricultural sector.

The vacuity of the Western models of development and their failure to come to grips with the broad social, political and structural issues, as well as the complexities of the agricultural sector, opened the door for the political economy models of development and underdevelopment to emerge and gain a large following among African intellectuals. Samir Amin, an Egyptian economist who has specialized in African development problems for the past 20 years, has been the preeminent proponent of the dependency and underdevelopment paradigm of development. The political economy models have made a valuable contribution in stressing the need to understand development as a long-term historical process, the need to consider the linkages between national economies and the world economic system, and the importance of structural barriers (e.g., land tenure) to development. But the Achilles' heel of the political economy models is their failure to provide a convincing understanding of the motivations of rural people, and the role of technological change. Furthermore, many political economy scholars have tended to spend more time commenting on the failure of market economics than in generating empirical evidence on farms and in villages in order to verify and refine their models.[8]

The third debate was over the use of pricing and taxation policies to achieve agricultural and food policy objectives. The first issue here is whether Africans are responsive to economic incentives. Empirical research has produced a consensus that African farmers do respond to economic incentives as do farmers in high-income countries, but that Africans rationally give priority to producing enough food for their families for the coming one to two years. The next question is whether African states have

[7] Albert O. Hirschman, "Rise and Decline of Western Development Economics," in *Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, Chap. 1.

[8] For a recent assessment of the modernization, dependency and political economy models, see Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1982.

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pursued positive pricing and taxation policies for agriculture. Numerous empirical studies across the continent have provided conclusive evidence that many countries (both capitalist and socialist) are pursuing negative pricing policies which dampen incentives to produce food and export crops and encourage black market operations.

For example, Tanzania has paid farmers throughout the country a uniformly low price for maize, encouraging the sale of maize in black markets. In Mali, the government pricing policy for small farmers in a large irrigated rice production scheme can be labeled as "extortion." A meticulous two-year study in 1980-81 has shown that it costs farmers 83 Malian francs to produce a kilo of rice but that the government paid farmers only 60 Malian francs per kilo.[9] Does it seem irrational for the rice farmers to smuggle rice across the border into Senegal, Niger and Upper Volta where they can secure 108 to 128 Malian francs per kilo?

Not only food crops are subjected to negative pricing policies—export crops are also heavily taxed. In an analysis of pricing and taxation policies for major crops in 13 countries over the 1971–80 period, the World Bank concluded that, taking the net tax burden and the effect of overvalued currency into account, producers in the 13 countries received less than half of the real value of their export crops.[10] These examples and other studies carried out over the past two decades provide solid evidence that African states are using negative pricing and taxation policies to pump the economic surplus out of agriculture. A simple but powerful conclusion emerges from this experience—African states must overhaul the incentive structure for farmers and adopt increased farm income as an important goal of social policy in the 1980s. Moreover, increasing incentives to farmers is a strategic policy lever for attacking poverty and promoting rural employment.

The fourth debate—agrarian capitalism or socialism—has been one of the most emotional topics over the past 30 years; it will continue to dominate discussions on politics, development strategies, and foreign aid in the 1980s. Even though it is difficult to define African socialism, about one-fourth of the states now espouse socialism as their official ideology. The experiences of Ghana and Tanzania are well documented. Four years after Ghana became independent, President Nkrumah abruptly shifted

[9] Malumba Kamuanga, "Farm Level Study of the Rice Production Systems at the Office de Niger in Mali: An Economic Analysis," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1982.

[10] *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, World Bank, Washington, 1981, p. 55.

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from capitalism to a socialist strategy which equated modernization with industrialization and large-scale farming. Ghana was unable to assemble the technical and managerial skills and incentive structure to operate its vast system of state farms, parastatals (state corporations) and trading corporations. The failure of agrarian socialism has imposed a heavy toll on the people of Ghana.

Tanzania's shift to socialism in 1967 produced a voluminous literature, international press coverage, massive financial support from international donors—especially Scandinavian countries and the World Bank—and attention from political leaders and intellectuals throughout Africa. The vision of agrarian socialism is set forth in President Nyerere's essay "Socialism and Rural Development." But after 15 years of experimentation, it seems fair to examine the balance sheet on socialism in a country where 80 percent of the population live in rural areas. Knowledgeable observers conclude that Tanzania is in deep financial difficulty in part because of the drought in the mid-1970s, the quantum jump in oil prices, and the conflict in Uganda, but basically because of the stagnant performance of its agricultural sector under socialism. One cannot overlook Tanzania's important gains in literacy and social services, but one may legitimately worry about their sustainability over the longer term without increased rural incomes or exceptionally heavy foreign aid flows. There are many unanswered questions about Tanzania's experiment with agrarian socialism, such as why President Nyerere authorized the use of coercion to round up farmers living in scattered farmsteads and forced them to live in villages. Many pro-Tanzania scholars avoid this topic. But the failure of Tanzania to feed its people explains why Tanzania is no longer taken seriously as a model which other African countries want to emulate.

Agrarian socialism is now under fire throughout Africa: after 20 years of experimentation, there are presently no African models which are performing well. First, and most important, socialist agricultural production requires a vast amount of information and managerial and administrative skills in order to cope with the vagaries of weather, seasonal labor bottlenecks, and the need for on-the-spot decision-making authority. Second, government-operated grain boards have been plagued with overstaffing, corruption, mismanagement and high marketing costs. Because these problems cannot be easily overcome, it is unlikely that Africa will make much progress with socialist agriculture in this century.

As the pendulum swings from socialism to private farming and private traders in the 1980s, it is important to remind the reader

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that to put all or most of the weight on ideology—capitalism or socialism—is to ignore an important lesson that has been learned over the past 30 years in the Third World—namely, ideology is but one variable influencing the outcome of agricultural development projects. The "correct" choice of ideology cannot in and of itself assure successful development. Examples of failure under both capitalist and socialist models are too numerous to conclude otherwise.

The fifth debate—about the Green Revolution and the African farmer—concerns what can be done to increase the low cereal yields in Africa. There is growing evidence that a dominant cause of rural poverty is the fact that 60 to 80 percent of the agricultural labor force works at very low levels of productivity. As Figure 3 indicates, while yields in Latin America and Asia have increased since 1965, those of Africa have remained stagnant. Over the past 20 years, this debate has focused on whether African states could make use of high-yielding food grain varieties developed in International Agricultural Research Centers in Mexico, the Philippines and other parts of the world, or whether improved cereal varieties could be more efficiently developed through investments in research programs in national and regional research stations in Africa.

FIGURE 3
CEREAL YIELDS



SOURCE: USDA, *Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 1981.

Twenty years ago, foreign advisers were optimistic about transferring the Green Revolution technology to Africa, but after two decades of experimentation the results are disappointing. In fact, the Green Revolution has barely touched Africa. For example,

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hybrid sorghum varieties from India have not been successful in Upper Volta, Niger and Mali because of unforeseen problems such as disease, variability of rainfall, and poor soils. Moreover, the Green Revolution crops—wheat and rice—that produced 40 to 50 percent increases in yields in Asia are not staple foods in Africa. Knowledgeable observers agree that African farming systems are extremely complex and that the development of suitable technical packages requires location-specific research by multidisciplinary research teams, which are supported by strong national research programs on the staple foods of each country.

These five debates illustrate the complex set of problems that have preoccupied African states over the past two decades as they tried to find a meaningful role for the agricultural sector. Throughout much of the post-independence period, most states have viewed agriculture as a backward and low-priority sector, have perpetuated colonial policies of pumping the economic surplus out of agriculture, and have failed to give priority to achieving a reliable food surplus as a prerequisite for basic national, social and economic goals. The failure of most African states to develop an effective set of agricultural policies to deal with the technical, structural, institutional and human resource constraints is at the heart of the present food crisis. Part of the failure must be attributed to the colonial legacy and part to the hundreds of foreign economic advisers who have imported inappropriate models and theories of development from the United States, Europe, Asia and Latin America. In the final analysis, agricultural stagnation in capitalist Zaïre and socialist Tanzania must also be placed before heads of state and planners who have promoted premature industrialization and have exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of incentives, the motivations of their own rural people, and the necessity to overcome technical constraints and restructure agricultural institutions.

IV

Africa's inability to feed itself amid vast amounts of unused land and record levels of foreign aid is, on the surface, one of the major paradoxes in Third World development. What should be done?

While the several notable recent reports on Africa's food and economic problems agree on the severity of the food and hunger crisis, each of these assessments underemphasizes the mistakes of African states and in a somewhat self-serving fashion overstresses

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the need for more foreign aid.[11] For example, the World Bank's *Accelerated Development* report correctly singles out domestic policy issues as the heart of the crisis, but it also advances an unsupported appeal for donors to double aid to Africa over the 1980–1990 period. Further, while the report criticizes large-scale irrigation projects, it neglects the Bank's own difficulties (and those of most of the other donors) in designing sound livestock projects. The recent World Food Council report correctly notes the overemphasis on project-type aid, the excessive number of foreign missions (for example, Upper Volta received 340 official donor missions in 1981), and the small percentage of aid funds for food production projects, but it skirts many of the political and structural barriers to change. The report by the African ministers of agriculture at their recent meeting in Nairobi avoids the topic of population growth, the empirical record of agrarian socialism, and the disastrous performance of state grain boards.

Solutions to these problems must, first of all, be long term. Secondly, they require a redirection in thinking about agriculture's role in development and the need for a reliable food surplus as a precondition for national development. In order to buy time to lay a foundation for long-range solutions, it will be necessary to rely on a number of holding actions. Examples include expanded commercial food imports, food aid, and promoting seasonal and international migration until more land is brought under irrigation and higher rainfall areas can be cleared of tsetse flies and river blindness. But these holding actions must not be allowed to substitute for efforts toward long-range solutions.

Two steps should be taken now to start the process of formulating longer term policies. First, African states, donors, and economic advisers should jettison the ambiguous slogans about food self-sufficiency, food first, and basic needs.[12] Although these have a powerful emotional and political appeal they offer little help in answering the key question—what blend of food production, food

[11] See Food and Agriculture Organization, *Regional Food Plan for Africa*, Rome, 1978; Organization of African Unity, *Lagos Plan of Action*, Lagos, Nigeria, April 28–29, 1980; U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Decade of the 1980s*, Washington, 1981; *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*, *op. cit.*; World Food Council of the United Nations, "The African Food Problem and the Role of International Agencies: Report of the Executive Director," Rome, February 22, 1982; and "Nairobi Conclusions and Recommendations of the African Ministers of Food and Agriculture at the World Food Council Regional Consultation for Africa," Nairobi, March 16–17, 1982.

[12] Although the World Bank was a staunch advocate of basic needs strategies in the late 1970s it has recently abandoned its support for this dubious concept. Still the International Labor Office continues to confuse African states with recent basic needs missions to Zambia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Is it surprising that African states have so little faith in donors?

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imports, and export crops should be pursued to achieve both growth and equity objectives?

The second immediate step should be the phasing out or restructuring of some of the crash food production projects—i.e., seed multiplication, irrigated wheat schemes, livestock schemes, and integrated rural development projects—that are floundering. Many of these crash projects were hastily assembled over the past decade without a sound technical package and without being tested in a pilot phase. These unproductive projects consume scarce high-level manpower, perpetuate recurrent cost problems, and create a credibility problem for both African policymakers and international donors. Particularly important is the reassessment of integrated rural development (IRD) projects. The weakness of most IRD projects—their lack of emphasis on food production and income-generating activities—can be corrected by restructuring the projects rather than phasing them out. Other projects which have been implemented in advance of a sound knowledge base, like those in livestock, should either be phased out or scaled down and continued as pilot projects for a five- to ten-year period. A five- to ten-year pilot phase is unheard of in Africa, but in projects like those in livestock it is a necessary period for solving technical problems and developing appropriate local institutions to solve such key issues as overstocking.

The starting point for food policy analysis in each country should be the development of a food policy strategy with two goals in mind: achieving a reliable food surplus (based on domestic production, grain storage, and international trade) and reducing hunger.

Looking toward policy reform, a word of caution is in order. Food policy is every bit as delicate as family planning. The rice riots in Monrovia, which left more than 100 dead in 1979, and the sugar riots in Khartoum and other major cities in the Sudan following the recent doubling of sugar prices, are reminders of the narrow range of options for policymakers on food policy issues. Consequently, as experiences from the Sudan, Zambia and Nigeria illustrate, African countries will move very slowly on policy reforms unless spurred by famine, a reduction in foreign exchange earnings from petroleum, or coordinated donor leverage to link long-term food aid to policy reform.

The Sudan provides a conspicuous example of the difficulty of mobilizing the agricultural sector as an engine of growth and expanded food production. In the mid-1970s, the international press frequently asserted that the Sudan could become the

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"breadbasket of the Middle East" by drawing on several billion dollars of OPEC loans and gifts to develop its vast reserve of idle land. The issue today, however, is not one of exporting food to the Middle East, but of the Sudan's inability to feed its 18 million people. The Sudan imported $30 million in U.S. P.L. 480 subsidized food last year and it is now facing severe balance-of-payment problems and inflation. Although the Sudan has historically excelled in cotton research, it has devoted only token attention to research on food crops. As long as the Sudan continues to receive food aid and has hopes of striking oil in the southern part of the country, there is little likelihood of policy reforms.

Zambia is importing large quantities of maize, its staple food. In Zambia, about 400 commercial farmers produce an estimated 40 percent of the marketable maize, yet the Ministry of Agriculture does not have proven maize varieties for its half-million small farmers. Should Zambia press on with efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in maize via commercial farmers or small farmers? In any case, the survival of President Kaunda's government will be in doubt if it does not address the most basic policy issue—the achievement of a reliable food surplus.

In the early 1960s, Nigeria was a net exporter of food—mainly oil palm and groundnuts—but by the early 1970s, Nigeria was importing food. Several authoritative reports commissioned by Nigerian policymakers recommended that immediate steps be taken in order to avert Nigeria's impending food crisis. Petroleum exports, however, have enabled Nigeria to buy time. In 1981, Nigeria imported more than one billion dollars of food from the United States. Although Nigeria is far ahead of most francophone African countries in trained agricultural manpower, a 1978 study reported that more than 40 percent of the positions for senior agricultural researchers in the eight major research stations were vacant. The government recently concluded that it will take 15 years to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. Nigeria has now formed a high-level Green Revolution Committee to address its food problem.

Turning to policy reform itself, scaling down the state bureaucracy, the state payroll, and state control over private farmers and private traders are central problems for most African states. After 20 years of experience with parastatals, the record is clear: parastatals are ineffective in stimulating the production of private farmers, are no more efficient than private traders in food grain marketing, and moreover, become a sponge for foreign aid. As the number of parastatal employees increases, the pressure intensifies

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for donors to commensurately increase their contributions to meet the payroll of the expanded bureaucracy. The parastatal disease is well known, but it is not given much attention in the reports cited above, except in the World Bank's *Accelerated Development* report, which should be applauded for its candor on this topic.

A food policy strategy must tackle the crucial need to raise prices for both food and export crops. Although one cannot generalize for sub-Saharan Africa, donors should withhold project aid unless there is a favorable incentive structure for farmers. In addition, a food policy strategy should not rule out the expansion of export crops because expanded farm income, through food sales, export crops and off-farm income is a prerequisite for solving the poverty and hunger problems.

A major issue in achieving policy reforms is whether donor agencies and countries can or should use food aid leverage to promote the required changes. In existence for almost 30 years, food aid is now a topic of growing interest in Africa. Although there is unanimity on using food aid for humanitarian purposes—for example, feeding refugees—food aid for development is more controversial. The opposition to this sort of food aid—where food is sold at concessional terms and extended as grants for food for work programs—comes from evidence that food aid: (1) can reduce the pressure on recipient countries to carry out policy reforms; (2) depresses farm prices; (3) is unreliable;[13] and (4) promotes an undesirable shift in consumption patterns (i.e., the bulk of U.S. food aid—60 to 70 percent—is in the form of wheat and wheat flour even though wheat is not a staple food in Africa).

Food aid programs are firmly institutionalized with donors. As far as the United States is concerned food aid has accounted for approximately 40 percent of all U.S. economic assistance to Africa over the 1970–80 period. African states find themselves in a strong position to bargain for food aid this year because of large U.S., European Community and Japanese surpluses, and falling international wheat and rice prices.

To date, there has been little solid research on the role of food aid for development purposes in Africa. The food aid experience in Asia and Latin America, however, shows that the availability of food aid can take the pressure off recipient nations to carry out internal policy reforms. Linking food aid with policy reforms in major food deficit countries in Africa would require the develop-

[13] For example, U.S. food aid to Mozambique was cut off for six months in 1981. See David Anderson, "America in Africa, 1981," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1981*, pp. 658–85.

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ment of food policy reform packages for countries such as the Sudan, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania, and agreement by donors to make three- to five-year food aid commitments in exchange for internal policy reforms. Countries such as Mali and the Sudan would be good test cases for linking food aid (which is not used to feed refugees) to tough domestic policy reforms. But unless donors come together and agree to meet minimum forward food aid levels, African states may postpone policy reforms as they continue to rely on a patchwork of bilateral food aid programs.

V

Beyond policy reforms, a long-range solution to food and hunger problems will depend, to a large degree, on achievements in agricultural research. Significant increases are needed over the next 20 years in research expenditures on dry land farming systems with emphasis on food crops (white maize, yams, cassava, millet and sorghum) and on livestock. Authorities on food production and livestock projects in the field now commonly bemoan the lack of proven technical packages for small farmers in dry land farming systems throughout Africa, and the uniformly unfavorable technical coefficients (e.g., low rates of growth, disease) for livestock production.

An expanded research program on food and livestock should be viewed in a 20-year time-frame because problems such as low soil fertility and livestock diseases cannot be resolved through a series of short-term, ad hoc research projects. The U.S. experience, wherein 40 years (1880–1920) were spent developing a productive system of federal and state research programs, should be heeded by U.S. congressmen who are likely to expect major results from the U.S. Agency for International Development financed research projects in Africa in five to ten years.

Research on irrigation is particularly important, and should be accelerated in the coming decades. The knowledge base for irrigation in Africa is meagre. Irrigation has played a minor role in Africa except in large-scale projects in the Sudan and in Madagascar where there is a history of irrigation by small farmers. The cultivated land under irrigation is probably less than five percent in most other countries (as compared with an estimated 30 percent in India). Following the 1968–74 drought in the Sahel, there was considerable optimism about the role of irrigated farming in "drought-proofing" the region. Due to numerous technical and administrative problems, however, the projected expansion of irrigation in the Sahel is behind schedule and it is certain that

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irrigation will not play a significant role in the Sahelian states until early in the next century.

Although research on the economics of irrigation is fragmentary, the limited results provide support for a smallholder irrigation strategy in the 1980s, with priority given to: ground water development with small pumps; land reclamation through drainage and water control; and an increase in small-scale projects which are developed and maintained by groups of farmers with their own family labor. A small-scale irrigation strategy is advocated because the cost of bringing more rainfed land under cultivation is substantially less than the cost of leveling and preparing land for large-scale irrigation. For example, World Bank data show that recent irrigation projects in Niger, Mauritania and northern Nigeria each had costs of more than $10,000 per hectare at 1980 prices. On the other hand, farmers in Senegal have cleared and prepared their own land for irrigation, expending several hundred hours of family labor per hectare (2.47 acres). Although irrigation will not be a panacea for the recovery of the Sahel, nor for feeding Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, a long-term research program on the human, technical and institutional dimensions of irrigation should be initiated in the immediate future.

An encouraging development on the research front is the recent formation of an informal working group of seven major bilateral donors to plan a long-term program for strengthening national agricultural research systems throughout Africa, with emphasis on food and livestock research. This shift to coordinate bilateral support for research is a welcome innovation, but it remains to be seen whether donors will have the courage to view research as a long-term investment and to provide guaranteed funding for a minimum of ten years. One refreshing change introduced this year by W. Peter McPherson, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, is the flexibility to authorize ten-year rather than five-year projects. For example, AID recently authorized funding for a ten-year centrally funded, worldwide water research project and a nine-year tropical soils project.

The question is whether AID's country priorities will remain stable enough to assure African countries of continuity in U.S. funding over a 10- to 20-year period. For example, the proposed allocation to the eight Sahelian states will be slightly reduced in real terms in Fiscal Year 1983 even though Congress had earlier endorsed a 20-year recovery program for the Sahel following the drought. On the other hand, U.S. economic assistance to the Sudan has been dramatically increased this year to over $100

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million, exceeding the total U.S. aid for the Sahel. A rule of thumb is that an African country should never embark on a long-term program to upgrade its national agricultural research system with major support from only one bilateral donor.

A third essential component of a long-range strategy is massive investments in human capital formation, including graduate training of several thousand agricultural scientists and managers. This is necessary to replace the foreign advisers, researchers, managers and teachers in African universities and to meet the needs of a science-based agriculture in the next century. Since it takes 10 to 15 years of training and experience beyond high school to develop a research scientist, the investments in human capital will not produce payoffs for Africa until the 1990s.

Building graduate agricultural training programs within Africa necessitates a reexamination of the role of the African university in national development. The time is propitious for African universities to move from undergraduate to graduate training programs in science and agriculture. Before graduate education is expanded, however, some questions must be raised about priorities in undergraduate education. Undergraduate degree programs in agriculture in many universities are still embarrassingly undervalued and underfunded when compared with law, medicine and history. For example, in Senegal, the University of Dakar was formally established in 1957, and in 1960 the Senegalese assumed its administration. Today, there are approximately 12,000 students in the University of Dakar, of whom several thousand specialize in law and economics. Not until 1979 was a National School of Agriculture established at Thies, north of Dakar. Students take their first year science courses at the University of Dakar and the initial group of undergraduates will graduate from the Thies school in 1984-85. That university-level teaching of agriculture was not initiated until 1979, 29 years after independence, reflects an enduring colonial legacy as well as the government's ambivalence about agriculture's role in national development. Although the structural reforms entailed in redesigning African universities to suit their country's needs will require decades to resolve, it is time for donors to stop merely paying lip service to African universities. Whereas donors embraced African universities in the 1960s they generally withdrew their support in the 1970s as they promoted crash food production, IRD projects, and international agricultural research institutes. Money saved ($100 to $200 million) from phasing out the floundering crash projects cited above can be reallocated to selected African univer-

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sities with emphasis on faculties of agriculture. Donors should press for long-term structural reform of the universities in exchange for long-term aid commitments of 10 to 20 years.

Currently, graduate-level education for African students in the United States costs $1,850 per month, or $35,000–$45,000 for a Master's degree over a 24- to 30-month period. AID should gradually phase out Master's level training programs in agriculture and related fields in the United States. Instead, U.S. faculty members should be sent to Africa to help develop regional centers of excellence in graduate training in eight to ten African universities over the next 10 to 15 years. In order to achieve this goal, AID will have to give greatly increased priority to aiding African universities, including ten-year authorizations to U.S. universities to facilitate this type of training program. In the final analysis, the initiative for this second phase—graduate training in agriculture in African universities—will have to come from within Africa.

The fourth component of a long-range solution to Africa's food crisis will be an ongoing effort to address the hunger/malnutrition/poverty problem. Rural poverty is potentially a much more difficult problem to solve than the food production gap, but self-sufficiency in food production will be a bogus achievement if the poor do not have access to a decent diet. A society cannot expect to move from a low- to middle-income stage of development if two-thirds of its population are producing millet, sorghum, maize and yams at stagnant levels of output. Agricultural research on stagnant food grain production is a prerequisite to solving rural poverty and hunger problems. Moreover, since jobs cannot be created in urban areas for all the unemployed, there must be created in rural areas opportunities in food and cash crop agriculture and rural small-scale industry.

VI

The implications of all this for the foreign assistance community flow quite clearly from the foregoing analysis. Currently, 40 donors are moving funds and technical assistance through a patchwork of several thousand uncoordinated projects in support of agricultural and rural development throughout Africa. Furthermore, donors are continuing to transfer models and slogans—basic needs, appropriate technology, and food first—to Africa. In turn, African states are allocating a high percentage of a scarce resource—trained agricultural professionals—to meet the project reporting requirements of donors. In short, both donors and recipients are prisoners of projects and slogans. Should aid to

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Africa be doubled in real terms during this decade? The answer depends on how these problems and others are resolved:

1. *Long-term Planning.* Emphasis should be placed on increasing the lifetime of projects, reducing the number of tiny projects (e.g., producing visual aids for the livestock service in a Sahelian country) and increasing the volume of aid in program grants which are tied to policy reforms. Long-term programs like ten-year research projects, five- to ten-year pilot livestock projects, 20-year programs to develop colleges of agriculture, and five-year food aid/policy reform packages—should not be perceived as luxuries, but rather as prerequisites to solving Africa's technical, structural and human capital constraints.

2. *Aid Coordination.* The lack of aid coordination is especially acute in Africa as donors phase out assistance to Latin America and smother Africa with project aid. Most African states have been able to resist the establishment of a formal Consortium of Donors. Such a consortium should be established for large recipient countries such as the Sudan, Senegal, Kenya and Tanzania. Moreover, a strong case could be made for donors to declare a two-year moratorium on certain kinds of projects with poor track records—e.g., livestock projects—in order to sort out the lessons to be learned from the failures over the past two decades.

3. *Developing Food Policy Strategies.* Despite the pleas of journalists who urge donors to increase the number of food production projects, the professional agriculturist knows that a single food policy reform in Mali—raising official farm prices—may be more effective than 20 new food production projects. Donors should concentrate their resources on helping local professionals develop food policy strategies which identify the constraints on achieving a reliable food surplus, with emphasis on food production, storage and international trade.

4. *Technology Transfer.* Analysis of the Green Revolution has shown that donors should shift their emphasis to helping African institutions generate technology within Africa through strengthened national and regional research programs. Although the U.S. and India's food grain varieties are not directly transferable to Africa, some of the processes the two countries used to generate technology appropriate to the needs of their farmers in dry land areas are applicable. The U.S. Dust Bowl crisis in Kansas and Oklahoma in the 1930s gave rise to the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, research on new varieties, irrigation, and other techniques which transformed the Dust Bowl into a highly productive area of American agriculture. In this 30-year process U.S. colleges of

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agriculture played a strategic role, in cooperation with local and state organizations and with the USDA. The U.S. and Indian experiences in the process of building research programs, colleges of agriculture, and new institutions such as a Soil Conservation Service can contribute to African agricultural development.

5. *Foreign Private Enterprise.* The Reagan Administration has identified the promotion of foreign private investment as one of four areas of concentration in its foreign assistance program. Can foreign private investment contribute to the resolution of Africa's food and poverty problems? Just as the roles of women in African development cannot be analyzed in isolation from those of men, the role of the private sector can only be analyzed in relation to public investments. The poor record of food production projects in the Sahel in the past seven years provides ample proof that many of these projects fail because public sector investments are not made in: agricultural research to develop profitable packages for rainfed farming, prevention and control of animal disease, rural roads, and schools to train agricultural managers. Professional agriculturists know that public sector investments can either facilitate or destroy the conditions for private African capitalists to function in a market-oriented economy. It would be unwise if the Administration pursued a dogmatic private enterprise approach at the expense of public sector investments.

In general, inadequate infrastructure and technical constraints presently limit the scope for foreign private investors. Although some foreign firms prospered in colonial periods when they were given choice land and protected markets, since independence there have been many failures, including the recent efforts of U.S. firms to produce food in Ghana, Liberia and Senegal. As a rule of thumb, if foreign private firms do not receive special subsidies, they cannot compete with African smallholders who have a knowledge of local climate, pests and soils, and are willing to produce food on their own land at rates of return of 75 cents to three dollars per day for family labor. Moreover, the large capital-intensive plantations and ranches emphasized by foreign private firms should be questioned on social grounds because they do not produce the badly needed jobs in an area of the world where seasonal unemployment is widespread. Foreign private enterprise, however, can contribute to Africa's food sector in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe which have a good infrastructure and require international managerial skills for investments in food processing plants, and in fertilizer and agricultural input industries. But in the final analysis, the focus of U.S. foreign aid should

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be on making public investments in roads, universities and research stations to help African capitalists—small farmers and herders—produce food for their families and for urban people.

Aid flows to Africa have grown dramatically in recent years: net official aid in 1980 was $13.70 per capita in Africa compared with an average of $9.60 for all developing countries. In many circles in Africa, there is a feeling that the continent is already too heavily dependent on aid and foreign transactions. The technical specialists in most donor agencies will privately concede that there is currently an excess of donor funds in search of technically sound agricultural production projects. However, if donors take a broad view of the need for massive, long-term public investments in roads, faculties of agriculture in African universities, and land transfer funds (e.g., for Zimbabwe), and if African countries shift their agricultural development strategies and priorities and introduce policy reforms, then it may be desirable for donors to double aid to Africa in real terms over the 1980–90 period.

To sum up, agricultural development is a slow and evolutionary process and it is up to African states and donor agencies to lay the foundation for solving the food production problem over a 10- to 20-year period. Unless steps are taken in the 1980s to solve these basic technical, political, structural and policy constraints, many African states may end up in the 1990s as permanent food aid clients of the United States, the European Economic Community, and Japan.

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Michel Oksenberg

A DECADE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While the past decade of Sino-American relations has been largely constructive, the ten years have not been on a steady incline. Rather, there have been two strong forward spurts, from spring 1971 through May 1973, and from May 1978 through early 1980. The relationship has also endured two periods of some acrimony and erosion: from the fall of 1975 to late 1976 and from mid-1980 to the effort to stabilize the relationship reflected in the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan that was agreed in August 1982. In addition to the periods of rapid forward movement and retrogression, several periods are best portrayed through metaphors such as "plateaus" or "mixed pictures." Even the best periods were punctuated by moments of doubt and uncertainty, while the phases of deterioration were constrained by a common desire to limit the erosion and to preserve a more positive public facade than the private exchanges warranted.

The ebb and flow of Sino-American relations merits closer scrutiny to illuminate the forces at work. What produces a forward surge? What halts it? What initiates a downturn? What contains it? A historical review of the past decade, in sum, reveals the interests, objectives, and limits which have inhered in the relationship. The account reveals a subtle interplay among three factors: the state of play in the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, the Taiwan issue, and the domestic political setting in China and the United States.

II

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have detailed the subtle maneuvers in which both sides intermittently engaged from early 1969 through the spring of 1971.[1] The story is by now a familiar one. Richard Nixon came to office privately determined to alter America's relations with China. Nixon's travels in Asia and converations with world leaders such as Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s had convinced him of the increasing costs which the United States was paying due to its hostile relations with China, and he saw the opportunities which the Sino-Soviet rupture offered. He also came to office determined to reduce the ground combat role of Americans in Vietnam, a task originally undertaken to help contain the expansion of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Nixon faced a delicate challenge reconciling these twin objectives, for a swift, heralded rush toward the Chinese could have been misinterpreted in communist countries as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve, as yielding to one of Hanoi's principal backers. A precipitate American opening to China

[1] See Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978, and Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

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might have emboldened the North Vietnamese, not encouraged them to wind down the war.

Moreover, at least at the outset of his Administration, Nixon apparently did not clearly perceive the domestic political benefits to be derived from a move toward China. In 1969, President Nixon probably was more aware of the costs a move to China would have among the Republican Right; his career had impressed upon him the precise strength of the authorities on Taiwan in American politics and exactly which American politicians owed obligations to them. Only about midway into his first term, as his global strategy jelled, did the domestic benefits to be reaped from a spectacular opening to China begin to come into focus, as well as the risks of delay should political rivals journey to Beijing before him. Now, over a decade later, it is easy to forget the pervasive, often intense enmity toward China felt throughout the executive branch in the late 1960s, sustained by the hostile missions toward China with which most agencies were charged. In this political environment, any movement toward China had to be gradual and subtle, particularly since the Chinese reaction could not be known.

As a result, the Nixon Administration moved cautiously forward on several fronts from early 1969 on. It gradually prepared both the executive branch and American public opinion for a change in policy, particularly in the way the Administration spoke of China and Sino-American relations. It slowly eased travel and trade restrictions. Finally, it sought to communicate its aspirations directly to Beijing through Pakistani and Romanian intermediaries.

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai found themselves in an equally delicate situation. We lack memoirs or similar evidence which reveal precisely when Mao began to conceive of an American opening, but inferential evidence points to late 1968, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.[2] At that point, Chinese extremism during the two years of the Cultural Revolution had seriously isolated Beijing in world affairs, while Chinese vulnerability to Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border, which had begun to be built up in the mid-1960s, was assuming threatening proportions. By autumn 1968, too, the course of the Vietnam War probably had taught the entire Chinese leadership an important lesson, namely that the United States had no particular desire to become embroiled in a war with China. In 1964–65, although Mao probably had already come to this conclusion, other Chinese leaders apparently believed Washington was willing to widen the war. The way the United States subsequently prosecuted the war underscored Washington's desire to avoid another Korea—a lesson not lost on the Chinese leadership. Thus, by late 1968, in Chinese eyes the Soviet Union and the United States had at least become coequal dangers to Chinese national security, and to some Chinese—the Chairman included—the Soviet Union clearly posed the greater danger.

Still, the evidence suggests, a protracted debate ensued among the top leaders in Beijing as to whether China should pursue a policy of rough equidistance toward Moscow and Washington or tilt toward the United States.[3] If the posture was equidistance, was the posture to be equal hostility

[2] A. Doak Barnett, *China Among the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977.

[3] For an account that traces the debate from well before the Czech invasion, see Thomas Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle*, Research Report R-1902-NA, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977.

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or a balanced effort to improve relations with both? If a tilt to the United States, then how far was the tilt to be?

Only haltingly were these questions settled. Driving the debate was the need to respond to the ominous signs that Moscow was considering military action against China, made credible by border clashes of considerable intensity in the spring and then late summer of 1969. Although Nixon and Kissinger briefly feared the Chinese might yield to these Soviet pressures, especially following Kosygin's September 1969 visit to Beijing, by year's end Mao and Zhou had understood the Nixon Administration's initiatives to seek a dialogue.[4] They had concluded that an American connection would offer them a counterweight against the Soviet Union, would help open doors to Japanese and Western European governments, and might facilitate securing the China seat in the United Nations then held by the Republic of China. They also saw that the Nixon Administration perceived an American interest in deterring a Sino-Soviet conflict.

The result of this signaling was two extraordinary meetings on January 20 and February 20, 1970 in Warsaw, between Walter Stoessel, the American Ambassador to Poland, and Lei Yang, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. The Ambassadorial Talks, first held in 1955 in Geneva and then in Warsaw after 1957, had proven a useful instrument of diplomatic exchange (especially during the 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, during the 1962 Chinese concern about Taiwanese military operations against the mainland, and during the 1965 Chinese concern with U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War). Nonetheless, the talks had dwindled to a largely sterile exercise until the Stoessel-Lei exchange. At the two meetings, new ground was broken in three areas. Ending a 15-year deadlock on the Taiwan issue, the United States tacitly acknowledged for the first time that this was a matter to be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves; the Chinese in turn abandoned their previous stance that until the issue was settled, no improvement in the relationship could take place. Second, both sides acknowledged a common desire for a more stable environment. Third, both indicated their desire for conversations at higher levels, perhaps through a presidential emissary to Beijing.

Even after this January-February 1970 convergence, 18 months passed before Kissinger's July 1971 trip. The May 1970 Cambodian invasion caused delay, as possibly did the February 1971 incursion into Laos. The process was made more protracted by the secrecy and indirectness of the communications. Another source of delay was the internal resistance, obstruction, and lack of coordination on both sides. Kissinger perceived foot-dragging at the State Department, while China specialists in the Foreign Service who privately supported changes in China policy hedged their memos, unaware of how rapidly the President was prepared to move. Mao and Zhou on several occasions hinted at their own internal resistance, presumably principally from Minister of Defense Lin Biao. With persistent, sometimes ominous Soviet pressure in the background, the obstacles were eventually surmounted, and the two sides began to plan for the Kissinger trip in April 1971.

III

The next two years witnessed a rapid sequence of events: Kissinger's July 1971 secret trip, Nixon's February 1972 visit, and the opening of the Liaison Offices. Interspersing these developments were major missions to Beijing by

[4] Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

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Kissinger in October 1971, Alexander Haig in January 1972, and Kissinger again in June 1972. Among the reasons for the swift forward movement, the foremost was a global strategic context conducive to rapprochement. Throughout this period, the United States saw the China connection as a way to facilitate settlement of the Vietnam War, while the Chinese, still feeling vulnerable to the Soviet Union, saw in the United States a credible counterweight to Soviet expansionist tendencies, including in Indochina. Statesmanship is required, however, to identify and transform opportunities into reality, and the rapid forward movement cannot be explained without reference to the artistry of Mao, Zhou, Nixon and Kissinger.

Several factors explain their capacity. First, although the principals in this drama came from extraordinarily different backgrounds—one the son of a peasant from the interior of China, another the aristocratic bearer of the Mandarin tradition, yet another of middle-class, Midwest and California origins, and finally, an immigrant Harvard scholar of international affairs—they were bound by a common approach to world politics. Drawing the four together was a belief that the essence of diplomacy, the requisite for stability, was the maintenance of regional and global balances of power. Not only was their approach to diplomacy similar, but their perception of the current situation was sufficiently congruent that their conversations during the two-year period were wide-ranging, congenial, and very constructive. Beyond their intellectual compatibility, from mid-1971 to mid-1973 the leaders on both sides had political credibility. They appeared to be in control of their domestic politics, Mao and Zhou having bested Lin Biao and Nixon gearing up for what became a triumph over the Democrats in the 1972 election.

As the relationship unfolded, moreover, the leaders on both sides became emotionally committed to their accomplishment, although at the outset self-interest rather than sentiment governed their calculations. The personal involvement brought a rigor, a precision, a meticulousness in the management of the relationship that is rarely exhibited in world affairs. Mao and Nixon were reluctant to vest the relationship in their respective, sprawling bureaucracies, with the cumbersomeness and parochialism which, whether justly or not, they feared would suffocate the policy.

Each side demonstrated extraordinary sensitivity to the other side. The handling of the Taiwan issue was the most obvious example in which each side accommodated the domestic needs of the other. In addition, perhaps as significantly, the United States responded to the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War in ways calculated to convince the Chinese of American determination to maintain the balance of power. The effort to prevent an Indian penetration of West Pakistan and the dispatch of elements of the Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, as well as Kissinger's private communications to Foreign Minister Huang Hua, indicated Washington would abide by its responsibilities to prevent the dismemberment of states by aggressive neighbors.

Gradually, as their confidence in the United States increased, the Chinese began to take American concerns into account in their posture toward Korea and Japan. On the Korean peninsula, the Chinese began to make a more explicit contribution to the maintenance of stability. In Japan, the Chinese ceased calling through their minions for the dissolution of the Japanese-American security treaty, a call that had been an irritant in Japanese-American relations since the treaty was signed. The net result, by early 1973, was a more stable Northeast Asia than had existed in decades.

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In Indochina, in addition to openly differing with Hanoi's military strategy and political objectives in the South, by the spring of 1973 Kissinger and Zhou Enlai had begun to coordinate their separate policies, in order to lay the groundwork for a coalition government in Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk. The grand design, as it began to unfold, was for the Americans to support the Lon Nol government and to weaken the Khmer Rouge, while the Chinese would work the other side of the street, sustaining their leverage over the Khmer Rouge through their aid program while continuing their vituperative verbal onslaught on Lon Nol. It was hoped that both the Lon Nol regime (without Lon Nol) and the Khmer Rouge would be sufficiently weary by year's end of a stalemate which only benefitted Hanoi's prospects for ultimately dominating an exhausted Cambodia. At that point, Beijing and Washington could induce their respective clients to accept a coalition regime. To achieve this objective required staunch American support of the Phnom Penh regime, of course, or else the Chinese would have no leverage, no incentive by which to encourage their clients to be even temporarily conciliatory.[5]

Thus, by the end of the period from the spring of 1971 to the summer of 1973, Sino-American cooperation had assumed unexpected forms. A scant eight years before, Secretary of State Rusk had seen the threat to Indochina as Chinese in origin, while the Chinese had wished to rid their southern flanks of the American-backed SEATO threat. By May 1973, each saw advantage in keeping the other engaged in the peninsula, to prevent it from being dominated by an increasingly Soviet-backed Hanoi.

IV

Within weeks, the hope which Zhou and Kissinger shared of bringing stability to Indochina was shattered. From then to President Ford's December 1975 trip, Sino-American relations essentially marked time. In mirror image, on both sides the factors that had contributed to the forward surge fell away.

Foremost were the ramifications of Richard Nixon's mortal political wounds. Already in the spring of 1973, distracted by the news conveyed to him by John Dean, the President lacked the strength and fortitude to counter Vietnamese violations of the Paris peace accords. In June, the Ervin Committee had launched its inquiry into the Watergate affair and the related incidents. With the American press and public wary of reengagement in Indochina and Democrats sensing Nixon's vulnerabilities, Congress imposed a deadline on all U.S. bombing in Cambodia and foreshadowed an end to U.S. aid to Phnom Penh. The Kissinger-Zhou design was pulled apart, as the Khmer Rouge saw an unopposed road to Phnom Penh and the North Vietnamese sensed the approaching opportunities in Saigon. Instead of dealing with credible leaders, the Chinese soon saw they were dealing with a Nixon and Kissinger under siege, from whom they could gain no solace.

Nor were Mao and Zhou in much better shape. In late 1973, Zhou was under severe domestic attack from other factions in the leadership. During Kissinger's November 1973 trip, Mao had a wide-ranging conversation which probably was intended at least as much for a Chinese audience. (Memoranda of the Chairman's conversations frequently were disseminated throughout the

[5] See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, pp. 335–69. This is not the place to discuss the realism or practicality of the policy.

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higher echelons of the bureaucracy to guide policy.) This conversation, from which the second volume of Kissinger's memoirs quotes extensively, provided a floor beneath which Sino-American relations could not sink in the ensuing couple of years.

Yet, during the remainder of Mao's and Zhou's lives and Kissinger's tenure in office, the relationship never achieved its previous élan and dynamism. By November 1973, the aging Mao himself may have been more the object of manipulation than an initiator of intrigue. Zhou's ability to sustain his policies was circumscribed, as cancer and the machinations of Mao's wife and her associates felled the Premier. From late 1973 on, the Chinese Politburo was split into two warring camps, with neither able to achieve dominance. On one side was Zhou, the architect of the Sino-American relationship; in the Hobbesian world of Chinese factional strife, his adversaries hit him with all the barbs the American connection provided: the introduction of bourgeois culture, the planned auctioning of Chinese natural resources, and the use of China to facilitate a Soviet-American rapprochement.

The latter point deserves elaboration, for during Kissinger's 1974 and 1975 travels to China a note of acrimony and bitterness crept into the Chinese dialogue. In his earlier trips, Kissinger had justified American détente with the Soviet Union less in its own terms than as a tactic to buy off liberals in Western Europe and the United States while Washington embarked on a program to strengthen its capacity to deal with Moscow. With SALT I, the Vladivostok agreement of December 1974, grain sales, technology transfer, and the Helsinki Accords of mid-1975, the Chinese began to feel they had been used. As they described it, the United States had "stood on China's shoulders" to reach agreements with Moscow. They believed Nixon's China opening simply had facilitated an improvement in Soviet-American relations, which hardly was Mao's intent. Soviet expansion in Angola and elsewhere encountered a supine American response.

To make matters worse from Beijing's perspective, hopes had been raised in 1972 that an American effort would be made to complete the normalization process during Nixon's second term. (No commitment was made as to the terms.) Watergate and then the growing Ronald Reagan challenge to Gerald Ford's renomination precluded fulfillment of the hope, a fact which the Chinese understood. Nonetheless, the same developments did not halt forward movement in Soviet-American relations. The net result was that by the time President Ford visited China in December 1975, the relationship had more image than substance, though both sides had incentive to sustain the image in hopes of a future upturn. Encouraging Beijing to reach this conclusion was Ford's hint that he would try to address the normalization issue early in his second term.

V

Soon after President Ford left Beijing, a concerted attack began against Deng Xiaoping, to whom Zhou had yielded authority in 1974–75. Indeed, Ford had been taken to Beijing University to witness the wall posters which launched the campaign. With Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976 and Deng's purge in April, the factional balance tipped at least superficially toward the militant ideologists of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's health was rapidly deteriorating, and key elements in the power balance (especially the military and the public security forces) marked time, awaiting the Chairman's death.

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During this interlude, when nativistic winds again blew strong in Beijing, the American connection suffered. Chinese officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and elsewhere who were widely perceived as pro-American took cover.

Mao's conversations with Nixon and Kissinger had left an ambiguous legacy with respect to Taiwan. On occasion, Mao spoke of Chinese patience; yet he also accused the United States of harboring imperialist designs and indicated that the issue probably would ultimately be settled by force. Zhou had sought to underscore the "soft" side of Mao's dualistic view, but in the summer of 1976, without attributing the source, for the first time Chinese began to quote the hard side of the polarity to such visiting Americans as Senator Hugh Scott. Not surprisingly, such militant Politburo members as Zhang Chunqiao and Ji Dengkui took the lead in subjecting Americans to the harsher edge of China policy.[6] At the same time, presidential campaign rhetoric exposed the Chinese anew to the American concern over Taiwan, as both candidates reaffirmed their commitment to the island's future.[7]

In the fall of 1976, leadership changes in both countries tested the narrow bureaucratic base of the relationship. Mao died in September, and the arrest of his militant supporters in October led to the removal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The subsequent months witnessed considerable uncertainty in the leadership, centering on the timing and conditions of Deng Xiaoping's resumption of high office. On the U.S. side, President Ford's November defeat removed the team that had built the relationship. A new group had to familiarize itself with a record of conversations that had been tightly held.

VI

Yet the relationship survived the succession in both capitals.[8] During this transition, the Soviet Union made a bid to improve Sino-Soviet relations. Other than reaffirming its commitment to the Shanghai Communiqué, the Carter Administration did little to counter Moscow's initiative, placing China low on its list of priorities in its first months. Nonetheless, perhaps spurred by the return of Deng Xiaoping in the summer, by mid-1977 the Chinese had rebuffed the Soviet initiative and reaffirmed their tilt toward the West.

The Carter Administration's China policy, but not its strategic rationale, finally began to take shape in June, though the objectives were not fully pursued until the following May. The State Department had prepared the first extensive interagency memorandum on China for the President—Policy Review Memorandum (PRM) 24, Part I—in May 1977, and after preliminary discussion it went to President Carter for his consideration. It recommended that normalization be pursued within the framework established in the conversations of the previous seven years. It therefore recommended that the United States establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., and terminate formal governmental relations with the authorities on Taiwan. Without diplomatic relations with Taipei, the defense treaty and the U.S. military presence would be terminated.

[7] For example, the Republican platform stated, "The United States should do nothing to compromise the freedom and independence of Taiwan," while candidate Carter said he would not go back on the commitment to protect Taiwan against a military takeover. See *The New York Times*, October 17, 1976, p. 28.

[8] The sections on the Carter Administration draw on personal recollections as a National Security Council staff member and on subsequent conversations with several other participants.

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The memorandum argued that our cultural and economic relations with China would stagnate or erode until full diplomatic relations were established: the Chinese no longer would trust U.S. pledges to normalize at a later date. In addition, State noted, the United States risked improvements in Sino-Soviet relations unless we moved forward. Finally, it was argued, improving relations with China would facilitate improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations, as had occurred in 1971–73. Secretary Cyrus Vance's position was strongly supported by Vice President Walter Mondale, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and the President's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Even before he came into office, Carter was determined to recognize the P.R.C. as the government of China, providing he felt confident Taiwan's prospects for a peaceful, prosperous future would not thereby be endangered. The assurances Carter decided in June 1977 to seek from Beijing were, first, that normalization would not prevent the United States from selling arms to Taiwan; second, that the American people could continue, unimpaired, unofficial cultural, economic, and other relations with the people of Taiwan; and third, that at the time of normalization the United States could make a unilateral, uncontested statement concerning its expectation that the Taiwan issue would be settled peacefully. This package was derived from the negotiating record which the Carter Administration inherited from the previous two Administrations.

In a July 30 meeting, when giving Vance instructions for his August China trip, the President said, "Cy, lay it all out on the line. I've never gained from procrastinating. Describe our full position." Carter said that if the Chinese were prepared to accept his package, he was ready to normalize, but if they were unwilling, then so be it. He would go no further. In fact, so serious was the Vance mission that the Secretary carried with him a draft recognition communiqué which he was authorized to table and begin negotiating, should the Chinese react favorably to his presentation.

Between the July 30 meeting and Vance's late August trip, however, a major political development intruded on the landscape: the growing recognition of the battle looming ahead to secure Senate approval of the Panama Canal Treaties. The President's earlier willingness to absorb the recognition issue was tempered by his desire not to jeopardize a single possible vote on the Treaties. As a result, Vance built some room for maneuver into his earlier, leaner presentation. Specifically, he indicated a preference, in the post-normalization period, for the United States to assign some governmental employees to the non-official entity which would represent the American people in Taiwan.

The Chinese fastened upon this portion of Vance's presentation, claiming it was a retrogression from Ford's earlier statements on this issue. Beijing also took exception to American descriptions of the Chinese stance on the Taiwan issue as "flexible"—unauthorized descriptions given to the press in Washington as the Secretary departed from China. Deng Xiaoping had too recently returned to office, his power still to be consolidated, to afford the label "flexible." He could not tolerate any misunderstanding over the Chinese principle that the United States had to sever official ties with Taipei unambiguously.

At the time, public speculation about the Vance mission attributed the lack of progress to his Taiwan presentation and to the ill-founded characterization of the Chinese position. In fact, even before hearing the Secretary's presenta-

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tion on Taiwan and on the prospects for normalization, the Chinese evidenced a confrontational rather than an accommodating stance. It was a posture not calculated to elicit the minimum American position from Vance. In retrospect, it seems likely that the Chinese leaders in August 1977 were no more prepared to absorb the normalization issue than the Carter Administration. Only one year from Mao's death, with Deng just returned and in an uneasy relationship with the novice Hua Guofeng, the leaders in Beijing were in no position politically to make the difficult decisions which normalization negotiations would certainly entail.

The Carter Administration had done little to that point to generate Chinese respect for the firmness of its overall foreign policy. Normalization to Beijing would signify a further Chinese tilt toward the United States, and the Chinese were seeking the sense of strategic orientation which the Nixon Administration had earlier provided. To August 1977, the signs were more in the other direction—of an Administration oblivious to the Soviet global design. Nor did the Administration's first moves in Asia reassure Beijing of Washington's commitment to maintain the regional balance of power: announcing its intent to withdraw U.S. forces from Korea, sending Leonard Woodcock to Hanoi to seek information on the men still missing in action (MIAs) and to initiate diplomatic contact with our erstwhile enemy, and indicating displeasure with the human rights violations of key friends in the area. In this context, during the Vance visit, Beijing adopted a classic Chinese negotiating posture, indirectly discouraging an interlocutor from initiating a negotiation the Chinese did not then want. Afterward, and again in classic fashion, they blamed the interlocutor for creating obstacles, in order to place pressure on him to offer more when the negotiations began.

Lest Washington lose interest, however, in the months following the Vance visit Beijing began to emit numerous signals that it desired forward movement in its relations with Washington. The rhetoric on Taiwan began to draw on the softer side of Mao's formulations, with renewed expressions of patience and hope for a peaceful resolution of the issue. (As late as June 1977, the Chinese had reflected the tougher of Mao's pronouncements.) Following a lapse of two years, Beijing resumed purchase of U.S. wheat. The Ministry of Petroleum accepted an invitation by Energy Secretary James Schlesinger to send a government delegation to the United States, the first time the Chinese did not insist on the fig leaf of all delegations being labelled "unofficial." Senators Jackson, Kennedy, and Cranston were separately accorded extraordinarily warm welcomes; the talk emphasized the hope for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Finally, through two channels, the Chinese invited Zbigniew Brzezinski to visit China. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had decided that it would play upon the institutional rivalry between the National Security Council staff and State, about which Kissinger had educated them, to prod American China policy forward. The Chinese turned to the official whose world views more closely corresponded to their own.

VII

The Chinese were knocking on an opening door. Brzezinski believed that the Carter Administration foreign policy had not been a roaring success during its first year. The United States had swiftly retreated from its initial proposals for deep cuts in nuclear weapons at the SALT talks. It had not focused on the Soviet dimension of turmoil in Africa. It had sought to

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introduce the Soviet Union into the Mideast equation. It had neglected China. Brzezinski believed that this softness would encourage further Soviet adventures and would make Senate approval of a SALT agreement more difficult.

Thus, even as the Chinese were fastening upon him as a likely advocate of strengthened Sino-American ties, Brzezinski began to push for initiatives toward China. He argued for the merit in his traveling to China to help restore momentum to the relationship. The fight for Senate approval of the Panama Canal Treaties precluded immediate, high-visibility forward movement toward China, but as passage came in sight in mid-March, Carter authorized planning for the Brzezinski trip to proceed. One day after the Administration won the vote on the first treaty, the Chinese were informed of Brzezinski's desire to accept the invitation they had extended in the winter, and the precise date for his visit was set on the day following the vote on the second treaty.

From early 1978, the Administration began to devote more attention to China. With the President's strong support, even before his May visit, Brzezinski had begun to hold regular conversations with Ambassador Han Xu, the acting chief of the Liaison Office, the purpose of which was to instill greater confidence in Carter Administration strategic thinking and to rekindle the consultative dialogue Kissinger enjoyed until late 1975. Also, in January 1978, steps were taken to relax export controls to China and to communicate to our European allies that Washington considered that their possible arms sales to China would primarily be a matter for them to decide. During Prime Minister Fukuda's visit, President Carter spoke favorably of the Sino-Japanese Friendship Treaty then under negotiation.

Further, with firm Presidential backing, Science Advisor Frank Press began planning for a broad-based government exchange program in science and technology. Press, who had headed the private Committee on Scholarly Exchanges with the People's Republic of China, believed our national interest would be well served by a broad-based official exchange program with the Chinese. An interagency task force under Press' direction set to work by early 1978, unknown to the Chinese. Here was a component of the Carter approach that differed substantially from the previous two Administrations. To Kissinger, science and cultural exchanges were clearly secondary concerns, relegated to the agenda of subordinates; to Carter and his associates, scientific exchanges with China could be used as an important instrument of policy.

Leonard Woodcock also provided important impetus through his fall and early winter trips to Washington. Earlier, in October, Woodcock had insisted on eliciting instructions from State to indicate to the Chinese that the issue of American post-normalization representation on Taiwan would not prove to be a stumbling block. Then, on February 7, the President met with Ambassador Woodcock and gave his full backing to Woodcock's determination to achieve normalization on the terms outlined the previous June. Upon his return to Beijing, Woodcock discreetly and indirectly began to test the waters to ascertain whether the Chinese would accept the package the President had in mind. He also began to lobby for this agreement by floating and defending it to the long list of American congressmen, businessmen, and journalists who came to the Liaison Office.

Adding significant momentum within the Administration was a State paper on China policy assessing the strategy for normalization. Drafted at the initiative of Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs

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Richard Holbrooke, the paper argued that a window for normalization would probably exist after the fall 1978 congressional elections. That window would remain open into 1979, but then would be limited by two factors: 1) an anticipated Senate fight over approval of a SALT treaty; and 2) eventually, politics over the Presidential election. The paper strongly recommended that the window be used.

A key question which the State paper and subsequent meetings addressed was the relationship between the timing of normalization, on the one hand, and SALT II and relations with the Soviets more generally. A consensus existed among the President's advisors—Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski—that ideally normalization should precede efforts to seek Senate approval of SALT II. Prior to Brzezinski's visit, no decision had been made as to whether normalization or signing of SALT II should come first. In April, both goals remained sufficiently beyond reach to make questions of precise sequence seem premature. The President decided the time was coming to bite the bullet: in June the United States would enter formal negotiations for normalization. Brzezinski carried this message to China in May.

President Carter based his decision on the expectation that Soviet-American relations would be improving by late fall. With a SALT agreement in hand, American interests would best be served, the President judged, by seeking to improve relations with both Moscow and Beijing simultaneously. Indeed, this position in the triangle would provide incentives for both the Chinese and the Soviets to continue their forward movement with the United States. The goal at this point was not to be drawn inadvertently into the Sino-Soviet dispute on one side or the other, although a rebuff by one side to American overtures would not deter the effort to improve relations with the other.

Developments in Beijing matched those in Washington. In February, the National People's Congress placed economic development at the top of China's agenda. This significantly enhanced the attractiveness of a closer relationship with the United States for the technology and capital it could offer. By May, Deng Xiaoping had gained considerable initiative within the Politburo, though not until the end of the year did he achieve a totally dominant position. At least as important, in terms of developments since the Vance visit, was the breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The vehemence with which the Chinese denounced Vietnamese perfidy was the most unexpected aspect of Brzezinski's discussions. Deng's consolidated position and China's increasing security concerns on its southern flank were probably two additional factors prompting a positive response to Brzezinski's proposals to enhance the strategic dialogue, to initiate normalization negotiations, and to broaden scientific and economic exchanges before normalization. The high level interagency science delegation led by Frank Press was one such step, and the Chinese ensured that Press visited Beijing in July, before an already-scheduled mission to Moscow he was to lead in August.

VIII

Upon Brzezinski's return, in a June 20 meeting President Carter instructed his advisors to aim for a December 15 normalization date, but not to inform the Chinese of the timing we had in mind. Ambassador Woodcock's negotiations were guided by that rough target.

The Administration's negotiating strategy called for Woodcock to present

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the American position slowly, one issue at a time. The most sensitive points—continued arms sales to Taiwan and the unilateral American statement—were deferred, while issues unlikely to prove stumbling blocks, such as the U.S. determination to retain economic, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan and the nature of the unofficial, nongovernmental representation on Taiwan, were addressed first. The idea was to unfold the American position at a deliberate speed, and to prolong the negotiations if it became clear the Chinese would not meet the minimum terms. The common hope that the difficulties could eventually be surmounted had bound the United States and China since 1971. A Chinese "no" to the minimum American offer would have done untold and irreparable damage to the relationship. The stage was therefore set to ensure that the answer would be a predictable "yes."

Woodcock's presentations to the Foreign Minister from July to December were but one of three channels between Beijing and Washington. Brzezinski continued his regular meetings with Han Xu and then the new chief of the Liaison Office, Ambassador Chai Zemin. His purpose was not to comment on Woodcock's presentations but to discuss the world situation—SALT talks, the eroding position of the Shah, Soviet expansionism in Africa, the Israeli-Egyptian peace process—so that the Chinese could understand the global strategic context in which the Carter Administration placed normalization. Finally, Richard Holbrooke fostered a third channel through which the Chinese protested to him U.S. arms sales to Taiwan which were being reported in the American press. This gave the Chinese the opportunity to limit their protests to this channel and keep their immediate concerns from intruding on the Woodcock or Brzezinski channels, thus signaling their desire to keep the two other dialogues moving forward.

The discussions proceeded as the top leaders on both sides kept their eyes on three related developments: their relations with Vietnam, the SALT talks with the Soviet Union, and their domestic standing.

Through the summer and early fall of 1978, Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to deteriorate, Vietnam moved increasingly toward the Soviet Union, and by September a major Vietnamese-Cambodian armed conflict was becoming increasingly likely. Not only did this situation encourage the Chinese to improve relations with Washington, but it also prompted the Vietnamese to seek normalization with the United States. In a September meeting with Holbrooke, the Vietnamese formally dropped their demand for reparation payments as a condition for normalization. The Vietnamese were cautioned that armed conflict in the region or a closer relationship with the Soviet Union would make normalization difficult. Although the Vietnamese understood that normalization could not take place before the congressional elections in November, in October U.S.-Vietnam negotiations began on issues surrounding normalization: settlement of frozen assets, planning for embassies, and so on.

Within the U.S. government, the issue arose briefly and prematurely as to how to relate the negotiations with the Vietnamese and the Chinese. On October 11, the President told Leonard Woodcock that he would not wish to complicate the China negotiations with an early normalization with Vietnam. Neither the Vietnamese nor the Chinese were informed of this decision. In any event, for a number of reasons the issue soon became moot. One day before the congressional elections the Vietnamese signed their treaty of alliance with the Soviet Union in recognition that only Moscow would provide it with the military and political support for its planned invasion of Cambodia. By

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early November, those plans were becoming increasingly manifest. Further, Hanoi's forced expulsion of countless Vietnamese by sea had increasingly eroded the remaining American political support for normalization. These considerations combined to make recognition of Vietnam impossible.

The looming Vietnamese-Cambodian conflict and the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty led the Chinese to begin cultivating the option of military action against Vietnam. This contingency added to the attraction of completing the normalization processes with the United States. It also may have strengthened Deng's hand against potential critics of the compromises necessary to reach an agreement.

Adding to Chinese incentives, on the Soviet-American front the SALT talks were progressing well. By late November, it seemed that an agreement was close at hand. The possibility of a Brezhnev-Carter summit in January or February 1979 was beginning to be rumored in the press. Brzezinski kept the Chinese informed of these developments, as well as about the débacle in Iran and the Camp David Accords. The Chinese understood that if they were to advance the Sino-American relationship significantly before and not in the wake of an upturn in Soviet-American relations, they had to act with dispatch.

The domestic political forces in Washington and Beijing and the strategic setting were converging to facilitate normalization. The President felt particularly ready to absorb the normalization issue in the wake of his successes at Camp David. He had returned from the Presidential retreat to give the normalization negotiations a decisive shove forward in his talks with Ambassador Chai Zemin on September 19, and spelled out American insistence on continuing carefully selected arms sales to Taiwan that would not be threatening to China—a formula repeated on several occasions. The President then communicated to the Chinese through Woodcock on November 2 that he was thinking of a January 1 date for normalization. He had begun to think of three spectacular successes to announce to the American people before Christmas: completion of the Camp David Accords, normalization, and SALT II.

His Chinese counterpart was enjoying a similar surge. Deng Xiaoping had nailed down the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan. Domestically, the political base of leaders associated with the Cultural Revolution continued to erode. Deng openly signaled Chinese readiness for normalization, on one occasion noting a desire to visit the United States and in another interview observing that if the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan took but one second to settle, normalization would require but two seconds. When the Chinese indirectly indicated to Woodcock on December 4 that they too were thinking in terms of a possible January 1 normalization date and that Deng Xiaoping was prepared to enter the negotiations, it was clear the denouement was close at hand. They seemed prepared to absorb the arms sales issue and negotiate on a recognition communiqué.

Woodcock was informed Deng would see him on December 13. For the first time, Brzezinski discussed with Ambassador Chai the negotiations in Beijing. To make the planned session more productive, on December 11 the National Security Advisor briefly foreshadowed the American presentation, alerting the Chinese that Woodcock would be inviting either Hua Guofeng or Deng Xiaoping to visit the United States in January and tabling a revised joint communiqué. (Woodcock had submitted a first draft in early November, and the Chinese had tabled a second draft on December 4.) Thus clued, and speaking on behalf of the Politburo, on the 13th Deng accepted the invitation and negotiated on the draft communiqué. In the light of the American

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determination to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with its terms, leaving the treaty in effect throughout 1979, Deng requested that the United States sell no arms during that year.

Woodcock's cable reporting the conversation led Carter to the unmistakable conclusion that only one meeting would be necessary to iron out the final details. Already sobered by the leaks the Administration had suffered on Iran, the President decided that an agreement of this enormity could not long be kept secret. Should the story leak out in bits and pieces, the President would lose the initiative in presenting the case for normalization to the public. He therefore decided to wrap up the negotiation swiftly, and to make the announcement two days hence, on December 15. Woodcock saw Deng twice on the 14th, once to alert him to Carter's preference for an announcement on the 15th and then to go over the communiqué. Woodcock conveyed Carter's willingness to forego new obligations for arms sales in 1979, though this pledge did not extend to replacement parts or sales already in the pipeline.

Some concern was felt in Washington that the Chinese might have misinterpreted the one-year moratorium on Taiwan arms sales as indicating a willingness to forego sales beyond that. Woodcock therefore was instructed to seek an additional meeting with the Chinese, to ensure the American position was clear. The President's formulation of September 19 was repeated. The Chinese responded in equally firm fashion that arms sales to Taiwan infringed on Chinese sovereignty and could not be accepted. Hence, the negotiating record is clear. No agreement was reached on this most difficult issue. In agreeing to normalize relations, the two sides deferred their differences on continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese reserved the right to raise the issue again, and American officials expressed the belief that the post-normalization era would gradually offer a better environment for discussing the issue.

The United States at no point placed a time limit on these sales or pledged to curtail them over time. Nonetheless, implicit in the American position was that the quantity and quality of sales would be linked to Beijing's posture on the Taiwan issue. The Shanghai Communiqué had linked the size of the American military presence on Taiwan to the level of tension in the region; this had led to a drawdown of U.S. forces to roughly 2,500 at the time of normalization. Though this point was never made in any discussions with the Chinese, a logical extension of this principle would suggest that arms sales would diminish as tension continued to diminish. Further, before normalization, both the Ford and Carter Administrations had decided to continue sales of the F-5E fighter aircraft rather than to meet Taiwan's request for the more powerful F-4.

Here, since the Carter Administration had laid great stress on its expectations that Beijing would seek a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue, Beijing may have concluded that their response to our expectations would elicit U.S. restraint in the area of their greatest concern. Thus, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remained a potential irritant in Sino-American relations. Given the gap in their positions and the thinness of their bilateral ties, had the two sides sought an explicit agreement or understanding in December 1978, normalization probably would not have been achieved.

IX

Recognition and Deng's triumphant visit in January 1979 broke the dam which had restrained the natural development of Sino-American relations for

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30 years. The next frenzied two years saw 35 treaties, agreements, and protocols signed between American and Chinese governmental agencies. Trade, tourism and scholarly exchanges grew rapidly. The process of rediscovery inevitably produced a public euphoria, and excessive expectations grew on both sides, generated more by sentiment than hard-headed analysis of future possibilities in the economic, cultural and scholarly realms.

To the attentive observer, however, several developments in 1979 struck a note of caution. The Taiwan Relations Act of February 1979 sobered the Chinese in its strong reaffirmation of the American interest in Taiwan. The Administration proved unable to temper a Congress that was highly indignant over what many on the Hill considered inadequate consultations on normalization. The Chinese had been forewarned that Congress would have to pass a law mandating an unofficial American relationship with Taiwan, but the final language on arms sales was more explicit than Carter's formulation in the normalization negotiations and highlighted the profound differences between the two sides on this issue: "The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." Carter's assurance that the Act would and could be implemented in a manner consistent with the normalization agreement only partially met Chinese concerns. Perhaps this President could be trusted, but how about his successors?

A lawsuit by Senator Barry Goldwater, with other Senators, then challenged the right of the President to terminate the defense treaty without consultation with Congress. Assured by the Administration of the constitutionality of its action, nonetheless the Chinese began to see that yet a third branch of government, also not subservient to the President, had to pass on the legality of his actions.

Finally, in the summer of 1979 the Administration became embroiled in a debate over extension of most favored nation (MFN) treatment to China. Should it precede or accompany MFN for the Soviet Union? If the latter, when should the Administration move, before or after SALT? Some Soviet specialists at State sought to delay submission to Congress of the trade agreement signed with China in early July until relations with the Soviet Union were on a steady course. They argued that the United States was being inadvertently drawn into the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Chinese side; further, they alleged, the increasing American tilt toward China was one of the major factors prompting Soviet opportunism. Particularly after the Soviets rebuffed overtures to obtain assurances on their immigration policy to meet the requirements of American law, the opposing side argued that to withhold MFN from China would simply punish the Chinese for Soviet intransigence. Nearly forgotten in the debate was an American commitment to seek expeditious approval of the trade agreement and extension of MFN in exchange for Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal's March 1979 settlement of the claims-asset issue on terms advantageous to the United States. In any case, the President supported MFN for China and went further. He supported Vice President Mondale's recommendation that the United States clearly differentiate between China and the Soviet Union on a whole range of bilateral issues: export controls, eligibility for Export-Import Bank financing, MFN, and so on. Mondale informed the Chinese of this basic decision during his August 1979 trip.

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The Chinese responded in kind, and throughout 1979 their opening to the West accelerated. So rapid had the progress been that the pathbreaking Mondale visit essentially completed the agenda which the two sides had set in January 1979 and which both sides estimated would perhaps take 18 months to complete. What remained to negotiate were aviation, maritime, textile, and consular agreements, and these complex negotiations were shepherded to completion in August 1980.

Without doubt, Soviet behavior over the previous year accelerated the Sino-American alignment: Brezhnev's heavy-handed attempts to warn Carter and our European partners against forward movement; opportunistic Soviet behavior in Latin America, Vietnam, the Middle East, and Africa; and the continued Soviet military buildup along the Chinese border, including the adding of strength in Mongolia. This general strategic environment and the continued political strength of Carter and Deng through the first half of 1979 provided the foundation for the surge in bilateral relations and shoved differences on Taiwan far into the background.

x

By the summer of 1979, relations had extended to all areas but military affairs. Ground began to be broken in that realm during Mondale's August visit, when the two sides agreed to a visit by Secretary of Defense Brown in the near future. The American sale of dual-purpose technology and the possible European sale of arms had already been contentious within the Administration, but planning for Brown's visit brought the debate into sharper focus. Brzezinski and Brown wished to cultivate the Sino-American relationship to become a permanent part of Moscow's calculations creating a Soviet perception that any expansionist move risked enhancing Sino-American military cooperation. This might help to constrain Soviet actions, to both Washington's and Beijing's benefit.

The strategy represented considerable movement from the Department of State advocacy in 1977 and 1978 of seeking simultaneous improvements in relations with both Beijing and Moscow, a policy precluded by the deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Not surprisingly, therefore, deep concerns existed at the State Department that the Brown trip and its consequences might unnecessarily provoke the Soviet Union, already feeling encircled, into risky actions. President Carter strongly backed Brown's trip, but initially envisioned a carefully circumscribed mission. The symbolism of the visit itself and the scheduling of subsequent defense exchanges would be the assured highlights.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan expanded the scope of the early January visit—the date for the visit having been set before the invasion began on December 27, 1979. President Carter told Brown on the morning of his departure to inform the Chinese of the Administration's willingness to consider sales of nonlethal military equipment on a case-by-case basis. The President had in mind trucks, radar, and communications, command and control equipment. The Chinese did not respond immediately, but as 1980 wore on, the matter was explored in increasing detail. Minister of Defense Geng Biao joined a group led by Deputy Chief of Staff Liu Huaqing in May for further discussions with Harold Brown, and William Perry, the head of development and research in the Department of Defense, visited China in September. Through these visits, the two sides acquired a more accurate sense of the needs

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for, possibilities of, and limitations on the sale of equipment and technology. At this point, many observers had begun to speak of an emerging Sino-American (and Japanese) alignment or entente in the Pacific.

Unquestionably, the 1979–80 initiation of military contacts was traceable to the rapidly growing Soviet military might in those years and to Soviet intervention in southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Indochina and Afghanistan. The Iranian débacle and Washington's desire to maintain a sustained military presence in the Persian Gulf also had their impact. Portions of the U.S. Navy in the Gulf came from the Pacific Fleet, and the American ability to assign these ships to Mideast duty on a sustained basis depended on the stability of the Western Pacific. Were conflict to erupt in Korea, for example, while the Persian Gulf remained tense, the United States would be in a difficult position indeed. In analogous fashion, China could devote its military resources to the Soviet threat and its Indochina problem, confident that the United States no longer would use Taiwan to complicate its defense planning. From this perspective, by early 1980 and continuing to the present, the constructive Sino-American relationship and the stability it brings to Northeast Asia have become essential ingredients in the national security policies of both the United States and China.

At the same time, Harold Brown's visit pointed to differences in strategic outlook. For the first time, the American toasts exceeded the Chinese in their anti-Soviet tone.[9] The Chinese did not seem to be eager to cooperate in manifest ways with American efforts to assist Pakistan. Rather, the Chinese began to develop a theme which grew in importance through the coming two years, namely, that China's ambitious modernization program required a tranquil environment. The Chinese had concluded that heightened Soviet-American tensions were not necessarily in China's interest. They might inadvertently entangle China in a conflict it did not seek. In sum, the Soviet invasion of Afghnistan probably reminded the Chinese of the risks of becoming too closely identified with the United States.[10]

XI

From the summer of 1980 through the summer of 1982, the relationship experienced a troubled and tense period.[11] The difficulties in part began in the Carter Administration, with the initial authorization for American aircraft companies to discuss with Taiwan the sale of an advanced jet fighter, labelled the FX, and with the granting of diplomatic immunity to members of the unofficial Taiwan agency in Washington, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA). Even more serious was candidate Ronald Reagan's August 1980 statement that he wished to make relations with Taiwan official. Reagan refused to endorse the Shanghai Communiqué or the normalization agreement and instead made the Taiwan Relations Act the bedrock of his China policy. The Chinese also saw Reagan surrounded by advisors who were extremely close to Taiwan. They became convinced that Reagan at heart

[9] See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, (People's Republic of China), No. 80-004 (January 7, 1980), p. B-2, and No. 80-007 (January 10, 1980), p. B-2.

[10] See Gerald Segal, "China and Afghanistan," *Asian Survey*, November 1981, pp. 1158–74.

[11] For a more detailed account of the Reagan Administration's China policy through the fall of 1981, see A. Doak Barnett, *The FX Decision: Another Crucial Moment in U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981.

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supported a "two Chinas" position and that his real intent was permanently to detach Taiwan from the mainland. The desire for the unity of China remains so intense, so central to the entire world view and purpose of the Chinese revolution, that relations were bound to be unsettled at the outset of a Reagan presidency.

Matters were not helped by the invitation to Taiwan, subsequently modified under Chinese protest, to send representatives to the Reagan inaugural, by Reagan's continued reluctance personally to endorse the Shanghai Communiqué, or by the initiation of contact between the President's National Security Adviser, Richard Allen, and the head of the CCNAA. Looming in the background was the question of arms sales to Taiwan, with the sale of the FX fighter a lively possibility.

The Administration attempted to stabilize matters by announcing its March 1981 decision not to upgrade relations with Taiwan and through Secretary of State Alexander Haig's June visit to China. Haig informed the Chinese that the President was willing to consider the sale of weapons to China and was relaxing export controls on high technology items to China. The Haig visit also appeared to allay Chinese fears about American arms sales to Taiwan. A second visit to the United States by Deputy Chief of Staff Liu was discussed. Through the summer, Chinese officials indicated that while they expected U.S. arms sales to taper off, possibly in a short period of time, and that sale of the FX would lead to serious retrogression, they would oppose but were prepared to withstand prudent arms sales.

Yet the March 1981 renewed commitment to the Shanghai Communique and normalization agreement and the Haig visit did not have an enduring effect. As one indication, the Liu visit did not occur. The Chinese continued to receive mixed signals over Reagan's China policy. In Chinese eyes, Haig had become the defender of the policy, and speculation about White House-State Department tensions and Haig's ebbing political fortunes generated continued anxiety.

Further, within China, Deng Xiaoping's own political strength appears to have been tested. The retrenchment initiated in late 1980 called into question Deng's management of the economy during the previous two years, and the tightening of controls in the cultural realm in mid-1981 reversed some liberalizing trends with which Deng had been identified. The assessment of Mao's role in Chinese history issued by the Chinese Communist Party in July was the product of protracted, contentious debate. Under domestic pressure, with his primary energy focused on arranging an orderly succession, Deng probably found it difficult to continue his close, supportive involvement in Sino-American affairs. Thus, it seems likely that throughout 1981, and into 1982, Deng was less able and willing to spend his limited political capital on protecting an American relationship that was not being meticulously managed on the Washington side.

Believing that they had not been assertive enough and that time was not necessarily in their favor, on September 30, 1981 the Chinese issued a nine-point proposal for the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.[12] Although the specific points had been stated previously, the reiteration underscored Beijing's preference for a peaceful settlement. The People's Republic also launched a

[12] The proposal is in *The New York Times*, October 1, 1981, p. 6. See also *The New York Times*, October 4, 1981, p. 6 and October 10, 1981, p. 3.

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major effort to engage Taiwan in talks. One secondary purpose of the proposal probably was to affect the American debate on arms sales to Taiwan, a subject which was addressed without satisfaction to either side during President Reagan's October meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang and during Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to Washington in the same month.

The Chinese sought assurances that the arms sales to Taiwan would terminate within a fixed period of time. Politically, legally, and many would argue on foreign policy grounds as well, the United States could not agree to this. The Taiwan issue, which had been so delicately set aside at the time of normalization, was again at front and center.

Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs John Holdridge journeyed to Beijing in January 1982 to inform the Chinese of the President's decision not to sell the FX fighter to Taiwan but instead to continue to help Taiwan coproduce the F-5E beyond the 1983 termination date. Bearing a message from President Reagan, Holdridge also initiated the search for mutually acceptable principles to govern arms sales. The Administration posponed notifying Congress about the F-5E, in hopes an agreement could first be reached with the Chinese.

Discussions continued through the spring and summer in Beijing, punctuated by letters on April 5 from Reagan to Premier Zhao and to Vice Chairman Deng, a May visit by Vice President George Bush bearing a Reagan letter to Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, and a visit by Senator Howard Baker. The future course of Sino-American relations literally hung in the balance during this time.

During this uncertain time, the Soviet Union made a bid to improve Sino-Soviet relations. While the Chinese did not respond in any dramatic fashion, Beijing persisted in efforts evident since Mao's death to make their essentially adversarial relationship with Moscow more stable. Except during the early 1979 Indochina conflicts and the early 1980 Afghanistan crisis, the trend since 1976 has been toward a less rancorous, less volatile Sino-Soviet relationship. The ideological polemics are gone. The border confrontation is less tense. Some low-level visits have begun. However, the military buildup persists on both sides.

Instead of responding to Soviet overtures (which may have been intended more for American consumption in any case) by moving significantly toward Moscow during a period of Sino-American tension, Beijing chose to highlight its own independence from both superpowers. Its rhetoric began to lump the Soviet Union and the United States together. The label "hegemonists" was no longer reserved for Moscow but was extended to include Washington as well. American policy in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East was condemned in harsh tones. In short, while distancing itself somewhat from the United States, the P.R.C. sought to strengthen its identity as a developing country, becoming more active in its espousal of various Third World causes.

These subtle changes in Chinese foreign policy in 1981–82 did not preclude an accord with the United States, and on August 17, 1982, the two governments issued an important communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan. The joint document built upon the Shanghai Communiqué and the normalization agreement, making explicit what was implicit in those documents. It incorporated wording from Reagan's three letters to the Chinese leaders and from Chinese statements concerning their policy toward Taiwan. By relating these previously separate statements, making each dependent on the other, they

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acquired more binding force. Among the communiqué's major points were these:

— The Chinese reiterated their fundamental policy of striving for a peaceful reunification of Taiwan.
— The United States disavowed any intent to infringe on Chinese sovereignty or territorial integrity or to pursue a "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy.
— The United States indicated its understanding and appreciation of the Chinese policy to strive for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.
— Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States indicated it did not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales would not exceed in quality or quantity the levels supplied since 1978, and that it intended to reduce gradually its sales.
— The two governments pledged every effort to create conditions conducive to a thorough settlement of the arms sales issue.

This carefully crafted document does not resolve the arms sales issue. But it commits both sides to resume the expansion of their economic, cultural, scientific and other ties. Thus, the arms sales issue will be handled in a context of increasingly thick connections between the two nations, where each side has ample incentive to continue to acknowledge the interests of the other.

What combination of factors produced the August agreement? Domestic considerations had their impact. Reagan's political need to notify Congress of the F-5E arrangements established a deadline for the negotiations, while the state of Soviet-American relations provide a major incentive to the Administration not to permit a major deterioration in its China connection. Politically, the President was under intense pressure to resume major arms sales to Taiwan, but Reagan would have been politically vulnerable if China relations worsened through his mismanagement. The Administration was prepared to settle the matter at an early date.

On the Chinese side, preparations for the 12th Party Congress had prior claim on the leadership's attention. In the spring, Deng and his allies appear to have recovered the initiative lost late in 1981 in making key personnel assignments, in reorganizing the government bureaucracy, and in directing the economy. By August 1982, planning for the Party Congress was sufficiently advanced that Deng could afford to take on the tough arms sales issue. More than that, the reaching of an accord presumably strengthened the leadership on the eve of a vital meeting which would chart China's succession and future economic development strategy. Comparable to the situation in late 1978, strengthening of the American tie was domestically useful.

XII

Three questions were posed at the outset of this article. What explains the ebb and flow in Sino-American relations since 1972? What facilitates forward movement? What are the constraints? Our examination reveals a subtle interplay of the global strategic context, the domestic political setting in each capital, and the handling of the Taiwan issue. Each step has required compromise and accommodation to the political needs of the other side, which in turn require firm leadership and a capacity to take on hard issues.

Firm leadership alone cannot guarantee expansion of ties. The expansion must suit the strategic and economic interests of both sides. Driving the

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relationship until 1980–81 was the common perception of the dangers posed to both sides by the Soviet Union and of the need to improve relations as one measure to meet the threat. In the more recent period, the Chinese perceive a Soviet Union that is less immediately threatening to it, bogged down in Afghanistan and Poland, with major commitments in Indochina, Cuba and Africa. Nonetheless, the American connection remains useful, not only as a long-run counterbalance to the Soviet Union but as a source of capital and technology to hasten China's economic development. To the United States, the China connection and the stability it has brought to Northeast Asia permit a concentration of resources where the Soviet threat is more immediate. Moreover, the August 17 Communiqué accepts the premise that the well-being of the people of Taiwan is best obtained not through exclusive reliance on arms but through constructive and binding Sino-American ties.

Nonetheless, the two sides do have conflicts of interest, particularly over Taiwan. Unless the domestic political situation and the strategic setting permit an easing of the problem, the Taiwan issue always threatens to become a severe irritant to Sino-American relations. Any American President or presidential aspirant must deal with a significant segment of the political landscape which believes the United States has deep obligations to the people (and some would add government) on Taiwan. Any Chinese leader faces an even stronger body of opinion that the eventual recovery of Taiwan must be a major goal. Once the issue heats up, consummate skill is required to reach a new accommodation, as the two sides exhibited in the summer of 1982.

The ten-year record reveals a paradox. On the one hand, the relationship exhibits continued fragility, easily susceptible to erosion through mishandling of the Taiwan issue. On the other hand, when the two sides confront the possibility of a breakdown, they are driven to accommodation, for constructive Sino-American relations have become essential ingredients to the national security of both sides.

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Lawrence Freedman

THE WAR OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 1982

The War of the Falkland Islands began with a successful invasion by Argentine forces on April 2, 1982, and ended with their surrender to British forces ten weeks later. It was a textbook example of a limited war—limited in time, in location, in objectives and in means. Care was taken when it came to the treatment of civilians and prisoners and only in the later stages did noncombatants get caught in the fighting. The military casualties were severe—800 to 1,000 Argentine and 250 British dead—but still only a small proportion of the forces committed.

In the character of the military operations, the clarity of the issues at stake and the unambiguous outcome, it was a curiously old-fashioned war. We have become used to wars of political complexity and strategic confusion. Such modern dramas were underway in the Middle East and Central America in 1982, compared with which the Falklands War came and went like something from the Victorian stage: a simple plot, a small but well-defined cast of characters, a story in three acts with a clear beginning, middle and end, and a straightforward conclusion that everybody could understand.

The limited and old-fashioned nature of the war should caution against trying to draw too much of wider significance out of the experience. Nevertheless, in an age of rapid technological development without regular opportunities to assess the current state of the military art, the details of any war will be picked over by those anxious for guidance on how to prepare for future conflicts. Professional observers expected much from this conflict: two belligerents capable of using advanced military technology properly and, there was reason to believe, the first major sea battles since 1945.

The search is therefore already underway for the lessons of the war. This article is concerned with that search, largely with the objective of encouraging a move away from a narrow preoccupation with the performance of individual items of hardware. My argument is that if there are lessons to be learned, they lie in recognizing that factors neglected in formal presentations of a military balance are often decisive. Britain's victory was only partly based on superior equipment. It depended much more on the professionalism and tactical skill of its forces, and on political conditions, at home and abroad, which allowed the government to prosecute the war in a determined and consistent manner.

The following account of the war is in some ways premature. Evidence is still being collated on key operations. Official secrecy obscures details of decision-making in London and some perplexing mysteries of the campaign. No Argentine sources have been used, so readers should be warned that this is very much a British version of events, though I have tried to be detached.

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Lastly, there is no attempt to judge the rights and wrongs of the dispute or to analyze fully the diplomatic side of the conflict, except insofar as it was relevant to the military side.

II

If initially it was difficult to take the conflict seriously, this was because of the unprepossessing nature of the territory at its heart. Nations are expected to go to war over something more than a collection of islands in an inaccessible and inclement part of the South Atlantic.

The islands consist largely of hilly grasslands and shrubs, few trees and barely 60 miles of roads. In addition to over 100 islands in the main group there are also a number of dependencies including South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The population of 1,800 would be barely sufficient to warrant one representative at the lowest level of local government in Britain. The economy was once based on whales and is now based on sheep. There have been rumors of exploitable resources, including oil, in the surrounding waters but, along with the rest of the islands' economic potential, exploitation has been rendered difficult by the persistent dispute over their future between the islands' closest neighbor, Argentina, and their owner, Great Britain.

The dispute's history goes back to the late eighteenth century, when control of the islands passed between Britain and Spain. In 1771 Britain reoccupied West Falkland (having been thrown off by Spain the year before) and it is claimed that Spain then recognized British sovereignty. However, a few years later Spain was back, following a British withdrawal. When Spanish rule in Latin America came to an end, Spain abandoned the Falklands (in 1811). They were occupied by the Government of Buenos Aires for the United Provinces, the forerunner of Argentina, in 1820 and sovereignty was officially claimed in 1829. Britain, which had never renounced its own claim, protested and at the start of 1833 expelled Argentine forces. Since then Britain has maintained a presence. The dependencies have a separate history, with British sovereignty on more certain ground.

Argentina never forgave Britain for this reoccupation, which marred otherwise friendly relations between the two countries. It revived its claim in 1945. In 1965, after much Argentine lobbying, the United Nations urged the two countries to sort out the dispute, "bearing in mind . . . the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."

The question of the interests of the local population dogged the negotiations from the start. As with practically all of the residue of its Empire, Britain has found itself holding on to colonies against its better judgment because of the strong preference of the colonized for British rule as against the most likely alternatives. The islanders have always shown a marked antipathy to Argentina. The principle of self-determination could therefore be interpreted to rule out any transfer of sovereignty. Argentina, on the other hand, argued that the islanders were not necessarily the best judge of their own interests.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office view came to be that the logic of the situation favored Argentina. However, the stubbornness of the islanders, fortified by supporters in the House of Commons, made it impossible to concede the point of principle to Argentina. Yet Britain was not willing to devote resources to the islands because it could not share the population's hope of a long-term future under the British flag. The compromise was an

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attempt to show good faith in negotiations and push the islanders as gently as possible into cooperation with Argentina, for example by making them dependent on Argentina for communication with the outside world. No special provision was made for the islanders in the British Nationality Act of 1981, which limited citizenship rights in British dependencies; thus many suffered a loss of "Britishness."

By 1980 this compromise had gone about as far as it could go. In that year a junior Foreign Office Minister, Nicholas Ridley, became convinced that the Islands would decline into non-viability unless some settlement were reached with Argentina. The option he favored was to transfer sovereignty of the islands to Argentina but then lease them back. Unfortunately he was not supported in the relevant Cabinet committee. This has been one of those issues where backbench sentiment exceeds ministerial interest. Mr. Ridley was given no mandate to solve the issue by the lease-back method or to give anything away to Argentina. When he visited the islands all he could do was consult over alternative options and acknowledge the local preference for freezing the status quo. When he returned to Parliament the general feeling was that he had no business even suggesting that there were options other than the status quo. Thus when he went back to talk with Argentine representatives he had nothing to offer.

British policy had got dangerously out of kilter. There was a lack of political will in London either to solve the dispute once and for all in some deal with Buenos Aires or else to accept full responsibility for the long-term security and prosperity of the islands. This became evident in June 1981 when it was decided to scrap the ice-patrol ship HMS *Endurance*. This ship, although sparsely armed, constituted the sole regular British naval presence in the South Atlantic and had taken on a symbolic importance far beyond its military capabilities. The Royal Navy had never attached a high priority to its preservation, offering it as a sacrifice when cuts were sought. If the government found the Navy's suggestions for cuts politically unacceptable, then it was unreasonable to cut elsewhere. In 1981 the Ministry of Defence was determined to reduce naval capabilities even if this meant letting HMS *Endurance* go. The Foreign Office warned that this could well be misread in Buenos Aires. This left a garrison of some 70 Royal Marines to deter Argentina from attempting to retake the Falkland Islands by force.

III

Britain now could offer neither compromise to Argentina nor a credible long-term commitment to the Falkland Islands. The only negotiating position left was prevarication. Talks with Argentina in February 1982 produced some agreement on negotiating procedures. British participants appear to have been misled by the accommodating behavior of their Argentine counterparts into believing that matters had not quite reached a head. Unfortunately the feeling in Buenos Aires was quite different.

Prior to April 1982 most people in Britain could not have found the Falkland Islands on a map. Argentines learn from childhood about Las Malvinas. By 1982, patience had run out with Britain. The 150th anniversary in January 1983 of the British seizure of the islands appeared as a sort of deadline. The government of General Leopoldo Galtieri, which had come to power in December 1980, had the issue high on its agenda.

It has been suggested that General Galtieri saw the invasion essentially as

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a distraction to take his people's minds off political repression and economic calamity. The invasion certainly improved, albeit temporarily, the regime's popularity. But the timing was also determined by international conditions that looked as conducive to invasion as they were ever likely to be. Argentina's links with both superpowers were in good repair. In Washington, the Galtieri regime was judged to represent the acceptable face of military dictatorship. Cooperation was developing on the support of other right-wing regimes in Central America. The Soviet Union had reason to be grateful for supplies of grain at a time of American embargo. The hope was that Washington would not be too cross if Las Malvinas were retrieved, while the Soviet Union would veto any strong action in the U.N. Security Council. As for Britain, it had managed to convey the impression of intransigence in negotiations on the principle of sovereignty but no real interest in holding on to the islands.

All these assumptions turned out to be overoptimistic. The crucial mistake concerned Britain. It may be that the underestimation was not so much of British anger and readiness to take up the challenge as of its actual capacity to retake the islands by military means. The timing of the Argentine invasion indicates a lack of concern for minimizing Britain's ability to respond. Much of the British fleet was home for Easter, which facilitated the rapid assembly of a task force. Two months later and the British position would have been more stretched, with a group of warships including the carrier HMS *Invincible* in the Indian Ocean. Any force which reached the South Atlantic would only have done so at the height of winter and after a long delay. Furthermore, Argentina was only just starting to take delivery of new arms, including the Exocet-carrying Super-Etendards from France. Within a few months, its own forces would have been much better equipped.

This leads on to the question of whether the invasion was triggered by the pretext provided by the comic-opera saga of the Argentine scrap metal merchants who raised the Argentine flag on the dependency of South Georgia on March 19, or whether this itself was part of a plan. It may be that this incident did take place with the connivance of Admiral Jorge Anaya, the chief of the Argentine Navy, who seems to have masterminded the eventual invasion. Certainly the invasion option grew in attraction with first, the muted British response to the South Georgia incident, and then the splitting of the limited garrison of marines as some went off on HMS *Endurance* to South Georgia.

With its Navy at sea and only two days away from the islands, the temptation for the Argentine government to take the historic step at the end of March 1982 seemed irresistible. When the invading forces arrived on April 2, the British marines were in no position to resist and they soon surrendered. Resistance on South Georgia was no more successful, if a little more spirited, and Argentine forces took some casualties. Nowhere were there casualties among the British forces or the civilians, a fact which the Argentine government appeared to believe would make the invasion tolerable.

Without adequate forces in place, British defensive plans had depended on the dispatch of reinforcements by sea at the first sign of trouble. As it takes up to three weeks to cover the 8,000 miles from Britain, this required a generous warning time. Whenever the issue flared up Britain had to decide between taking strong military action while the crisis was still in its early stages, or alternatively, for the sake of quiet diplomacy, delaying preventive military measures until possibly too late. In 1977 the Labour Government responded

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to an invasion scare by sending some frigates and a nuclear submarine to the area, but the decision was rendered easier by the fact that the vessels were relatively close for quite unconnected reasons. It is still not clear whether Argentina was then either considering invasion or aware that the British were taking action to forestall one.

There would always have to be good reason to send forces specially to the South Atlantic. It would involve taking ships away for a long period from other duties and high expenditure on fuel. Even maintaining two ships in the squadron watching over the Gulf of Oman over the past two years has made a large dent in the Navy's fuel allocation. In March 1982 these considerations created a disposition not to react strongly to the incident on South Georgia. It was reinforced by a desire not to upset by provocation the good work that had gone into improving relations with Latin America, including Argentina, over the previous few years as well as a belief that the problem could be solved through diplomatic channels. Indicators of an intent to invade, such as speculation in the Argentine press, were not judged to be significant in themselves: such indicators had appeared too often before.

The misjudgment was in not recognizing the change in political conditions in Buenos Aires and that the crisis this time was serious. Ministers in Britain had their minds on other things: the Foreign Secretary's visit to Israel and another row over the European Communities' budget. Too late was it realized that sovereign British territory was about to be seized by a foreign power. There was time only for frantic but futile diplomatic activity.

IV

If Argentina had expected a muted and embarrassed British response it was mistaken. Nothing could turn the Falkland Islands themselves into some great strategic and economic asset, but the circumstances of their loss turned their recapture into a popular cause. Here was a clear act of aggression and a disregard of the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes. The victims were clearly British and the perpetrators fascistic and, fortunately, white and not too wretched. Moreover, there was a need to avenge what Lord Carrington described, in his resignation as Foreign Secretary, as a "national humiliation."

The option of a solely non-military response was not seriously considered though it was recognized from the start that any military operation was likely to be hazardous and without guarantee of success. A large naval task force was dispatched immediately, but it would take a number of weeks to reach the South Atlantic. There was more time than is normally available on these occasions to explore diplomatic solutions to the crisis. To encourage a peaceful withdrawal, Britain sought to maximize pressure on Argentina.

The pressure began at the United Nations where, helped by a Soviet abstention, Resolution 502 was passed calling for withdrawal of all forces prior to negotiation. The European Community's Council of Ministers agreed to economic sanctions, surprising themselves by their alacrity and unanimity. (Needless to say, this did not set a pattern for future decision-making on the matter.) Other friendly nations followed with their own sanctions. The United States, embarrassed at a quarrel between two allies, did not take sides but acted as mediator in the form of Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

In a slow-motion shuttle, Secretary Haig could not reconcile the two countries' positions. Britain hinted at flexibility in future negotiations and

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began to equivocate over the extent to which the islanders' wishes would be "paramount"; Argentina promised to respect and improve the islanders' current way of life. Neither side could concede anything on the fundamental principle of sovereignty. Britain demanded a return to the status quo ante; Argentina insisted on recognition of the new status quo.

The political and economic pressures faced by Buenos Aires were severe but resistible, given the domestic popularity of the government's positions. Nor was there reason initially to believe that the military pressures were irresistible. Time was on Argentina's side. If Britain failed to get quick results, then its military operation would become difficult to sustain and it would be forced to retreat. By then the immediate fuss would have passed over. The international community would soon come to terms with the new situation and economic sanctions would fall into disrepair.

The British assessment was not that different. There was little confidence in economic sanctions as a means of solving the dispute, though an arms embargo would be helpful if fighting began in earnest. The international support for Britain's stance was gratifying and probably important in terms of maintaining domestic support, but could not be decisive in solving the dispute. It was irritating to watch a display of American evenhandedness between aggressor and aggrieved. There was some feeling that this hid from Buenos Aires the extent of its isolation, without producing commensurate benefits in the process of mediation. If anything could impress the Argentine leaders, it was likely to be the military power to be faced if they failed to back down peacefully and gracefully.

On both military and diplomatic grounds, it was therefore pointless for Britain to send a token force. From the start the task force had to look capable in principle of retaking the islands. But even then it was not obviously and overwhelmingly superior to the force it would meet. As no outcome could be predicted from an analysis of the balance of the forces, battle would have to be joined before either side need feel obliged to make significant concessions. Furthermore, while it was in Argentina's interests to prevaricate, Britain could not really allow too long for a diplomacy unaccompanied by military action.

On April 30 the task force reached its destination, and a total exclusion zone was imposed around the Falkland Islands. On the same day Secretary Haig announced that after a month of effort his mediation had failed and that the United States was now coming down firmly on the side of Britain. U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar tried to pick up the diplomatic pieces in May, but without success. By then it was evident that the impasse could now only be broken by a clash of arms.

V

The quality of the British military response was a function of the numbers of men and matériel that could be transported 8,000 miles to the South Atlantic and then sustained in operational condition over an extended period. The extent to which this was achieved is one of the most remarkable logistical feats of modern times. The bulk of the task force was prepared for departure virtually over a weekend. Not only were warships fitted out and equipped but also civilian ships were transformed to take helicopters and to refuel at sea. The success of this operation was due to sheer hard work at the dockyards and other naval establishments, laws which facilitated the requisitioning and

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chartering of civilian ships, and detailed contingency plans drawn up for a European emergency which guided all this activity.

The task force did not quite exhaust Britain's naval resources. It did require the services of both of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers, HMS *Hermes* and HMS *Invincible*, both of its assault ships (recently reprieved from being scrapped) and practically all of the fleet auxiliaries. However, during the campaign the total number of destroyers and frigates sent to the South Atlantic was 23, under half those readily available at the time. Contrary to popular suspicions, only two of these ships were scheduled for disposal. The four nuclear-powered and one diesel-powered submarines on patrol in the South Atlantic were only a portion of Britain's submarine fleet. Fifty-one warships were involved in all, and the maximum number active at any one time was 26 (in the second half of May). The crucial factor was the number of civilian ships which were mobilized—some 54 in total. The most celebrated were the luxury liners, *Canberra* and *Queen Elizabeth 2*, which served as troopships, but others played critical roles from tankers to hospitals.

The second important factor in the logistical effort was Ascension Island, owned by Britain but normally used only by the United States. Some 3,500 miles from the Falkland Islands, it was too far back to be used as an operating base but it was invaluable as a staging post, with personnel and freight being taken there by air to continue their journey by sea.

The troops sent with the first wave of the task force were by and large made up of the highly trained specialist units—Royal Marine commandos, the Parachute batallions and the Special Air Services. They were joined later on by soldiers from Guards Divisions and the Nepalese Gurkha troops, who were less well suited to the particular demands of this campaign. In all the land forces totaled some 9,000 men (6,000 Army and 3,000 Marines).

The task force was most limited by the lack of air power it could carry. Deployed in the South Atlantic were 22 Sea Harriers, joined later by six more and by ten Royal Air Force Harrier GR3 combat support aircraft, and 140 sundry helicopters of which the majority were either Sea Kings or Wessex. There were none of the wide-ranging fighter aircraft which would have been found on earlier generations of aircraft carriers.

As part of the effort to compensate for this deficiency, great strides were made in the art of in-flight refueling. This was used to get Harrier GR3s to Ascension Island (and for four to fly directly on to a carrier), as well as four Vulcan bombers, Nimrod maritime surveillance aircraft, and Hercules transport aircraft. The 16 Victor tankers based at Wideawake Airport on Ascension Island were kept busy but their military impact was limited. As it took ten Victors to keep one Vulcan in the air for the raids on the islands, only one bomber could be used at a time. Nimrod air warning and control aircraft did not really get close to the combat zone. It was only through individual pilots being willing to fly excessive numbers of sorties and the maintenance crews attaining impressive levels of availability (of up to 90 per cent) that effective patrols could be maintained. With aircraft and helicopters of limited range and staying power, the capability that was missed the most was for early warning of enemy attack.

The Argentine forces awaiting Britain benefited from geography—home ports and air bases. Nevertheless, the Islands were some 400 miles from the mainland, which meant that Argentine aircraft had to operate at the limits of

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their range while an awkward supply line had to be set up to service the garrison defending the newly won territory.

Argentine forces when compared with those of Britain looked impressive enough, with many weapons of comparable quality and similar type—often, embarrassingly enough, bought from Britain. The Navy was smaller than that of the British task force and many elements of it were of World War II vintage. But other elements such as British destroyers, French frigates and German submarines, and much of the armament, were quite modern. In the air there was a clear advantage in numbers if not in quality with some 120 Mirages, Skyhawks, Super-Etendards and Canberras. The other advantage derived from being the defending force. By the end of April 12,000 troops—a mixture of regulars and conscripts—had been transferred to the islands and positions had been fortified.

VI

The commander of the task force was charged with bringing about the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands and reestablishing British administration there with the minimum loss of life. A prerequisite for most of the strategic alternatives was to blockade the defending forces. A maritime exclusion zone of 200 miles was declared on April 12, as soon as Buenos Aires could reasonably expect a nuclear submarine to have reached the area. This was turned into a total exclusion zone once the main task force arrived.

The only diversion was to retake the dependency of South Georgia. This was not part of the original plan, but the opportunity to demonstrate military prowess, probably without interference from the Argentine Navy or Air Force because of the distance from the mainland, was too tempting. In the event the operation was almost a disaster. An advance party was helicoptered onto a glacier on which it got stuck. Two helicopters crashed trying to rescue it but a third succeeded. Eventually, sufficient men were landed to provide keen observation of Argentine activity. On April 25, they observed a submarine reinforcing the garrison. The operation was immediately brought forward. The submarine *Santa Fe* was severely damaged by missiles and depth charges from helicopters and was forced to ditch on land. Marines landed and surprised the garrison, which surrendered without much resistance, providing the desired impression of effortless British victory.

Enforcing the exclusion zone proved more taxing. There was reasonable success on the naval side as a result of the first major engagement of the war and the one that involved the most casualties. On May 2, the cruiser *General Belgrano*, while accompanied by two destroyer escorts, was torpedoed by the submarine HMS *Conqueror*. The cruiser sank with the loss of 360 lives. The destroyers did not wait around to pick up survivors. They were looking either for the submarine or simply for cover. The large cruiser may have been picked on instead of the more capable destroyers as an easier target for the submarines' relatively unsophisticated Mark-8 torpedoes.

Politically the incident was damaging to Britain, as the victim was just outside the 200-mile exclusion zone. Although Britain had been very careful not to suggest that this was a combat-inclusive zone it had been widely understood as such. Such a dramatic transformation of the crisis led to accusations of unwarranted escalation. The counter was that the Argentine ships were well armed and heading toward elements of the task force on

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something other than a goodwill mission.

That being said, it is doubtful that the British commanders were dismayed that such a target presented itself, allowing for an awesome display of the power of modern submarines. The lesson was underlined when it was announced a few days later that any Argentine warships or aircraft found further than 12 miles from the Argentine coast would be treated as hostile. No Argentine surface warships took up the challenge, though a number of patrol boats and supply ships were caught attempting to break the blockade.

The anticipated large-scale naval battle never materialized. Of the Argentine submarines, one of the old ones was cannibalized for its twin which was caught at South Georgia. Of the two modern German submarines little was seen. There were rumors of problems in their operation. Once Harriers attacked what might have been a submarine with no evident results. At any rate, as the U.K. fleet is now largely designed for anti-submarine warfare, it would have been scandalous if its ASW net had been penetrated. All Argentina could do was to avenge the loss of the *General Belgrano*. The destroyer HMS *Sheffield* was surprised on May 4 by an air-launched Exocet missile. The missile failed to detonate but its spare fuel ignited and a fire soon engulfed the ship. Twenty sailors were killed, and the ship abandoned to sink.

The attempt to impose the exclusion zone in the air was less successful. The key to this operation was the closure of the airfield at Port Stanley. There were five long-range air strikes mounted against this and related targets by Vulcans from Ascension Island using gravity bombs, with follow-up raids by Harriers. The first, on May 1, was the most successful, with one bomb leaving a crater in the center of the runway. This prevented it from being used by high-performance combat aircraft but not by lighter aircraft and transports. Argentine transports managed to get through until the end, largely by taking risks flying onto an inadequate airfield at night. Reconnaissance was unsatisfactory, as a result of cloud cover and a shortage of aircraft. The British were kidded by sand placed on strategic points in the runway pretending to be craters.

Given the difficulties of putting a crude airfield out of action, it was surprising that there was any interest in attempting to bomb air bases on the Argentine mainland. The possibility of an attack on a carefully delineated target, for example the base of the Super-Etendards, was not ruled out but the general view was that the political costs of this sort of escalation, combined with the practical problems of making it a success, rendered it unattractive.

The other part of the air strategy was to destroy Argentine air resources wherever possible. On May 1, a Sea Harrier shot down a Mirage while others successfully took on two Canberras. Thereafter the Argentine Air Force avoided dogfights with the Sea Harriers to conserve resources for a British landing on the islands. On being spotted by Harriers, Argentine aircraft returned home. More success was achieved by a commando raid on a small airstrip at Pebble Island on May 15. Eleven aircraft, mainly light ground-attack Pucaras, were destroyed. However, despite these and a few other losses, the bulk of the Argentine Air Force was still intact.

It became clear to the British command that a blockade would not work. There were no signs that the military pressure exerted thus far was encouraging Argentine compromise on the sovereignty issue. There was no reason to believe that the state of the garrison on the islands was dire, or that it had less staying power than the task force. Only one Harrier had been lost in combat (attacking

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Port Stanley) but two others and three helicopters had been lost in accidents. This plus the destruction of HMS *Sheffield* created the prospect of gradual attrition that would lower morale. The greatest problem was of sustaining the task force in increasingly stormy and inclement weather over an extended period. Stuck on board ships the soldiers would lose combat readiness. Options to harass the enemy by small-scale raids or even troop landings on remote parts of the islands would not inconvenience the enemy sufficiently. There was little choice but to attempt a landing.

Those with a knowledge of the history of British amphibious landings could feel nothing but trepidation. The calculation was made that, in military terms, substantial losses were tolerable if the land forces could establish a beachhead. On May 21, there was a dawn landing at Port San Carlos off the Falkland Sound which divides the two main islands, just to the west of East Falkland, 50 miles from Port Stanley. It succeeded beyond the expectations of the British command.

It was important that no enemy forces were sufficiently close to provide opposition. At the start of May, at the earliest possible opportunity, special forces had been landed on the islands to keep a close watch on Argentine positions. The islands offered lots of alternative landing sites, most of which would be undefended. However, because of the lack of an internal road network and the limited number of heavy-lift helicopters, it had to be feasible to move forces to Port Stanley. One advantage of Port San Carlos was that the Argentine command probably assumed that it was just too far away for British forces. The other advantage was that the layout of the bay made it very difficult to mount air attacks on the landing forces. With the attacking aircraft coming from the west, they would have to first pass a Harrier cordon, then a picket line of ships with a variety of anti-air defenses and eventually the antiaircraft weapons of the ground forces. The disadvantage was that many warships would have to sit for a number of days in highly vulnerable positions. The only compensation was that the Sound allowed for reasonable protection against Exocets and submarines (because of the narrow entrance at each end).

With the help of a series of diversionary raids, surprise was achieved. By the time Argentine forces had realized what was going on, three separate beachheads had been established and 4,000 men were ashore.

Then the air raids came. In the intensive duels four ships—two frigates, a destroyer and one merchantman (the *Atlantic Conveyor*)—were lost. Contrary to repeated claims from Buenos Aires, neither aircraft carrier was hit, nor was the most valuable target to venture into Falkland Sound, the troopship *Canberra.*

Much has been made of the good fortune of another six ships hit by bombs or missiles which failed to explode. The failure was a direct result of the low altitude at which the Argentine aircraft was forced to attack in order to get under British air defenses, which allowed insufficient time for the delayed action fuses on the bombs. An Exocet missile was diverted on to the *Atlantic Conveyor* from the carrier HMS *Invincible* by the use of chaff, one of a number of countermeasures that were developed against this missile during the campaign. Later on, a ground-launched Exocet from Port Stanley struck the HMS *Glamorgan* a glancing blow.

The Argentine Air Force suffered dreadful attrition. The pilots flew bravely and skillfully with, at times, barely a one in two chance of survival. In the

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three days of May 21 to May 24, almost 40 aircraft were lost, including 15 Mirages and 19 A-4 Skyhawks. This can be compared with Argentina's total air losses during the campaign of over 90 (including 26 Mirages and 31 Skyhawks). This number excludes those caught on the ground. The effort left the Argentine Air Force severely depleted and exhausted. The only aircraft able to bother the British ground forces were the Pucaras still on the islands. Toward the end of the campaign, aircraft were mustered for a last raid on June 8. This succeeded in inflicting the heaviest British casualties of the war on two landing ships in Port Fitzroy. In this raid eight Mirages and three Skyhawks were shot down.

Harriers achieved most "kills" of Argentine aircraft (though not always en route to a raid). Naval air defense missiles performed reasonably well, shooting down 20 aircraft during the whole campaign, with close range weapons accounting for another five, but, as mentioned earlier, the consequences of the diversionary action they forced onto attacking aircraft must also be taken into account. Land-based missiles, including the Rapier and hand-held weapons such as the Blowpipe, shot down about 20 aircraft. Argentina also used the Blowpipe to shoot down two helicopters but was unable to make its sophisticated Franco-German Roland work at all.

The land campaign which followed was neither as spectacular nor as interesting to those addicted to modern technology. With air power playing a limited role on either side, conditions unconducive to armored warfare, and an absence of urban sprawl and modern roadways, it was almost a throwback to 1914–16. For the British such thoughts were disturbing, for their task was to dislodge a well-armed enemy from entrenched positions. The methods were not dissimilar to those of the Great War—artillery bombardment combined with determined infantry assaults on vulnerable points with a hope that surprise, training and morale could compensate for the natural advantages accruing to the defense. Formulas offering guidance on the necessary numerical superiority for a successful offense were irrelevant.

As stores were unloaded at Port San Carlos, advance patrols determined enemy dispositions. The breakout from the beaches began on May 27. The next day came the first battle at the settlements of Goose Green and Darwin, where 600 men of the 2nd Parachute Brigade took on 1,000 Argentine troops. Pucara aircraft with the Argentine garrison were shot down before they did much damage. Argentine troops fought fiercely at first but became demoralized by their inability to hold on to forward positions. Before surrender, some 50 had been killed (not 250 as originally reported) as against 17 on the British side.

The Argentine Command had not expected an attack from the West. It had anticipated a landing reasonably close to Port Stanley on either the north or the south and had prepared accordingly, for example by laying minefields astride the likely attack route. Now hasty adjustments were required, including some frantic mine-laying that will plague the islanders for years to come. Another adjustment was to move troops from Mount Kent, some five miles inland from Port Stanley, to reinforce the garrison at Goose Green.

When it was realized that Mount Kent had been vacated, Royal Marines moved forward in appalling conditions to occupy it. This may have been a mistake, for Mount Kent was more suited to defense than for launching attack and the troops there were bitterly exposed to the elements. It required the use of scarce helicopter resources to attend to their needs. This, plus the fact that

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three valuable Chinook heavy-lift helicopters had been lost on the *Atlantic Conveyor,* created a helicopter shortage.

This had important consequences for the 3,000 men of the British 5th Infantry Brigade who had by now arrived at Port San Carlos. They lacked the wherewithal for movement in sub-Arctic conditions and were in danger of getting stuck. The troops had therefore to be moved by sea. An advance party established, by telephoning one of the local residents, that Bluff Cove (just to the south of Port Stanley) was not occupied by Argentine forces. The Second Parachute Regiment was quickly helicoptered to Bluff Cove and the neighboring Port Fitzroy to take advantage. Then over the next few nights landing ships brought first the Ghurkhas, Blues and Royals, then Scots Guards and finally Welsh Guards around from Port San Carlos. The operation went wrong only at the final stage. Two landing ships, *Sir Tristram* and *Sir Galahad*, arrived at Port Fitzroy in clear daylight on June 8 to the surprise of those already there. They were spotted, an air attack was launched, and the two ships were hit leaving 50 men dead.

Despite this calamity, land forces were now in position around Port Stanley for the campaign's finale. Argentine defenses were based on the high ground on the outskirts of Port Stanley overlooking one of the few roads boasted by the islands which led into the capital, on the erroneous assumption that the British would wish to launch their main attack along this road. Instead, the defending forces were unhinged by a series of nighttime attacks on their exposed flanks. The battles were sharp, with stubborn Argentine resistance in some cases and disarray elsewhere. The loss of the defensive perimeter and the wearing down caused by intense bombardment from the sea as well as land (6,000 shells over the last 12 hours) took its toll. On June 14 white flags went up and the next day General Mario Menendez, commander of the Argentine garrison, surrendered on behalf of all his forces on the Falkland Islands.

VII

The key difference between the two sides was in the organization of their military forces and their professionalism. Argentine forces were riven by conflicts between officers and men, regulars and conscripts, which impaired their performance. At the end General Menendez did not even have an accurate picture of all the forces under his command. The British forces had the advantage in training, stamina and leadership and so demonstrated the virtues of military professionalism. In a war in which physical elements such as terrain and climate loomed as large as the technical factors, the traditional military virtues could be decisive. In this sense, the important lessons of the war were old ones that had been neglected in the fixation on technological prowess and weapon inventories.

The technical side of the conflict was once again shown to depend on competence and skill in using equipment, and a capacity for improvisation, as well as the basic reliability of the equipment. It also depends on a tactical appreciation. For example, Argentine troops were surprised at night despite excellent nightfighting equipment. As the capability of a modern weapon is very much a function of what it is up against, variations in conditions of challenges can have lasting consequences for a weapon's reputation. Circumstances can flatter: for example Harriers were often taking on Argentine aircraft which had no reserves of fuel to allow maneuver. A weapon such as the long-range air defense weapon Sea Dart can be effective if the enemy

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avoids it out of respect—but this will reduce the "kills" to its credit.

Notorious successes create reputations. Exocet, for example, was in fact only moderately successful. Its major success was achieved despite a failure in the warhead and its second success was a result of a diversion. Cumbersome but effective counter-measures were developed to cope with it.

The focus today is on the most advanced weapons, but most forces are a mixture of the old and the new and it is important to know how well the more elderly items cope. A good eye can sometimes compensate for a lack of precision guidance but nothing can compensate for a lack of range.

Obsolescence turns out also to be a function of circumstance—a 4.5-inch gun shot down a Skyhawk. Air attack is no occasion for sophisticated disdain of primitive weapons.

High rates of ammunition usage were recorded and at the end some of the British units had virtually exhausted their supplies. The readiness to use up resources—be they shells or aircraft—could well have been linked to expectations of how long the battle would last. Lastly, Britain gained enormously by plans to mobilize civilian assets, particularly shipping, in the event of war.

By and large what was suspected was confirmed. Submarines may be of little use for showing the flag or carrying supplies but they are lethal instruments. Surface ships are extremely vulnerable to dedicated air attacks. The British fleet lacked sufficient air cover and early warning, spent much of the time in a confined space, and still shot down many attacking aircraft, so its losses may not have been excessive. But the Argentine Air Force was neither particularly modern nor designed for anti-shipping purposes.

The technical lessons are thus ambiguous and the revived old lessons may only be relevant if future wars are to be fought in such unmodern conditions. At the very least the experience serves as a correction to notions of electronic battlefields where human qualities are redundant and it can all be explained by cybernetics. The political lessons may be more interesting. They stem from relating the experience of a modern industrial power fighting alone in a limited war to the war it plans with its allies in the center of Europe.

The first concerns military management. The Royal Navy was assigned overall command responsibility which it exercised from its headquarters on the outskirts of London, transmitting orders to the commander of the task force. Operations on land were the responsibility of the senior Army officer. The decision-making was by and large successful but there were still misunderstandings between the two services: the Army did not always understand why naval gunfire support had to be withdrawn at crucial moments or key ships kept back when they might have been useful. The central staffs at the Ministry of Defence busied themselves with attending to requests from the commanders and considering the broad policy options and the rules of engagement. The Prime Minister's small "war cabinet" took the fundamental decisions on diplomacy and military action but offered no advice on how to implement the decisions. The civilians' constancy of political purpose was their most valuable contribution to the military effort. This experience with a relatively simple conflict threw into relief the likely problems with lines of command in a NATO-Warsaw Pact crisis, attempting to coordinate a variety of governments each with their own views on its conduct and some with a proclivity to interfere with field decisions.

This leads us to the second lesson, which concerns crisis management. Military power is not a simple instrument of diplomacy. Once invoked it

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transforms diplomacy as compulsion takes over from compromise. Military means come to demand commensurate political ends. After Britain was forced to fight for the Islands, the sort of diplomatic solution that would have been embraced a few weeks earlier now turns out to be an insult to the men who have died. At the end of the war, Britain found itself with a political commitment to the Falkland Islands that had been absent before.

Nor is diplomacy a clear-cut alternative to military action, for it often depends on the assessment of the likely winner of an eventual battle. If one side is continually requested to hold back, its diplomatic position may deteriorate along with its military options. For the party that does not have time on its side, it is necessary to keep the military initiative. Moreover, this initiative rarely allows for gradual escalation. In general, graduated response is an ideal that can rarely be achieved in practice. An overwhelmingly superior country can show flexibility and patience, meting out the military medicine in small doses to begin with, but this course is unlikely to commend itself to a country risking defeat. There is a military logic which it dare not ignore. This logic warns that military options cannot be maintained indefinitely and that some are highly perishable; that there are risks attached to tentative actions taken merely for demonstrative effect and that, confronting a capable enemy, there may be risks attached to doing nothing at all; that military campaigns rarely involve a simple buildup to some grand finale, but that the bloodiest and most difficult operations may be amongst the earliest; and that military action is unpredictable, so that what looks good in the plans can look awful in reality.

In the Falklands War the engagement with the greatest casualties—the sinking of the *General Belgrano*—came right at the start of the actual fighting. It was an important military victory for Britain, yet it turned into a political defeat because of the premium that the international community put on the appearance of avoiding escalation. Any military action which is not self-evidently for defensive purposes, even if it is preemptive, becomes an outrage. Measures such as economic sanctions or blockades are deemed more acceptable than any military action which tends to lead to direct casualties. Yet if sanctions or blockades are to succeed it can only be by causing immense distress to civilians—while if they fail, those involved will still have suffered lasting disruption and the international community is left with a smoldering problem. All this provides political discouragement for going on to the military offensive unless it is going to be reasonably bloodless.

The relevance of this for crisis management seems to be as follows. First, the concept of "escalation," which is now an established part of thinking on crisis and war, is in practice misleading, and creates unreal expectations as to the likely development of a conflict. Second, there can rarely be a neat proportionality between ends and means. Third, it is a diplomatic as well as often a military advantage to force the enemy to initiate battle.

All this makes it harder rather than easier for democracies to manage conflicts. Yet in other respects the war of the Falkland Islands showed that simple assumptions about the difficulty of maintaining political support were not well founded. Since the American experience with Vietnam there has been an assumption that democratic societies have a low level of tolerance of war, with national will being sapped with each casualty and lurid media coverage.

This assumption may explain some of the awkwardness of the Ministry of

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Defence in its handling of the media. Certainly a role for the media needs to be incorporated into strategic planning. There were no contingency plans available in this case. Government policy on the release of information showed great inconsistencies. Correspondents were only allowed to accompany the task force after an enormous fuss, and their accreditation papers were left over from the Suez Crisis of 1956. No means were found to transmit television pictures back or even, for some time, black-and-white stills. It is perhaps significant that the Parliamentary Defence Committee is conducting its first postwar investigation on this matter. Here again, this was a very unusual and old-fashioned war. From the British, but not the Argentine, side there were no television images. The correspondents with the task force were utterly dependent on the military for their stories and their external communications. This made possible tight censorship. The consequent public demand for information in Britain was met too much by speculation and reports from Argentina.

However, there seems to have been no reason to assume that the public would not support the war. Opinion polls have long recorded an immediate surge of support for governments in such circumstances and this case was no exception. This was helped by the fact that the opposition parties who initially saw the issue in terms of embarrassing the government for its "loss" of the islands found themselves associated with the cause of their recapture. The British public is unfortunately used to its soldiers being killed in Northern Ireland. This is easier to take with a volunteer than with a conscript Army. Polls showed initial reluctance to contemplate any loss of life in retaking the Falkland Islands, but once the casualties came, Argentina was blamed and support for the war grew.

The question again becomes what would have happened in different circumstances: if Britain had not appeared to be keeping the initiative and the war turned into a stalemate or even defeat; if allies had been more critical or indeed if Britain had been trying to fight in concert with them; if the fighting was not so contained in time and space and so far away; if the issue had not been the simple one of aggression against British subjects by a military dictatorship but one much more complex and ambiguous, involving shadowy notions of national interest.

The war was a strange and atavistic interlude for Britain, a curious and enthralling distraction from its economic troubles. It was generally believed to have been popular and the victory raised national morale. What it did not do was solve the problem of the Falkland Islands. It made a diplomatic solution virtually impossible for many years, as the islanders' feelings about Argentina have become even more hostile. Britain will now have to provide properly for the islands' defense and try to improve their economic viability in the face of persistent hostility from Argentina and non-cooperation from the rest of Latin America. Having retrieved the Falkland Islands, Britain is well and truly stuck with them!

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COMMENT AND CORRESPONDENCE

THE ISSUE OF NO FIRST USE

To the Editor:

The furor aroused by the article by McGeorge Bundy and his three colleagues in your Spring 1982 issue, including the disclaimer by the Secretary of State, the hostile comments in European journals, and finally the riposte by Karl Kaiser and his colleagues in your Summer issue, has provided depressing evidence of the extent to which a strategic doctrine whose military credibility has been steadily decreasing still remains a political orthodoxy to be questioned at one's peril.

The original American "Gang of Four" put forward a view which to many of us has been increasingly self-evident. A guarantee by the United States to its partners in Western Europe that it would be prepared to counter a Soviet attack on Western Europe on any level by initiating the use of nuclear weapons may have been effective when the West enjoyed a virtual nuclear monopoly, but it looks very different when the Soviet Union has attained nuclear parity. For either side to initiate the use of battlefield nuclear weapons would now make a desert of Central Europe. To initiate an exchange of Intermediate Nuclear Forces would lay Europe waste from the Atlantic to the Urals. To initiate a strategic exchange, whatever the targeting doctrine used and however careful the provision for communication, command and control, would be to risk global holocaust. It is not simply a question of whether the President of the United States would or should be willing, in an emergency, to do such things. It is more profoundly a question of whether his proclaimed readiness to do so is any longer credible to an adversary, or can be made so by any new deployment of forces. And there are a growing number of people, both in Western Europe and in the United States, who see little advantage in being defended by such means.

This, I take it, was the point of the Gang of Four's article: that a more *credible* defensive strategy must be developed, and that this can be done only by concentrating on developing our conventional capabilities. However, the authors went further to recommend (subject to careful study and the achievement of adequate conventional capabilities) a categorical policy that NATO should *under no circumstances* initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and it was this aspect of their proposal that so disturbed Mr. Kaiser and his colleagues. The fears voiced by these latter were real and justified ones. It would indeed be deeply disturbing to the solidarity of the Alliance, and enfeebling to the security of Western Europe, if the Soviet Union ever came to believe that it could attack us without thereby incurring an appalling risk of triggering off a nuclear exchange. A strategy that totally foreswore the first use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances whatever, and a declaratory policy deriving from it, would indeed be profoundly destabilizing. But a strategy *dependent* on first use is no less destabilizing, both because of its doubtful credibility, and because of its growing unacceptability to the very peoples it is intended to defend.

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The improvement of conventional forces in Europe is in fact necessary, not to replace the American nuclear guarantee, but to make it more credible and to supplement it.

In the first place the Soviet leadership must understand what an anguished and prolonged process would have to be gone through before any American President could bring himself to authorize a nuclear response to a conventional attack on any territory outside U.S. soil. In consequence the temptation to secure a "quick fix" with conventional forces before any such decision could be taken might one day appear very great. To eliminate such a possibility there is no alternative to adequate conventional defenses *en place*—the best deterrent to *any* kind of attack.

In the second place the Soviet leadership has to be brought to see that, *even if there were no escalation to nuclear war*, their armed forces would suffer so severely at the hands of the defenders of Western Europe that the cost of any military achievements would be unacceptably high in terms, not only of blood and treasure, but of the cohesion of their Empire. The alternative to a strategy based on nuclear first use is not, as the German authors seem to think, one based on a capacity to defeat the Soviet Union in a full-scale conflict with conventional forces. Their criticisms of the American proposals here are entirely beside the point. It would not be necessary, as they suggest, to turn Western Europe into an armed camp. Clausewitz pointed out that an aggressor can be deterred not only by the prospect of defeat but by "the improbability of victory" and by "its unacceptable cost." That the imposition of such "unacceptable cost" on any Soviet conventional attack is not so far beyond the resources of the Alliance as Mr. Kaiser and his colleagues appear to believe is made clear by the authoritative article by General Bernard Rogers that appears in the same issue as their own.

The German article rightly points out that our object must be to deter *any* war in Europe, conventional as well as nuclear. But a strategy with no other recourse than an early use of nuclear weapons provides, with its dubious credibility, little deterrence against either. It is therefore a matter of some relief that the Germans conclude their article by agreeing with the main thrust of their American counterparts, that "an energetic attempt to reduce the dependence on an early first use should be undertaken." It is utterly fallacious to suggest that any attempt to redress the conventional balance in Europe would erode effective nuclear deterrence and undermine the credibility of the Alliance. In an age of nuclear parity strong conventional defenses are a necessary condition of both.

MICHAEL HOWARD
Oxford University

FUTURE CLIMATE

To the Editor:

William W. Kellogg and Robert Schware have done an outstanding job in your Summer 1982 issue, presenting a difficult and controversial scientific problem which is of far-reaching importance. They have, perhaps for the first time, developed some of the economic and political consequences of the global warming many expect as a result of the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide which derives from the massive burning of fossil fuels.

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The authors represent the "middle view" on the carbon dioxide controversy. There are also extreme views: one holds that nothing will happen; and the other expects a catastrophe—that is, a change in the environment which is so rapid and far-reaching that people cannot readily adjust to it. It is important to point out that the middle view is not necessarily the correct one. In scientific discussions of this sort, one cannot simply average the different views of scientists or even seek a consensus. More often than not, it has turned out that an extreme view was the correct one.

While I cannot settle the controversy, I can at least indicate why such extreme views exist and why they must be given some credence—perhaps more than appears from the article, which leaves the reader with the impression that all has been settled.

The major uncertainty relates to the existence of feedbacks, both positive and negative. In layman's language this means that the warming of the earth's surface can produce consequences which will either counteract the warming (i.e., a negative feedback) or reinforce it—a positive feedback. In the first case, we speak of stability produced by negative feedback; in the second case we have instabilities because of positive feedbacks. The trouble is that both positive and negative feedbacks exist, and we can't be sure which are going to prevail.

The concept of positive and negative feedbacks is of course familiar to all of us from everyday experience. Negative feedbacks keep bicycle riders from falling off their bikes. A nuclear reactor has a number of negative feedback features built into it, so that it can never explode. On the contrary, a nuclear bomb is constructed with as little negative feedback as possible so that it will explode.

In the case of the earth's climate we have some historical experience. The variations in climate have been huge, as the authors point out: from a virtually ice-free earth to one in which glaciers extended as far south as the central United States (and corresponding latitudes in the rest of the world). Does this prove that the climate is stable—or is it unstable? Here we run into semantics. Some would refer to such wide variations as unstable. But geologists would refer to the climate as stable, arguing that the oceans never completely iced over during the history of the earth.

Incidentally, there is a scientific mystery about why the oceans remained liquid early on in the history of the earth. At that time the sun's heat output was less than today; if the sun's output should decline now to that same value, we would have a completely ice-covered earth. Many believe that, fortuitously, the atmosphere then held a large amount of carbon dioxide which produced exactly the kind of "greenhouse effect" that we are now concerned about. In other words, the CO_2 served to retain the heat on the earth and thereby kept the oceans from freezing over. Others don't accept this explanation and prefer to look to ancient heat sources, including a larger heat flux from the earth's interior and heating produced by tidal friction from the moon. At that time the moon was very much closer to the surface of the earth than it is today and the tides were very large indeed.

As the above record suggests, even a minute decline in the sun's heat output could operate—as it may have done then—to counter the warming effect of a large amount of carbon dioxide in the air. This of course would be an example of a change in natural forces, rather than feedback associated with the side effects of the increased carbon dioxide itself.

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The major example of feedback concerns the earth's albedo, which is the reflecting power of the earth's surface and atmosphere. As we know from direct satellite data, the greatest albedo is produced by white clouds and by white snow and ice deposits. On the other hand, oceans have a low albedo, meaning that they absorb most of the solar energy rather than reflect it back out into space. The earth's land masses have an intermediate albedo, depending on the nature of the surface—deserts have a high albedo, forests have a low albedo.

Thus, if the average albedo level of the earth as a whole were to change even by a small amount—a fraction of one percent, for example—the warming effect of increased carbon dioxide could be negated, or it could on the contrary feed on itself.

As an example of the first possibility, there are those who argue that an initial warming trend would increase evaporation from the ocean and thus the water vapor content of the atmosphere. With enough turbulence and atmospheric motion, the water vapor would produce clouds and therefore increase the albedo of the earth, thereby rejecting more of the solar radiation. The feedback effect would have to produce only a minute increase in cloud cover to keep the earth from warming up on any lasting basis. The proponents of this view believe that such negative feedbacks are simply so strong as to overcome any warming trend, and that nothing much will happen to the climate, even if carbon dioxide increases at current rates.

To understand the fears of the opposing "catastrophe group," we need to recognize the concept of a "threshold," beyond which the change in climate becomes irreversible. If a strong cooling trend, for example, ever caused the oceans to ice over, it is believed by many that they would never again melt.

In the present projections, a warming earth would also mean—as the authors note—the gradual shrinking of the Antarctic ice caps and an early melting of ice in the Arctic Ocean. These changes would tend to reduce the albedo level of the earth as a whole, and the effect would be particularly great in the present areas affected by ice. Once the ice of the Arctic Ocean is removed, the fact that solar radiation would now be directly absorbed by the surface waters rather than reflected by ice means that the ice may never reform. This can induce a large and permanent change in the climatic regime of the Northern Hemisphere and inevitably of the whole earth. Some would define such an irreversible change in the climate as a catastrophe.

Finally, whichever way the feedbacks work, it should be noted that the increased atmospheric carbon dioxide which is the principal basis of the authors' predicted warming trend is not itself permanent. One may plausibly assume that the use of fossil fuels and their input of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere will in due course decline. In any event, as the authors note, the excess carbon dioxide, above the pre-industrial value, would be slowly absorbed into the ocean or utilized by the biosphere, although only gradually over a few hundred years.

In sum, the article presents a benign non-catastrophic point of view on the impact of fossil fuel burning, leading to gradual shifts but no drastic change in climate or to catastrophe. Both the uncertainty about the major inputs (above all the radiant energy of the sun) and the uncertainties about possible feedback effects could mean a future substantially different from their projections.

It must be disconcerting to non-scientists to learn that such formidable problems as the impact of human activities on the environment are not

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sufficiently well understood to make clear-cut predictions. Yet, as Messrs. Kellogg and Schware point out, the burden falls very much on monitoring and on researching the many different influences which determine the earth's climate. I certainly agree with them that drastic policy measures are premature.

S. FRED SINGER
Washington, D. C.

S. Fred Singer is Senior Fellow for natural resources policy at The Heritage Foundation, on leave from the University of Virginia. He was formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior.

To the Editor:

In their article "Society, Science and Climate Change," appearing in your Summer issue, Messrs. Kellogg and Schware preface their discussion with Kant's three questions on reason. It is not often that the underwriters of much of the basic research done at many fine institutions in this country are given their due and allowed answers to Kant's first question, "What can I know?". The authors' attempted articulation of this particular topic is therefore welcomed, if only to illuminate the possibilities. However, as much of a disservice as it is to keep such information wholly confined to the scientific community, it is an equal if not greater offense to present it as if axiomatic.

For centuries the quest of science has been to explain, to a reasonable degree, that which is "observed." Vastly improved technology has altered the mechanics, but the methodologies of scientific pursuit remain the same: namely, proposed hypotheses followed by data collection to either support or refute them.

As stated in the article, the postulated ability of carbon dioxide to affect surface temperatures was suggested before the turn of the century. Not until the past 20, and especially within the past ten years, has a concerted effort been made to assess the importance of atmospheric CO_2. This assessment is a continuing process with measurements made on a routine basis by various organizations throughout the world. That no mention of actual data is made in the authors' discussion—which instead places its emphasis on a very tenuous extrapolation through rudimentary atmospheric modelling—seems an oversight. The mechanics used in the construction of their Figure 1 are given passing reference which does not indicate the many uncertainties involved.

Radiative processes, atmospheric interactions, and even the general climate of the polar regions are not well understood due to the paucity of data. As to the authors' suggestion of "apparently conclusive answers" indicating a carbon dioxide-induced warming trend reflected by the retreat of Antarctic sea ice, one has only to read the cited reference to George Kukla and J. Gavin's article (footnote 14, p. 1083). This concludes with the following statement: "Since it is not known to what extent the observed changes in snow and sea ice areas and in surface air temperature can be explained by natural fluctuations or by processes unrelated to CO_2, any conclusions about a relation between the observed departures and a CO_2 increase are, at present, highly tentative." The translation by Messrs. Kellogg and Schware from "highly tentative" to "apparently conclusive" seems to reflect their premise. This attempt to fuse orders of reality to give the quotidian overarching truth does not lend itself to scientific pursuit. If prognostications are to be given credence then they should be based upon some credible evidence and not on supposition.

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Tolkien said, "It does not do to leave a live dragon out of your calculations if you live near him." Society now has the ability to create its own dragons which must be dealt with. The question of the influence of carbon dioxide and other anthropogenic material is a cause for concern; it should be pondered not only by the scientific community but by those responsible and concerned with its implications, both in the very near and distant future.

Thus, while the authors' conjectural discussion may indeed be adumbrative of much, if they truly believe in asking Kant's first question then they owe the reader the benefit of their understanding and knowledge in providing a more thorough discussion. It is hoped that the authors will continue to address this problem, but without the genuflection to speculative reason and with a more cogent approach befitting their backgrounds.

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Messrs. Kellogg and Schware reply:

We are grateful to Fred Singer for his gracious comments on our article, and for providing what amounts to an important footnote. We agree that we represent a "middle view" in the carbon dioxide-climate change debate—at least, that is the position we sought to achieve. It is entirely possible that, in dealing with the extremely complex and interacting global system of atmosphere, oceans, land, ice and so forth, we may have underestimated the importance of some factor (or "feedback"). This being the case, the "best current estimate" of the climatological community may turn out to err in *either* direction.

In his comments, Mr. Singer points to several specific factors that could influence the climate systems' response to increasing carbon dioxide, and we should make it clear that most of the current climate models do indeed take them into account. For example, the changes of snow cover on land and of sea ice, which affect the earth's albedo (reflectivity), are explicitly included in virtually every atmospheric general circulation model in one way or another. The possible behavior of the sea ice of the Arctic Ocean has received special attention, since an ice-free Arctic Ocean in summer may present a situation not witnessed by our planet for one million years or more—and this could happen before the middle of the next century. (We disagree with Mr. Singer when he implies that this would be irreversible and a "catastrophe," since it could result in a more benign climate for the Arctic Basin.)

Changes of cloudiness are also included in general circulation models, however imperfect, developed at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (Boulder, Colorado), the Geophysics Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (Princeton, New Jersey), the British Meterological Office (Bracknell, United Kingdom) and Oregon State University (Corvallis, Oregon). Though there are differences in the designs of these various models, they seem to agree that the overall influence of cloudiness on the earth's albedo and heat balance should remain surprisingly unchanged in the face of a global warming.

We can take advantage of this opportunity to underline a point that we passed over rather too briefly in our article (p. 1085), a point that adds to Mr.

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Singer's list of caveats concerning theoretical predictions of future climates. During the week of August 2–6, 1982, an international meeting was held on Solar Terrestrial Influences on Weather and Climate (Boulder, Colorado), and new evidence was presented to suggest that the sun may already be in a temporary phase when it is increasing its radiational output. This is what prompted Ronald Gilliland to state recently: "The extrapolation [of the effects of solar activity, as indicated by the 22- and 76-year sun spot periodicities, plus the effect of carbon dioxide] from 1976 to 2000 A.D. shows a steeper temperature increase than would be expected from CO_2 forcing alone" ("Solar Forcing of Recent Climatic Changes," *Climatic Change*, Vol. 4, 1982, pp. 111–32).

For those who wish to pursue this matter in more depth, we recommend an excellent report that appeared after our article went to press, *Carbon Dioxide and Climate: A Second Assessment*, prepared by a highly knowledgable panel on climate review established by the U.S. National Research Council. Among other things it discusses several of the feedback mechanisms in the climate system to which Mr. Singer referred.

We are also grateful to Stephen C. Barnard for underlining the growing concern that many people now feel for the "dragon" of future climate change that human societies may have unleashed. We also agree with his expressions of caution concerning the picture of the future climate that is now being drawn by the international scientific community; indeed, in our article we have repeatedly emphasized that there are bound to be uncertainties in any such long-range predictions, no matter how well founded they are in what we already know. (Nowhere have we implied that our statements about future climate changes and possible socioeconomic responses to them are "axiomatic.")

We cannot let his comments go unchallenged, however, since he seems to have some misconceptions on two counts: first, regarding the "quest of science;" second, regarding the purpose of our article. We will address each of these briefly.

He is only half-correct in saying that "the quest of science has been to explain . . . that which is observed," since science has not and should not be stopped there. Out of our growing understanding of the universe must come the ability to interpret a fund of knowledge in terms that can be understood by the non-scientist, and this is of little value unless such interpretations can enhance our ability to anticipate and prepare for the future. There is a well-recognized sequence of efforts in the process we call "science," starting with observations, followed by their explanation in terms of physical laws or generalizations, and finally extending this description to possible future states. One of us, a meteorologist, seeks to describe the range of possible future climates; the other, a political scientist, seeks to anticipate ways in which different societies can best respond to a given change in the environment.

Our article began by outlining in simple language what we know about the planetary system that determines our climate. We purposely did not go into great detail about "the mechanics used in the construction of . . . Figure 1," since this would have defeated our purpose of making the story clear to the larger and mostly non-scientific audience of *Foreign Affairs*. Our footnotes provide ample avenues for further reading by those interested in "the mechanics."

Mr. Barnard's allusion to our use of the phrase "apparently conclusive

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answers" indicates that he did not understand the question to be answered. The question concerned the cooling trend observed in the Northern Hemisphere between about 1940 and 1965—why did it cool down at a time when carbon dioxide was steadily increasing? We showed, referring to three sets of studies (and we could have carried it further), that this temporary cooling trend in one hemisphere had a fairly satisfactory explanation, and our summation stated: "While the data do not conclusively prove a warming effect from increased carbon dioxide, the temperature observations over the past 100 years are at least consistent with the notion of the greenhouse effect." This is essentially the same message as that of George Kukla and J. Gavin, who stated in the same article to which Mr. Barnard referred: "The observations [of Antarctic sea ice] outlined above agree qualitatively with the expected effect of a CO_2 increase" (p. 502).

From the many favorable comments on our article received so far, we gather that Mr. Barnard is in a small minority that somehow rejects the desirability of speculating on the future climate and its implications in a responsible way. If scientists should not engage in such speculations, then who should? We have cited a number of reports that substantiate our viewpoint, including those of the U. S. National Academy of Sciences and the World Meteorological Organization. We are clearly in good company.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

RUSSIA AND THE ROAD TO APPEASEMENT: CYCLES OF EAST-WEST CONFLICT IN WAR AND PEACE. By George Liska. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982, 261 pp. $25.00.

Not conventional history or academic political science, but rather a broad philosophical essay on the theme of future world order, with frequent excursions into the past to illuminate social and intercultural dynamics relevant to present and future. Liska's work—this is the last in a series of four volumes on America and Russia—is marked by wordy, often debatable and sometimes obscure generalizations, but the ideas are arresting and the argument is impressive. Preserving the heritage of the West and facing the global North-South problem, he maintains, requires a controlled relaxation within Russia and a gradual accommodation—he is not afraid of the word "appeasement"—between East and West. As to policy, he is as contemptuous of the naive idealism of Western liberals as of the crude cold-war dogmatism of the neoconservatives.

THE CONSERVATION OF ENEMIES: A STUDY IN ENMITY. By Frederick H. Hartmann. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood, 1982, 258 pp. $29.95.

The author sees "enmity" as a permanent factor in the game of nations; the question for any of them, such as the United States, is how to reduce and control it in order to maintain essential interests and avoid disaster. With many excursions into history for illustration, Hartmann tests various theories that have been advanced for sound policy or for a more peaceful world (balance of power, containment, collective security, world government), along with some "cardinal principles" of his own. A thoughtful and stimulating book.

DICTATORSHIPS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: RATIONALISM AND REASON IN POLITICS. By Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. New York: Simon & Schuster (for the American Enterprise Institute), 1982, 270 pp. $14.95.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick's political philosophy on both foreign and domestic affairs, set forth in these articles written over the past few years, takes on added interest because of her present official position, especially the *Commentary* article (from which the title of the book is taken) which was supposed to have won for her the post on the East River. She wages a shrill but not unconvincing

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campaign against the Carter Administration and its predecessors, but her arguments for hard-headed realism in defense of the national interest in the struggle against communism raise the old question of whether the facts of international life can be cut to fit the ideology of the day.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Fred E. Baumann. Gambier (Ohio): Kenyon College, 1982, 182 pp.

A symposium held in 1981 concentrated, perforce, on the record of the Carter Administration in the field of human rights, but the different approach of the Reagan team was already taking shape and finds both defenders (including Jeane Kirkpatrick) and critics in these pages. All of them, of individual interest, come to the subject from widely different starting points in time, place and the political predilections of the authors.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. By Robin Renwick. Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1981, 118 pp.

A British diplomat looks at several historical examples of economic sanctions, unilaterally or collectively imposed, with a view to judging their effectiveness in changing the policies of the target country. His prime case history is that of Rhodesia, which exhibited all the difficulties an international effort may be expected to encounter. The study, brief as it is, is well defined and argued. The author notes, rightly, that despite the uncertainty and limitations of the economic weapon, governments continue to use it, generally with little attention to past experience and insufficient calculation of possible results.

NORTH OVER SOUTH: A NON-WESTERN PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1982, 290 pp. $20.00.

The North-South problem will never be solved by conferences and negotiation but only by a "combined class-race struggle" to overcome imperialism and neoimperialism. That is the theme and conclusion of this uncompromising challenge, by an Indian professor, to the system he sees as imposed on the majority of mankind by the industrial countries (capitalist and Marxist alike), and to the theories of international relations developed by their scholars.

PETITIONING THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY IN HUMAN RIGHTS. By Ton Zuijdwijk. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 397 pp. $35.00.

A legal and procedural study of how, since 1945, various U.N. bodies have dealt with the question of complaints and petitions from individuals or nongovernmental groups alleging violation of human rights. It is tediously long but useful for specialists because of its completeness.

GRUNDZÜGE DER WELTPOLITIK: DATEN UND TENDENZEN VON 1945 BIS ZUR GEGENWART. By Hans Wassmund. Munich: Beck, 1982, 304 pp. DM. 24.

A German scholar performs a remarkable feat of condensation: covering the history of world politics since World War II in about 250 pages and still having space for some theories and charts on the changing structure of international relations.

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General: Military, Technological, and Scientific

Andrew J. Pierre

COMMON SECURITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR SURVIVAL. By the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982, 202 pp. $5.95 (paper).

This is the report of the Palme Commission which was formed to examine international security problems in the way the Brandt Commission reported on international development issues. Among the more novel or interesting suggestions are the establishment of a battlefield nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, a chemical-weapon-free zone in Europe, and talks among the conventional weapons-supplier states as well as with recipient states on guidelines for regulating arms transfers. Much of the analysis regarding strategic arms covers the well-known arms control agenda. A good deal of attention is devoted to dealing with Third World tensions and insecurities. The analysis in most—not all—sections is sophisticated and realistic while forward-looking. At a time of much general interest in disarmament, this usefully brings the discussion down to specifics.

MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES. Edited by Gen. Brent Scowcroft. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly, Columbia University), 1982, 226 pp. $7.95 (paper).

A collection of papers prepared for an American Assembly on the future of the all-volunteer force and the alternatives. The quality of the contributions is high, making this probably the best and most current discussion available of this subject. Interestingly, at the conference (held in September 1981), a substantial majority of a highly experienced group wound up agreeing that a return to compulsory service was neither necessary nor desirable in order to correct deficiencies in the all-volunteer force.

BEYOND EMPIRE & REVOLUTION: MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE THIRD WORLD. By Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 321 pp. $19.95.

Horowitz's provocative and thoughtful book carries further his earlier analyses of the development process. Here he views the military as playing an essential and beneficial role in achieving the political stability necessary for economic growth. In this sweeping sociological work, the military establishments in the Third World are seen as having a unifying impact upon their nations and as being central to foreign affairs. This is less true in the very poor Fourth World where the military is more involved in police activities and maintaining internal order.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. By Keith B. Payne. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 239 pp. $20.00 (paper).

The coauthor (with Colin Gray) of the widely noted "Victory is Possible" (*Foreign Policy*, 39) article puts here into greater detail his emphatic critique of "assured vulnerability." The present U.S. doctrine of deterrence based on offensive forces is seen as grossly inadequate following the loss of American superiority. It must be complemented, in Payne's view, by a damage limitation strategy including ballistic missile defenses.

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THE ARMS RACE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILITARY GROWTH. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Praeger, 1982, 199 pp. $21.95.

The work of a University of Michigan professor, this book is distinctive because of its focus on the economic roots of the arms race. In the United States, internal pressures for defense spending are seen as resulting from short-term macroeconomic goals as well as the claims of organizations whose influence are linked to military programs. In the U.S.S.R., economic circumstances are more likely to play an inhibiting role on defense spending. This is a scholarly and stimulating book.

EUROPEAN SECURITY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE. Edited by William Gutteridge. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 236 pp. $27.50.

The result of Pugwash meetings in Finland and Poland, the essays in this book were written by Soviet and East European contributors as well as Westerners. Covering a broad field, the most original ones deal with the Baltic and Arctic zones.

THE ATOMIC COMPLEX: A WORLDWIDE POLITICAL HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. By Bernard Goldschmidt. La Grange Park (Ill.): American Nuclear Society, 1982, 500 pp. $31.00 (paper, $24.00).

What makes this book of interest is that it is written by a retired French official who was at the heart of France's nuclear activities for over three decades (as well as on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1958 to 1980). The occasional special insights into French nuclear policy and perspectives, which were often out of step with those of others, are therefore valuable. But, in the main, the book covers very well-known ground dealing with both the diplomacy of atomic affairs since the Baruch Plan and the development of nuclear technology.

NUCLEAR POWER AND NONPROLIFERATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE. By William C. Potter. Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, 1982, 304 pp. $25.00 (paper, $9.95). Written under the auspices of the Center for International Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles.

A comprehensive and knowledgeable discussion of most aspects of the spread of nuclear weapons. The author is well steeped in the issues and the existing literature, and grinds no special axe.

NUCLEAR POWER IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1982, 372 pp. $28.95.

A series of well-researched essays, organized on a country-by-country basis, that identify the major factors responsible for the shaping of the nuclear power programs in 15 developing countries. The volume suffers, however, from the lack of comparative analysis.

OUTER SPACE: A NEW DIMENSION OF THE ARMS RACE. Edited by Bhupendra Jasani. London: Taylor & Francis (for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 1982, 425 pp. (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, distributor, $35.00).

This is one of the more useful SIPRI volumes, providing a great deal of information on a subject which is not widely known outside parts of the

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scientific community. Clearly outer space could easily become a major new arena for military activities; equally clearly it presents opportunities for arms control which should be seized. This book provides much background for the debate.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

THE SPORTY GAME. By John Newhouse. New York: Knopf, 1982, 242 pp. $14.95.

"Heads of government must interest themselves in this industry," said James Callaghan, the former Prime Minister of Britain. Will President Reagan agree, now that the long-established American lead in selling commercial airliners all over the world is being challenged by Airbus, a European consortium with the backing of several governments? Should Washington give more help to Boeing and the others? Is a partnership with the Japanese the answer? These policy questions are raised but not explored by Mr. Newhouse; nonetheless, his excellent study, which incorporates a great deal of original research, should improve the quality of the public debate that seems bound to come.

THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES: TRADE AND ADJUSTMENT. By Louis Turner and Neil McMullen. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), 1982, 290 pp. $35.00.

Five industries, eight developing countries, and the manufactures they export to North America and Western Europe provide the material for this detailed, systematic study by collaborators in several countries. There is much valuable material, but the best work concerns different methods of adjustment (and the resistance to it) in the old producing centers and in the world economy as a whole.

ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: THE RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham. Totowa (N.J.): Allanheld Osmun, 1982, $29.50.

This very good volume deals with questions of law, economics, American policy and international negotiations intended to reduce the risk that national differences in environmental control will distort international trade.

BUSINESS IN THE PUBLIC EYE. By G. A. Wagner. Grand Rapids (Mich.): Wiliam B. Eerdmans, 1982, 125 pp. $9.95.

In a book that is unusual because it says nothing about what Western business can learn from Japan, the chairman of Royal Dutch Shell comments interestingly on the power of private business and how it should be used, the importance of competition and the advisability of openness in the organization of international business. He believes that a binding international code of conduct for international business is impossible because governments will not tie their hands.

SUBSIDIZING SUCCESS: THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK IN THE U.S. ECONOMY. By Richard E. Feinberg. New York: Cambridge University

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Press, 1982, 189 pp. $34.50.

A great deal of work succinctly presented makes this the fullest picture of the Exim Bank that we have. Its diverse operations, its place in the capital markets, its relation to trade and development and the criteria implicit in its record are all well analyzed. The author (an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations) is quite restrained in his comments on the generally cautious way the Bank has pursued its sometimes contradictory aims.

BRITTLE POWER: ENERGY STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY. By Amory B. Lovins and L. Hunter Lovins. Andover (Mass.): Brick House, 1982, 486 pp. $17.95.

Americans do not need to be told how frequently "things don't work." Few of them, however, can realize how vulnerable the national energy system has become not just to foreign control of supplies but to nature, accidents, deliberate disruption, selfish interest and mischief. This book explains that, vividly. Even so, its most interesting parts concern the principles of resiliency that might be built into the system. When it comes to actual measures—smallness, decentralization, alternative sources and the like—the case again becomes highly controversial, as is to be expected from the pioneers of *Soft Energy Paths.*

GLOBAL INSECURITY: A STRATEGY FOR ENERGY AND ECONOMIC UPHEAVAL. Edited by Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, 427 pp. $15.95.

THE CRITICAL LINK: ENERGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1980s. Charles K. Ebinger, Project Director. Cambridge: Ballinger (for the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University), 1982, 296 pp. $29.95.

ENERGY VULNERABILITY. Edited by James L. Plummer. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982, 480 pp. $37.50.

These are three of the better books on energy. Inevitably, such collections overlap. These all favor stockpiles, increased international cooperation and, above all, taking energy seriously as a continuing problem. Plummer and his group work from a model that is helpful for thinking about supply disruptions. Ebinger and his Georgetown colleagues stress the larger political and security dimension. The Yergin and Hillenbrand volume, which has sponsors in a number of countries, is broadest of all. Using upper and lower projections of supply and demand, several authors have cogent things to say about the long-run political, economic and social effects of the great energy shift.

CRUDE OIL PRICES AS DETERMINED BY OPEC AND MARKET FUNDAMENTALS. By Paul W. MacAvoy. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982, 199 pp.

Professor MacAvoy of Yale, aided by simulations, argues that market conditions do more than OPEC to explain past oil price changes and will probably do so in the future. He provides the whole model for those who wish to change the terms.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR EXPORTS: A SECOND-BEST ALTERNATIVE. By Penelope Hartland-Thunberg and Morris H. Crawford. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1982, 105 pp.

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The subtitle tells the story. If there cannot be international agreement restraining subsidies, the United States should provide "countersubsidies" to offset the effect of what foreign governments do. Concentrating on export financing and research and development, the authors have a few original suggestions but stay out of the morass of detail and measurement their formula might call for.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH POLICY. By Vernon W. Ruttan. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982, 369 pp. $32.50.

This is a most timely book, highly relevant to current concerns about the relation of scientific and technological research to productivity and growth. It provides a very comprehensive analysis of the experience in agriculture, national and international, public and private. Focus, organization, management, funding, assessment, adaptation to change and a number of other basic issues are looked at trenchantly and thoughtfully. Professor Ruttan, who has been in government, foundations, experimental stations and universities, likes to deal with questions of principle in concrete terms. How far his shrewd observations and persuasive arguments provide guidance for research in manufacturing, mining, construction and services, it will be up to others to find out.

AGAINST THE GRAIN: THE DILEMMA OF PROJECT FOOD AID. By Tony Jackson (with Deborah Eade). Oxford (U.K.): OXFAM, 1982, 132 pp. £4.50.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOOD AID. By John Cathie. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 190 pp. $25.00.

Though they sound impeccably benign, food aid projects have come under increasing attack in their twenty-odd years of existence. Jackson's polemic (as he calls it) focuses primarily on field experience with the use of food in development projects and tells a sad story of waste, inefficiency, corruption, hypocrisy and failure. Cathie's broader study blames most of the trouble on producing nations and their surpluses. Whether the failures in food aid are as intrinsic as these authors think they are can be argued, but they make quite a case.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

POST-CONSERVATIVE AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN A TIME OF CRISIS. By Kevin P. Phillips. New York: Random House, 1982, 261 pp. $14.50.

Political pessimism is in fashion. Mr. Phillips, who gained fame in the 1960s for discerning and applauding the growing power of the Sun Belt, conservatism, and the Republican Party, here surveys the Reaganite present and future with dismay. He sees the Reagan coalition as nostalgic, volatile and incapable of dealing constructively with "an ebbing global economic competitiveness, a declining civitas, a Balkanizing society, a century-old party system and archaic national decision-making mechanisms." Although not predicting a totalitarian outcome (the Weimar analogy), he wouldn't be surprised should such occur.

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THE IMPERIOUS ECONOMY. By David P. Calleo. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982, 265 pp. $17.50.

This uncompromising critique of American economic and foreign policies since 1961 argues that successive administrations have turned to "gunmickry" while avoiding the recognition that their domestic and international goals were beyond the nation's means both materially (insufficient productivity and efficiency) and politically (insufficient planning and discipline). The disease is easier to describe than is the remedy to prescribe.

AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF: THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1956–1980. By Theodore H. White. New York: Harper, 1982, 465 pp. $15.95.

More pessimism. This valedictory to a quarter century of superlative writing about presidential campaigns is pensive and questioning. One of the author's several unhappy themes is that Ronald Reagan's election in 1980 indicated that the majority of the American people "were persuaded that the cost of equality had come to crush the promise of opportunity."

AMERICAN JOURNEY: TRAVELLING WITH TOCQUEVILLE IN SEARCH OF AMERICA. By Richard Reeves. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982, 399 pp. $15.95.

A talented writer retraces Tocqueville's famous travels through America in 1831, comparing the Frenchman's observations with his own today. He finds the problem of race a major and ominous continuity and the liberation of women the greatest change.

THE HOUSE AND FOREIGN POLICY: THE IRONY OF CONGRESSIONAL REFORM. By Charles W. Whalen, Jr. Chapel Hill (N.C.): University of North Carolina Press, 1982, 201 pp. $18.95 (paper, $9.95).

As a member of Congress (1967–79, Ohio), the author took a leading part in the reforms which greatly increased the power of the House and individual members in foreign affairs. Now, after reflection and study, he concludes that the new methods "have often bred legislative excesses and contributed to House actions that have repudiated long-standing global obligations, threatened the continued existence of several international oganizations, and offended many friendly nations in both hemispheres."

PLANNING A TRAGEDY: THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM. By Larry Berman. New York: Norton, 1982, 203 pp. $14.95.

An intensely focused study, based in part on recently opened documents in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, of how decisions were made in July 1965 to increase, almost without limit, the American military commitment to the Vietnam War. The author explores many "components of the decision process" and disagrees with those who place primary emphasis on President Johnson's overpowering personality and intellectual flaws.

JAMES F. BYRNES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. Edited by Kendrick A. Clements. Durham (N.C.): Carolina Academic Press, 1982, 127 pp. $13.95.

Papers and comments from a 1979 conference at the University of South Carolina on the diplomacy of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. The mixed verdict is that Byrnes was neither the unprincipled compromiser of the Truman accusation nor a principal author of the cold war. His skills as a

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domestic politician were inadequate, however, to the international problems of 1945–46.

HAIG: THE GENERAL'S PROGRESS. By Roger Morris. New York: Playboy Press, 1982, 450 pp. $13.95.

This unfriendly biography, completed before the former Secretary of State's resignation, is based on published sources. It portrays a man of limited intellect, moral insensitivity and cold ambition. The larger theme, that Haig's character and career are a paradigm for the failures of American foreign policy, is not convincing.

ALLIES: PEARL HARBOR TO D-DAY. By John S. D. Eisenhower. New York: Doubleday, 1982, 500 pp. $24.95.

A readable account of the military alliance between the United States and Great Britain with emphasis on the fighting in the West and the personalities of the leading generals (not least, of course, the author's father) and politicians. A good introduction for the non-specialist.

OWEN D. YOUNG AND AMERICAN ENTERPRISE: A BIOGRAPHY. By Josephine Young Case and Everett Needham Case. Boston: Godine, 1982, 964 pp. $25.00.

Owen D. Young (1874–1962) rose from poor New York farmboy to preeminence as chairman of General Electric and respected international financial statesman. This stately and untroubled biography by his daughter and son-in-law describes Young's intelligence, energy, integrity and serenity. This is the story of an era which, despite wars and depression, did produce leaders devoted to family, community and nation.

The Western Hemisphere

Robert D. Crassweller

THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON. Edited by Robert Spencer, John Kirton and Kim Richard Nossal. Toronto: University of Toronto, Centre for International Studies, 1981, 158 pp. $10.00.

The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty between Great Britain (on behalf of Canada) and the United States created the International Joint Commission for the regulation of the waterways which flow along or across the Canadian-American border. The papers in this volume are a useful and up-to-date review and analysis of the generally effective and sensible work of the Commission.

G.S.

POLITICS IN CENTRAL AMERICA: GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, COSTA RICA. By Thomas P. Anderson. New York: Praeger/Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 221 pp. $23.95.

A clear and balanced presentation of the dilemmas associated with each of the four nations listed in the subtitle. A skillful cultural framework is provided in the first chapter, which serves as an overview.

COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Robert Wesson. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 178 pp. $10.95 (paper).

Ten essays, one of them a conclusion, trace communist infiltration and activity in the principal Caribbean Basin area nations. One significant con-

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clusion: "It is not clear . . . how far democratic institutions are consonant with the economic growth that is generally accepted as not only desirable per se but the basic answer to radicalism. . . . The most successful Third World economies . . . are uniformly authoritarian, with strong governments moderated by fairly consistent adherence to legality and a constitutional order." Brazil and Mexico are cited as examples.

CENTRAL AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CRISIS. Edited by Richard E. Feinberg. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982, 280 pp. $29.50 (paper, $12.50).

The emphasis here is on the effects of foreign pressures and other factors on the chaotic local scene. One section is devoted to U.S. interests and practices; another considers non-U.S. extraneous influences. A final chapter covers the Central American response.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. Edited by Ricardo French-Davis and Ernesto Tironi. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 254 pp. $27.50.

Not forbiddingly abstruse but not for the novice either, the essays presented here cover a wide spectrum of political economy. Included are such topics as finance, price structures, markets, trade and commodities. Statistical tables are provided.

NICARAGUA IN REVOLUTION. Edited by Thomas W. Walker. New York: Praeger, 1982, 410 pp. $32.95 (paper, $14.95).

The accomplishments of the current Sandinist government during its first 18 months in office are reviewed here, sympathetically, in 21 essays. The range is wide, encompassing such disparate fields as ideology, sports, housing policy, and the media.

PANAMANIAN POLITICS. By Steve C. Ropp. New York: Praeger/Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 151 pp. $22.95.

An overall review, necessarily compressed, of the political scene from the beginning to date. After noting similarities between the Panamanian political culture and that of Latin America in general, the author refers to Panama's uniqueness resulting from the historically high level of foreign participation: "The very nature and composition of the urban elite and the urban working class were fundamentally affected by foreign efforts to develop and expand the global maritime transportation network."

SMALL GARDEN . . . BITTER WEED: STRUGGLE AND CHANGE IN JAMAICA. By George Beckford and Michael Witter. London: Zed, 1982, 167 pp. (Westport, Conn: Lawrence Hill, distributor, $31.00; paper, $9.50).

A small polemic, indignant in tone and indigenously Jamaican in style, attacking local problems and underdevelopment in general, while looking to an ultimate transformation to socialism. The IMF is a particular *bête noire.*

MEXICO TODAY. Edited by Tommie Sue Montgomery. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues (with the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York), 1982, 140 pp. $12.50 (paper, $6.95).

Fourteen brief essays sketch a general overview of the Mexican people, their nation and culture, and their present problems. The introduction by Octavio Paz, comparing the Spanish and English heritages, values, minds and souls, is a gem of its kind.

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BASES PARA UNA ARGENTINA MODERNA, 1976–80. By José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz. Buenos Aires: Compania Impresora Argentina, S.A., 1981, 244 pp.

The famous Argentine Minister of Economy reviews the period of his stewardship, from 1976 to 1980, explaining his objectives, the principal reforms accomplished, the reasons for the means adopted, and the difficulties encountered. Included are economic and financial aspects, monetary policy, sectoral developments, and general policies.

THE ROAD TO OPEC: UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA, 1919–1976. By Stephen G. Rabe. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982, 262 pp. $25.00.

The author reviews 60 years of U.S.-Venezuela relations in the context of the former's overall Latin American policies. Included are assessments of the impact of the United States upon Venezuela's development and upon its attainment of stable government and very high per capita income.

POST-REVOLUTIONARY PERU: THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION. Edited by Stephen M. Gorman. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 252 pp. $25.00 (paper, $12.00).

These nine essays, without benefit of an integrating or summarizing overview, cover such broad topics as history, political party analysis, labor, military developments, and political economy, among others. There is recognition that from the viewpoint of its original objectives, the 1968 revolution was a failure, but the authors believe nevertheless that significant social, political and economic changes resulted.

SOCIALISM, LIBERALISM, AND DICTATORSHIP IN PARAGUAY. By Paul H. Lewis. New York: Praeger/Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 154 pp. $18.95.

Short but rewarding, this study attempts to picture Stroessner and his regime within the context of Paraguayan political culture, which the author regards as "the clash of inherited resentments accumulated over generations." Instead of flashy stereotypes, the complexities stand revealed. By way of prediction, a trend toward socialism is possible, but it is equally likely that Paraguayans, having had no experience with democracy, will maintain the familiar authoritarian tradition.

THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN CHILE: CHALLENGES TO MODERN CATHOLICISM. By Brian H. Smith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 416 pp. $30.00 (paper, $9.95).

In a broad and scholarly analysis of church-state relations during the last 60 years, based in part on interviews and survey data, the focus is upon the Church's response to such widely differing political systems as traditional conservative, Christian-Democratic, Marxist, and military-repressive. Very thorough.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

MUSSOLINI. By Anthony James Joes. New York: Franklin Watts, 1982, 405 pp. $18.95.

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MUSSOLINI. By Denis Mack Smith. New York: Knopf, 1982, 429 pp. $20.00.

The two books, by odd coincidence appearing simultaneously, demonstrate the range of views on Mussolini and the multiplicity of historical genres. Joes strives for a portrait and achieves an intelligent, partisan essay, with remarkable detachment from the bulk of scholarship. He sees "Italian socialism as the prime cause of the success of the Fascists," he plays down the violent character of Mussolini's nature and rule, sees the end of fascism as premature, and believes that Mussolini's fascism has left a live legacy for Third World countries today. Mack Smith, probably the foremost British historian of Italy, has written a masterly life of Mussolini, once the idol of most Italians and, in defeat, the great villain. In this scholarly and elegant work, Mack Smith discusses the young socialist, the early fascist, and the brutal, indecisive, and megalomaniacal dictator in wartime. Joes contributes a polemical edge, Mack Smith a dispassionate, enduring work.

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1945–1947. By Walter Lipgens. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1982, 723 pp. $98.00.

A translation and expansion of a German work published five years ago. Beginning with a sweeping analysis of the decline of Europe in the pre-1945 period, based on a fine command of the literature, Lipgens, a German historian, describes "the incubation period" of the movement toward European unity from the Resistance hopes of 1943 to the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The book focuses on nongovernmental groups in seven West European countries and their promotional efforts for Europe, at a time when governments temporized and the two superpowers in 1945–46 opposed European integration in any form. Lipgens is an enthusiast for Europe and for minutiae; the phenomenal price includes excessive detail and a few minor slips. Invaluable for the specialist, its analysis of the political scene of those three years gives the book a still wider importance.

THE WASTING OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY. By Sydney Pollard. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 197 pp. $27.50.

A brilliant tract tracing the terrible decline of Britain's economy since 1945. This well-known British economic historian attributes the decline to the continued mismanagement of government policy, to systematic underinvestment, and, in passing, he notes that "in a few short years, British trade unions have destroyed the moral basis of trade unionism built up over generations." And still he hopes that argument will persuade policymakers and that the essential strength of Britain's economic and human resources will enable the country to stage a recovery.

BRITAIN AGAINST ITSELF: THE POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS OF COLLECTIVISM. By Samuel H. Beer. New York: Norton, 1982, 231 pp. $18.95.

A somber analysis of the structural and spiritual changes that account for the destabilization of British politics in the last two decades. "Pluralistic stagnation, hubristic Keynesianism" are some of the more or less felicitous terms used to describe the growing number of groups successfully demanding greater public spending for private interests. Beer, a veteran American political scientist, argues persuasively that the deepest change came in Britain's previously stable political culture, seen negatively as "the decline of the civic

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culture; positively, the rise of the new populism." An excellent command of recent studies and a sound, eclectic approach make this a serious but not a scintillating work.

WEST GERMANY: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. By Michael Balfour. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 307 pp. $25.00.

A highly competent, well-written history of the Federal Republic, with a third of the book devoted to a summary of its antecedents. Balfour focuses on politics, for which he has a nice sense.

THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN. By José Maravall. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 213 pp. $30.00.

Before it happened, most political scientists denied that a fascist or Francoist dictatorship could evolve into a democratic regime. Spain managed, and now a Spanish political sociologist examines causes and context. His analysis is highly technical, full of charts and quantitative minutiae, but the process of how the elites sought reforms from above, the lower classes change from below, is painstakingly depicted, within the context of a political culture that is carefully analyzed. The author emphasizes that Francoist elements remain strong and pose a threat to the new regime. This is a monograph for the specialist in political sociology and Spanish politics.

THE CYPRUS TRIANGLE. By Rauf Denktash. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1982, 222 pp. $17.95.

One of the highest officials of the Turkish minority on Cyprus gives a passionately partisan view of the struggle between the two communities in the shadow of Greek aspirations for *Enosis* (union with Greece).

THE TRANS-ATLANTIC CRISIS: A CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE FREE WORLD. Midge Decter, Executive Director. New York: Orwell Press, 1982, 141 pp. $3.95 (paper).

A well-publicized meeting in January 1982 of a committee to save the West—both from internal decay and from the Soviet threat. Notable Europeans and Americans discussed *the* topic of the day, fortunately with some depth and with some important papers, including one by Henry Kissinger. Tone and substance of some of the American participants can be gauged from Norman Podhoretz's simplicity: "So long as our European counterparts remain silent or only stammer defensively while the neutralists and the appeasers and the Red Vichyites dominate the European air, we in the United States who wish to resist the rising tide of American neutralism and isolationism will be unable to do so indefinitely."

THE SECOND ENLARGEMENT OF THE EEC: THE INTEGRATION OF UNEQUAL PARTNERS. Edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 275 pp. $29.95.

A collection of uneven essays on various aspects of the Community's response to the actual or potential admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal. The essays range from political and economic concerns to the poetic-philosophical in one instance. As François Duchêne in his habitually incisive style makes clear, the manner in which this enlargement is tackled will say more about the Community in this period of "apparently indefinite recession" than it will about the three new members. Dudley Seers speculates on a much-expanded European Community of the future, one that would include Eastern Europe and encompass a radically new relationship between the two German-

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ies. But he also sees that "The last quarter of this century is making mercantilists of us all—really the only question is what to protect: the nation or the continent."

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

SOVIET RISK-TAKING AND CRISIS BEHAVIOR. By Hannes Adomeit. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1982, 377 pp. $47.50.

A German scholar's intensive investigation of Soviet moves in the two crises over Berlin, illustrating the "operational code" for risk-taking and crisis management in which ideology, state interest, military power, and domestic factors all have a part. One cannot reach hard and fast conclusions or predictions in this field, but the combination of industry in research and originality of approach in this study helps to enlarge our understanding of Soviet international behavior.

IDEOLOGY OF A SUPERPOWER: CONTEMPORARY SOVIET DOCTRINE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By R. Judson Mitchell. Stanford: Hoover, 1982, 159 pp. $10.95 (paper).

By carefully collecting and dissecting Soviet statements and writings the author traces the changes in Soviet ideology corresponding to the U.S.S.R.'s rise to the status of a global superpower and leading to what he describes as the "second Brezhnev doctrine." He may overargue the case of the role of ideology as a determinant of policy, but the exercise is a useful one, especially in clarifying what the Soviets mean by correlation of forces, détente, coexistence, proletarian internationalism, and other familiar but often misunderstood terms.

THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Erik P. Hoffmann and Robbin F. Laird. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1982, 224 pp. $19.50.

The Soviet economic system has changed considerably since Stalin's time under the impact of the scientific-technological revolution, but the changes have not been unilinear or without debate within the leadership and the bureacuracy. Using Soviet sources, the authors describe—oversimplifying, perhaps, but not thereby vitiating the validity of their points—the continuing controversy between the "modernizers," who favor increased involvement in the world economy, and the "conservatives," who stress military power and autarky within the Soviet bloc.

NOTES OF A REVOLUTIONARY. By Andrei Amalrik. New York: Knopf, 1982, 343 pp. $16.95.

An engaging personal memoir covering the dissident historian's life and persecution in Russia during the 1960s and 1970s. He describes his unending struggle against the system: encounters with the KGB, prison and labor camp experiences, contacts with Western correspondents, episodes of daily life. Written in the West after he was exiled in 1976, the book is published now following his untimely death.

CURRENT TRENDS IN THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN FOOD ECONOMY. Edited by Karl-Eugen Wädekin. Berlin: Duncker & Humblŏt, 1982, 368 pp.

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An overview and critique, by an international battery of experts, of the state of agriculture in the communist states (including Yugoslavia) in mid-1981, taking account of the past and looking tentatively ahead. It is a generally sorry picture except in Hungary. This is a most useful reference book, with contributions in English or German, sometimes both.

EAST CENTRAL EUROPE: YESTERDAY–TODAY–TOMORROW. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 417 pp.

Such surveys of Eastern Europe have appeared periodically, and it is good to have the latest one on the shelf. This volume is the product of a symposium held in January 1980, with some updating to take account of the Polish events later in that year. The chapters on individual countries, written mainly by younger scholars, are competently done. So are most of the others, by distinguished and well-known authorities, but as they have been writing about the region for as long as the Soviets have been there, do not look for novelty.

DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN YUGLOSLAVIA: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE PARTY. By April Carter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 288 pp. $25.00.

The Yugoslav liberal reform movement of the 1960s presents an intriguing case study in the evolution of a communist party in an East European socialist society. It is possible to follow it in considerable detail in Yugoslavia's semi-free press, and this April Carter has done with striking success, tracing the Party's changing role in different contexts and the splits among the various personalities and factions (Tito himself seemed rather distant from the battle except at points he saw as crucial). The conclusions are mixed and ambivalent, as they were bound to be given the ambivalence inherent in the idea of pluralism in a single-party system.

POLICY AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND: REFORM, FAILURE, CRISIS. Edited by Jean Woodall. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 200 pp. $25.00.

POLEN-DAS ENDE DER ERNEUERUNG?: GESELLSCHART, WIRTSCHAFT UND KULTUR IM WANDEL. Edited by Alexander Uschakow. Munich: Beck, 1982, 276 pp. DM 19.80.

COUNT-DOWN: THE POLISH UPHEAVALS OF 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980. . . . By Jakub Karpiński. New York: Karz-Cohl, 1982, 214 pp. $29.95 (paper $9.95).

THE POLISH ORDEAL: THE VIEW FROM WITHIN. By Andrzej Szczypiorski. London: Croom Helm, 1982, 154 pp. $17.50.

THE REAL POLAND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF NATIONAL SELF-PERCEPTION. Edited by Alfred Bloch. New York: Continuum, 1982, 201 pp. $14.95.

THE POLES. By Stewart Steven. New York: Macmillan, 1982, 417 pp. $15.95.

The output of books on Poland going behind the headlines approaches flood proportions. Most of them, whether written by Poles or by foreign observers, assume a near total ignorance in the West about Poland and cover much of the same ground in giving the highlights of history since World War II as background for the extraordinary events of 1980–81. Completed before December 1981, these works reflect the hopes for "renewal" and greater freedom dashed, or postponed, by the imposition of martial law. The Woodall

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volume, well edited and well documented, is written for scholars by scholars now associated with British universities; it is especially good on the failures of the Gierek period and on the crisis within the Party. The Uschakow volume, a comparable book for German readers, includes a chapter by Stefan Kisielewski, a prominent Catholic intellectual and political figure still active in Poland. Karpiński (now teaching in America) and Szczypiorski (interned in Poland after December 1981) personally experienced the upheavals of recent years and describe them well, but both accounts end before the strikes of August 1980. Bloch, using a different method to convey the essence of Polish history and national character, opens with an extended essay of his own, then follows with excerpts from the works of Poland's great writers of the past. Steven, a British journalist, provides a rather light and anecdotal but nevertheless informed and perceptive first-hand picture of Polish politics and everyday life in the strained but heady atmosphere of 1981.

ROMANIA: A DEVELOPING SOCIALIST STATE. By Lawrence S. Graham. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 136 pp. $17.00.

A compact country "profile" which provides background for the general reader and adds informed comment on a number of specific subjects such as nationalism, bureaucracy and local government, but is thin on the economy and foreign policy, two areas loaded with future trouble for the leadership and the country.

The Middle East and North Africa

John C. Campbell

THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Seth P. Tillman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, 333 pp. $22.50.

For an understanding of America's role in the Middle East in the past decade this is the best book available: informed, carefully documented, objective. It does not dodge the tough questions. Tillman served on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the book is excellent in covering the legislative side of U.S. policy, less intensive on the executive side. The focus is always on the Arab-Israeli problem; accordingly, areas such as the Northern Tier and the Gulf, which are important for U.S. policy but peripheral to the Arab-Israeli problem, get peripheral treatment.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By Mahmoud Riad. Salem (N.H.): Quartet Books, 1982, 392 pp. $25.00.

Mahmoud Riad, Egypt's Foreign Minister from 1964 through 1971 and later Secretary General of the Arab League, gives his side of the diplomatic exchanges on the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially those with the Americans and the Russians. The details of negotiations and verbatim reports of conversations, without citations but obviously with documents or diaries at hand, make this an important book. Distrust of U.S. policy suffuses Riad's thinking then and now, his particular *bête noire* being Henry Kissinger.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. Edited by Steven Spiegel. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin (for the Center for International Strategic Affairs, UCLA), 1982, 252 pp. $28.50.

American, European and Japanese vital interests in the Middle East are roughly the same (security and oil), but the policies have been divergent and

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often in conflict. At a conference held in 1980, scholars from all three regions and from the Middle East itself discussed what could be done about it. The main impression one gets is confusion, repetition, complexity, a maze with no exit; but that is a reflection on the nature of the problems, not on the authors or editor. Most of the pieces are in fact well presented. They do not lead one to expect a common, effective Western policy.

VIOLENCE AND PEACE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Edited by Mari'on Mushkat. New York: K.G. Saur, 1982, 192 pp. (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, distributor, $21.00).

Under the auspices of the Israeli Institute for the Study of International Affairs a diverse group of Israelis, Europeans and Africans, plus two Arabs, came together in Munich to talk about peace. The papers they discussed make a strange mixture of reflections on peace terms, negotiation, international law, Arab-African relations, and other subjects. All the contributors are moderate and reasonable, but is anybody listening?

PALESTINIAN RIGHTS: AFFIRMATION AND DENIAL. Edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. Wilmette (Ill.): Medina University Press International, 1982, 225 pp. $17.95 (paper, $7.95).

THE PALESTINIANS IN PERSPECTIVE. Edited by George E. Gruen. New York: Institute of Human Relations, American Jewish Committee, 1982, 109 pp. $3.50 (paper).

The perspective in each case is very different. The U.S. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People convened four international seminars, from which the book edited by Abu-Lughod publishes a selection of papers. It is an exercise in special pleading and directs a barrage of criticism against Israel and the United States. The Gruen volume is published by the American Jewish Committee and written by Israelis and Americans. One of its main purposes is to show that the Palestinian problem is not the only, or even the central, problem for U.S. policy in the Middle East; yet Rita Hauser, in the concluding piece, says that the United States has no choice but to persist in the effort to resolve it.

THE ARAB BALANCE OF POWER. By Alan R. Taylor. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1982, 165 pp. $22.00 (paper, $11.95).

A history of inter-Arab relations which, in a sense, carries on from Malcolm Kerr's *The Arab Cold War* (3rd edition published in 1971). While it gives the highlights and maintains relative objectivity, its brevity scarcely does justice to so complex a subject.

RICH AND POOR STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: EGYPT AND THE NEW ARAB ORDER. Edited by Malcolm H. Kerr and El Sayed Yassin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1982, 482 pp. $35.00 (paper, $13.95).

What distinguishes this volume, a collaborative venture of the University of California, Los Angeles, and *Al Ahram* of Cairo, is the combination of good planning and organization plus authors well versed in their subjects. The bulk of the book is on the new economic and social order (oil wealth, investment, migration of labor, inter-Arab aid, new policies in Egypt), but there are also good chapters on political relations and regional diplomacy. At present there is not much order of any kind in the Arab world: hence, much of the book's focus is on what ought to be but is not yet.

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SAUDI ARABIA: RUSH TO DEVELOPMENT. By Ragaei El Mallakh. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982, 472 pp. $32.50.
SAUDI ARABIA: A CASE STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT. By Fouad Al-Farsy. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982, 224 pp. $17.50 (paper).

Professor El Mallakh's book, an analysis of Saudi Arabia's economy during the first two five-year plans (1970–80) and of prospects for the third (1980–85), using all the available statistics, is the best and most comprehensive yet published. Although he does not dwell much on political conditions and may take too rosy a view of Saudi Arabia's prospects, he is not unaware of the pitfalls in the unprecedented economic and social transition that is taking place. By contrast, the volume of Fouad Al-Farsy, a Saudi official, though presented as a case study in development, merely describes the administrative system without delving deeply into either politics or economics.

IRAN: BETWEEN TWO REVOLUTIONS. By Ervand Abrahamian. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 561 pp. $45.00 (paper, $14.50).

The author started out to make a study of the Tudeh party but then expanded it into a many-sided history of Iran from 1905 to 1979. In many ways it is an impressive achievement, drawing on previously untapped Iranian sources and material from the British and American archives. The political and social portrait of the Tudeh is still the heart of the book, although unfortunately the author does not probe the Soviet connection. The coverage of the period since 1953, while sketchy compared to that of the reign of Reza Shah, has useful analyses of the elements whose combined opposition brought about the fall of the dynasty.

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. By Ragaei El Mallakh. New York: St. Martin's, 1981, 215 pp. $32.50.

An American economist well acquainted with the Gulf region and with energy furnishes useful information, handbook-style, on one of the major but little-known oil-producing states. His study of development policy would have benefitted from some brief evaluation of the political situation and the prospects for continued stability.

OIL AND SECURITY IN THE ARABIAN GULF. Edited by Abdel Majid Farid. New York: St. Martin's, 1981, 162 pp. $19.95.

Papers and statements from a symposium held at Chatham House in 1980 under the auspices of the Arab Research Centre. Many of the participants offer brief and predictable views, but the list includes a few names beyond those of the usual experts. Michel Jobert discourses on the European Community and the Gulf, and a Soviet representative provides a useful if unsurprising statement on oil and Soviet policy.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM IN CHINA. Edited by Mark Selden and Victor Lippit. Armonk (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1982, 336 pp. $25.00 (paper, $12.95).

For years, Western leftist intellectuals and official Maoist media were describing a China—of decentralized socialism, mass participation, worker

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control, etc.—that did not exist except in rhetoric. Andrew Walder's gem of an essay in this otherwise undistinguished collection explains why Mao's model of populistic socialism never offered a truly coherent or feasible alternative to the standard Soviet model. The Maoist experiment failed because Mao condemned as "revisionist" the only possible mechanism for achieving decentralization of the Chinese economy—market socialism; consequently his policies had results exactly contrary to his wishes and to the claims of his apologists. That Walder's important essay should appear in this volume is rather ironic. Several of the contributors to it were among the principal purveyors of the Maoist "myths."

FROM THE CENTER OF THE EARTH. By Richard Bernstein. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, 260 pp. $15.95.
MAO: A BIOGRAPHY. By Ross Terrill. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1982, 481 pp. $6.95 (paper).

Richard Bernstein is the first resident *Time* correspondent in Peking, a Harvard-trained China specialist, fluent in the language. His book is an angry and devastating criticism of the PRC system in all its dimensions, based largely on a series of poignant personal encounters with forlorn and victimized Chinese citizens. As an antidote to the Maoist apologetics fashionable ten years ago, it is a healthy corrective. Still, the book lacks balance, and, while long on vivid anecdotes, it is short on analysis. Terrill's book is a paperback version of his widely and justly acclaimed biography of Mao. It is extremely readable, covers a great deal of ground, and has shrewd insights into one of the great and complex revolutionaries of the twentieth century. Terrill sees Mao's many faults, but he writes more in sorrow than in anger, and he is basically sympathetic to the founder of the PRC.

A U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR ASIA: THE 1980s AND BEYOND. Edited by Ramon H. Myers. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 144 pp. $10.95 (paper).

The editor of this useful collection argues that the U.S. policy of giving top priority to Western Europe, relying upon China to counterbalance the Soviet Union in Asia, rearming Japan and transferring modern weapons and economic aid to such states as Pakistan does not effectively deal with the threats. He calls for a new policy based on four key principles: recognize that Asia's strategic importance is as great as Europe's; develop multiple linkages with the Asia-Pacific countries; elevate India's importance to a level equivalent to China's in America's Asia policy; and maintain a strong American naval and air force presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The transfer of military technology and weaponry to China, it is argued, will not impress the Soviet Union and will only be countered by an increased Soviet military buildup in the Far East.

SENTIMENTAL IMPERIALISTS. By James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley and John Curtis Perry. New York: Harper, 1981, 323 pp. $17.50.

A neatly knit history of relations between East Asia and America, using mostly familiar material. The conclusion is that, in their dealings with China and Japan, Americans have been usually well meaning if not highly sophisticated. The authors note the present "quietude" in current relations but warn against the old American sin of complacency and overoptimism. The Philippines, in particular, are a time bomb.

L.D.

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EMPIRES IN THE BALANCE: JAPANESE AND ALLIED PACIFIC STRATEGIES TO APRIL 1942. By H.P. Willmott. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, 520 pp. $21.95.

A respected British military historian offers one of the most thorough overviews yet of the Pacific War up to the Spring of 1942.

A FAMILY AFFAIR: INDIA UNDER THREE PRIME MINISTERS. By Ved Mehta. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, 166 pp. $14.95.

In some Third World countries, anti-Western fundamentalism has come to power; in others, it lurks beneath the surface. The virtue of this small but highly readable book is not merely its style. It makes the reader aware that beneath the surface of Indian politics there is a fundamental struggle going on between a Western-oriented middle class and a backward-looking, populist, atavistic, obscurantist array of forces, many of which joined hands in the Janata coalition that overthrew Mrs. Gandhi in 1977. Mehta describes vividly an India that, although a parliamentary democracy, is also a feudal society, organized around principles of caste and family, and rife with superstition. He has acerbic sketches both of Mrs. Gandhi and of her Janata rivals.

VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM, 1925–1945. By Húynh Kim Khành. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1982, 400 pp. $25.00.

Based almost entirely on primary sources, this is one of the most thorough accounts yet written of the rise of Vietnamese communism. Khành sees communism in Vietnam as a fusion of nationalism and Leninism, one indigenous and the other imported. The book contains a remarkable amount of research and will be useful to historians, general readers, and to policymakers seeking to understand our Vietnam tragedy.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND ORDER IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. By Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 278 pp. $29.95.
UNDERSTANDING ASEAN. Edited by Alison Broinowski. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 323 pp. $27.50.

Despite the doomsday predictions of the domino theorists following the fall of South Vietnam, the five non-communist countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) have become one of the fastest growing, relatively stable, and dynamic groups of countries in the Third World. They have, moreover, come together in a successful regional organization, ASEAN, which has diminished the likelihood of resort to violent methods to resolve interstate conflicts and has greatly enhanced their overall influence and position in the international community. These two books complement each other and are useful introductions to the subject.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

THE WHITE TRIBE OF AFRICA: SOUTH AFRICA IN PERSPECTIVE. By David Harrison. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, 307 pp. $16.95.
BLOOD RIVER: THE PASSIONATE SAGA OF SOUTH AFRICA'S AFRIKANERS AND OF LIFE IN THEIR EMBATTLED LAND. By Barbara Villet. New York: Everest House, 1982, 213 pp. $16.95.

Afrikaners complain that no one in the outside world can understand them. Two new books aimed at a popular audience, however, depict the Afrikaner

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past and present with great empathy, through portraits of individuals. Television producer Harrison has set down a prose version of the BBC series he produced in 1980—balancing Afrikaner travails in the great trek and the Boer War against the hardships of their black countrymen today; Afrikaner feelings about their country against the responses of blacks in the townships and homelands. Villet, a former *Life* reporter with family roots in South Africa, goes over much of the same territory in a more superficial way. Vivid in the historical sections, her account sheds a deceptively romantic gloss over harsh present-day realities in the Republic.

SOUTH AFRICA: PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Robert Schrire. Cape Town: Juta and Company, 1982, 374 pp. R24.50.

A knowledgeable group of South African social scientists analyzes the goals and consequences of Pretoria's domestic and foreign policies. Sharing a broad historical perspective and a penchant for exhaustive documentation, they define in depth the reality—and limits—of change within contemporary South Africa.

TOM MBOYA. By David Goldsworthy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982, 308 pp. $35.00.

The recent Kenyan upheaval heightens the interest of this densely detailed political biography of Kenya's charismatic leader, assassinated in 1969. As Goldsworthy tells it, the complex skeins of Kenya's tribal and clan-based politics, and of Mboya's own intricate maneuverings, tightened around him throughout his 17-year public life. In the midst of it all the political man emerges here on balance as both overwhelmingly ambitious and genuinely commited to his country. The combination of formidable talent and undeniable arrogance, however, made him a major target for political intrigues of varied stripes.

TANZANIA: A POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Andres Coulson. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 1982, 394 pp. $34.95 (paper, $15.95).

A former official of the Tanzanian Ministry of Agriculture and professor at the University of Dar-es-Salaam captures the essence of Tanzania's ecopolitical dilemma in his exceptionally full and balanced account of the country's development since colonial days. His conclusion, though suggestive, is more problematic (and the Kenyan case may prove him wrong). In his view Tanzania's productivity will continue to stagnate until either of two classes—a "national bourgeoisie" seeking a "more ruthless capital accumulation," or peasants and workers producing, experimenting, and innovating for their own good—frees itself to pursue economic gains.

ZIMBABWE'S INHERITANCE. Edited by Colin Stoneman. New York: St. Martin's, 1982, 234 pp. $25.00.

Thoroughly dissecting Zimbabwe's political economy today in relation to its history under colonialism and Ian Smith, the contributors to this volume share a conviction that the country's development now demands a socialist transformation. While focusing on the problems inherent in such a prospective transition, however, the authors scant the real ethnic dilemmas which could upset the best-laid rational planning.

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COMMUNIST POWERS AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA. Edited by Thomas H. Henriksen. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1982, 152 pp. $9.95 (paper).

The individual contributions to this compendium—on Soviet, East European, Cuban and Chinese involvement in Africa—are generally balanced and informative. While the editor feels that Afrocommunism may be here to stay, the other authors depict fairly mixed results for all the communist powers.

AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM. Edited by Timothy M. Shaw and 'Sola Ojo. Washington: University Press of America, 1982, 308 pp. $23.50 (paper, $12.25).

A Canadian and seven African political scientists explore Africa's dependency on the West through a variety of lenses. Their call for self-reliance is more a *cri de coeur* than a prescription; contrary to several contributors' projections, interdependence appears to be waxing, not waning—even for the socialist or Marxist states.

INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES. Edited by Adebayo Adedeji. New York: Africana, 1981, 413 pp. $29.50 (paper, $12.50).

In this low-key collaborative effort, a group of African scholars, including Claude Ake and Samir Amin, examine the progress of a number of national efforts to move toward economic self-reliance. Case studies on Nigeria, Egypt, Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Senegal and southern Africa emphasize goals and process.

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Janet Rigney

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